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 Due to rapid changes in technology, science, and the marketplace, while 
recognizing knowledge as a key resource for competitive advantage, many firms lack 
the internal knowledge resources to achieve their goals. To address this challenge, 
firms increasingly rely on outsourcing knowledge from external entities such as 
consultancies. Since I personally observed this global trend at Samsung, I could fully 
understand the importance of this challenge. While there is a substantial amount of 
literature examining supplier-buyer interactions for physical components and 
finished goods in Operations Management, studies that provide managerial 
implications on the interactions between a buyer (she) and a supplier (he) for 
knowledge outsourcing are limited. In this dissertation, I study how firms effectively 
manage knowledge outsourcing. In particular, I focus on investigating how factors 
such as absorptive capacity, uncertainty, information asymmetry, and competition 
impact firms’ decisions and the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. 
 Using a game-theoretic formulation, the first essay (Chapter 2) studies how a 
buyer’s ability to understand and apply outsourced knowledge (i.e., absorptive 
capacity) affects the interactions between the buyer and the supplier. It also 
investigates the impact of uncertainty about the amount of knowledge needed and 
asymmetric information regarding a key element of absorptive capacity on firms’ 
decisions and the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. To build further implications 
on knowledge outsourcing, the second essay (Chapter 3) incorporates market 
competition between two buyers who outsource knowledge from a common supplier. 
It examines how competition in the downstream market impacts the buyers’ 
 
 x 
knowledge outsourcing decisions and the supplier’s service strategies. As the current 
literature on knowledge outsourcing remains in the early stages, the third essay 
(Chapter 4) reviews current studies to identify what is known and unknown about 
knowledge outsourcing at present, and provides a future research agenda. Overall, 
my dissertation contributes a significant building-block for Operation Management 
to better address managerial challenges in the knowledge economy.
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Many firms lack the critical knowledge resources necessary to successfully 
meet their innovation goals, which may include higher yield or new component 
designs. Increasingly, such firms pursue knowledge outsourcing to obtain scientific, 
engineering, analytic, and technical services. Motivated by personal experience 
interacting with internal R&D managers and external consultancies in the field, this 
doctoral dissertation, entitled “Essays on Knowledge Outsourcing,” examines issues 
related to knowledge outsourcing. This dissertation consists of three essays studying 
how firms can effectively manage knowledge outsourcing. 
 To define the scope of this dissertation on knowledge outsourcing, the third 
essay (Chapter 4), entitled “Knowledge Outsourcing: A Literature Review and 
Future Research Agenda,” reviews the current literature on knowledge outsourcing, 
which includes the first essay (Chapter 2) and the second essay (Chapter 3), and 
provides a future research agenda. To this end, we clarify the external sources of 
knowledge and environmental forces which jointly impact the firms’ decisions and 
outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. We also propose a conceptual framework, 
consisting of five phases, to manage knowledge outsourcing projects: Phase 1 – 
Initiate, Phase 2 – Plan, Phase 3 – Execute, Phase 4 – Utilize, and Phase 5 – Check. 
Based on this knowledge outsourcing framework, the third essay discusses current 




 In Phase 1 (Initiate), we find that current studies consistently report that 
knowledge outsourcing is more suitable to incremental innovation due to the 
relatively low risk of knowledge leakage. In Phase 2 (Plan), during which a buyer 
selects a supplier and makes a contractual agreement, current studies show that the 
buyer may be better off choosing a highly capable supplier or a known supplier with 
whom they have previously worked. Firms’ critical challenges in this phase include 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and competition, which we partly address in 
essays 1 (Chapter 2) and 2 (Chapter 3). In Phase 3 (Execute), the supplier’s 
knowledge leakage and opportunistic behavior are critical risks that the buyer faces 
and further research is required to better understand how to ensure trustworthy 
behavior from the supplier.  
 In Phase 4 (Utilize), the buyer integrates and utilizes the knowledge 
outsourced from the supplier to generate value. Current studies consistently report 
that higher absorptive capacity leads to higher performance of the buyer’s knowledge 
integration. However, the buyer’s behavioral factors, such as NIH syndrome, may 
reduce the effectiveness of the buyer’s internal knowledge integration process. The 
first essay (chapter 2) studies some of the unanswered questions in this phase, which 
includes the impact of different elements of absorptive capacity. In Phase 5 (Check), 
the buyer evaluates the performance of the knowledge outsourcing project and plans 
ways to reuse the knowledge developed by the supplier in future projects. For most 
performance measures, the current literature has not yet reached a consensus. 
Therefore, further research may investigate under which conditions pursuing 
knowledge outsourcing improves each measure of performance. Overall, it is difficult 
to derive a consensus for many of the issues involved in knowledge outsourcing from 
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only a small group of studies, and a number of important managerial challenges 
remain unaddressed. 
 Paradoxically, while knowledge outsourcing is meant to compensate for a lack 
of existing internal knowledge, the buyer (she) must rely on existing knowledge to 
understand and apply the knowledge purchased from the supplier (he). The buyer’s 
ability to understand and apply the outsourced knowledge is limited by her 
absorptive capacity (one of the critical challenges in Phase 4 – Utilize), which 
increases in relation to her existing knowledge, the quality of communication with 
the supplier, and the buyer's willingness to accept external knowledge. In the first 
essay (Chapter 2), entitled “An Economic Model of Knowledge Outsourcing,” three 
Stackelberg games are introduced providing important managerial insights on the 
knowledge outsourcing problem. The profit-maximizing supplier leads by 
determining his price for knowledge outsourcing, while considering the buyer’s 
response as well as the extent to which he can leverage his own prior knowledge. The 
buyer determines the amount of knowledge to outsource versus develop internally to 
minimize the cost of meeting her performance goal. 
 Through this study, we first show that when a buyer has superior absorptive 
capacity, a supplier can increase his price and still benefit from higher demand for 
outsourcing. Second, if a buyer pursues a highly novel innovation project, we find 
that both the buyer and the supplier may benefit from the corresponding uncertainty 
in the buyer’s goal. Moreover, conditions are given in which the total cost of the 
supply chain decreases as uncertainty increases. Third, when the buyer keeps a key 
element of her absorptive capacity as private information, we identify conditions 
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whereby the supplier focuses on serving a superior type of buyer by charging a high 
price. 
 In the second essay (Chapter 3), entitled “Knowledge Outsourcing for 
Competing Buyers,” we attempt to answer intriguing questions that arise when one 
common knowledge supplier serves two buyers (1 and 2) competing in the 
downstream market. (Competition is a critical challenge that firms face in Phase 2 
– Plan.) Under what conditions do either of the buyers pursue knowledge outsourcing 
from the supplier? In a situation where only one of the two buyers outsources 
knowledge from the supplier, how does that buyer’s knowledge outsourcing influence 
both buyers’ decisions concerning knowledge development and their retail prices in 
the downstream market? Under what conditions does the supplier prefer to serve 
only one buyer, as opposed to both buyers? Specifically, in what ways is the supplier 
better off serving one buyer instead of both buyers? 
 To answer these critical questions, we build on our analysis by considering 
different competition scenarios: monopoly (only buyer 1 exists in the downstream 
market) and duopoly (buyers 1 and 2 compete in the downstream market). In the 
monopoly case, we find that buyer 1 chooses to outsource knowledge only if her in-
house knowledge development cost is sufficiently high, in order to reduce her total 
knowledge acquisition cost. We also find that a buyer’s desire to pursue knowledge 
outsourcing depends on the competition structure (i.e., monopoly or duopoly) in the 
downstream market. When the supplier commits to serving only one buyer (buyer 
1), we find that buyer 1 who competes with buyer 2 in duopoly is more inclined to 
outsource knowledge than in monopoly. This is because buyer 2, who does not have 
the option of knowledge outsourcing in the duopoly case, makes the strategic decision 
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to keep her level of product performance lower than that of buyer 1. This indicates 
that buyer 1’s knowledge outsourcing effectively discourages buyer 2 from pursuing 
in-house knowledge development and gives buyer 1 an advantage as the higher 
quality manufacturer. Lastly, we investigate the situation where the supplier 
attempts to serve both buyers 1 and 2. If the buyers’ in-house knowledge 
development costs are sufficiently low, we find that the supplier is better off charging 
a higher wholesale price of knowledge and serving only one of the buyers. This is 
because the supplier can benefit more from charging a high price to one buyer than 








 Due to rapid changes in technology, science and the marketplace, many firms 
lack the internal knowledge resources to conduct the problem solving required to 
reach their manufacturing or marketing goals, which may include increasing the 
manufacturing yield or quality, developing new components, or performing scientific 
or engineering experiments (Grant 1996). Increasingly, these firms rely on 
outsourcing knowledge from external entities to obtain scientific, engineering, 
analytic and technical services (Quinn 1999; Carson 2010; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; 
Cui et al. 2012; Gaimon et al. 2017b). The U.S. census data indicates that the 
knowledge-intensive service industry more than doubled its contribution to GDP 
from 1998 to 2016 (BEA, 2016). Similarly, the value of knowledge outsourcing 
contracts grew from $12.5B in 2000 to $37B in 2017 (Weber, 2017). According to 
Booz, the “hot” sectors for knowledge outsourcing include product development and 
design, engineering services, R&D, and analytic services (Couto et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, despite its growing importance, while a great deal is known about 
component outsourcing, the challenges and decision-making processes for firms 
engaged in knowledge outsourcing are not well understood. 
 In part, this research is motivated by one of the co-author's experiences as a 
member of an engineering team in a major Korean electronics firm. Upper 
 
 7 
management directed the team to improve the manufacturing yield to reach a specific 
performance goal. Recognizing that it lacked the internal knowledge necessary to 
meet this goal, the team identified the portion of knowledge it would develop 
internally through its own problem solving efforts (prototyping, simulation, 
experiments (see Ozkan-Seely et al. (2015)), as well as the portion of knowledge to 
outsource from a highly respected (external) consultancy. By leveraging prior 
experience from another engagement, the consultancy was able to charge a moderate 
price to the electronics firm for the outsourced knowledge. The two firms 
contractually agreed to the unit price for outsourcing (set by the consultancy), the 
quantity of outsourcing (problems to be solved set by the buyer), and the deliverables 
(reporting mechanism such as a written report, software, or design drawings, and 
due date). Unfortunately, due to its limited knowledge and poor communication with 
the consultancy, the engineering team at the Korean electronics firm required a full 
six-months to understand and apply the outsourced knowledge to increase yield and 
thereby reach upper management's goal. 
 The above example illustrates a particularly interesting phenomenon of 
knowledge outsourcing. While outsourcing knowledge is meant to compensate for a 
lack of internal knowledge resources, the buyer must rely on that internal knowledge 
to understand and apply the outsourced knowledge purchased from the supplier. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) refer to absorptive capacity as the “ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends.” Empirically, it has been shown that a buyer with a larger amount 
of existing knowledge is better able to understand and apply the outsourced 
knowledge received from a supplier, subject to diminishing returns (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). Moreover, if the buyer is highly motivated to accept the outsourced 
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knowledge (as opposed to displaying the “not invented here syndrome”) then she is 
better able to understand and apply it (Osterloh and Frey 2000; Ko et al. 2005). The 
buyer’s ability to benefit from outsourced knowledge also improves if the buyer and 
the supplier have established methods of communication (such as shared 
terminology) as well as trust based on past experience working together (Levin and 
Cross 2004). We refer to the buyer's motivation to accept external knowledge and 
the quality of communication and trust between the buyer and the supplier as the 
buyer's integration factor. Therefore, absorptive capacity is driven by both the 
buyer's existing knowledge and the buyer's integration factor. 
 Many intriguing questions must be answered to understand the complex and 
interrelated decision-making processes of the knowledge buyer (she) and the 
knowledge supplier (he). What drives the buyer’s determination of the portion of 
knowledge to develop internally versus outsource to a supplier? How are the buyer’s 
decisions impacted by her existing internal knowledge and the price charged by the 
supplier for outsourcing knowledge? What are the buyer’s key considerations when 
selecting a supplier for outsourced knowledge? How does the quality of 
communication between the buyer and the supplier (integration factor) affect the 
buyer’s reliance on internal knowledge development versus knowledge outsourcing to 
meet her goal? Similarly, how does the quality of communication between the two 
firms impact the supplier’s price? How is the supplier’s price affected by knowledge 
he accumulated from prior engagements versus the cost he incurs to internally 
develop new knowledge to meet the buyer’s demand for outsourcing? How does 
uncertainty in the buyer's goal as she pursues a novel project impact both firms’ 
decision-making? In particular, why might both the buyer and the supplier benefit 
from uncertainty in the buyer’s goal? Naturally, the buyer provides considerable 
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information to the supplier so that he meets her outsourcing deliverables. But, does 
the buyer possess some information that should remain private to drive the supplier 
to charge a lower price? How should the supplier respond to this information 
asymmetry? 
 To analyze these critical questions, we introduce three Stackelberg games of 
knowledge outsourcing. At the outset of each game, upper management directs mid-
level managers to meet a performance goal (such as improving manufacturing yield, 
creating component designs, or completing scientific or engineering experiments). 
The mid-level managers (referred to hereafter as “the buyer”) identify the project 
scope (expressed in hours of effort) needed to meet the goal, which is reduced by the 
extent of relevant knowledge she already possesses. The supplier (leader) sets the 
price (per hour effort) for outsourcing. In response, the buyer (follower) determines 
the amount of knowledge to outsource from the supplier (hours of effort) and the 
amount of knowledge to develop internally (hours of effort) to reach her project 
scope. The deliverables the supplier provides to the buyer include the specific 
problems to be solved or experiments to be performed, the reporting mechanism 
(e.g., written report, prototype, design drawing, software), and the due date. 
 The buyer’s ability to understand and apply the outsourced knowledge (e.g., 
her absorptive capacity) is a function of the buyer’s existing knowledge and her 
integration factor, which reflects the quality of communication between the buyer 
and the supplier as well as the buyer's motivation to accept external knowledge. The 
buyer minimizes the total cost incurred to meet her project scope from outsourcing 
and internal knowledge development. When the profit-maximizing supplier sets the 
price, he considers the buyer’s response as well as the extent to which he can leverage 
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his own prior knowledge versus the cost he incurs to develop new knowledge (hours 
of effort) to meet the buyer’s demand for outsourcing. Note that the above-mentioned 
approach to measurement in terms of hours of effort is consistent with the project 
management literature (Clark 1989; Tavares 2002; Cui et al. 2012). 
 In a deterministic model with full information we show that, if the buyer has 
a larger level of existing knowledge, her minimum cost objective is always lower but 
the supplier’s profit maximizing objective may either improve or worsen. Conversely, 
we show that the objectives of both the buyer and the supplier always improve when 
the supplier has more prior knowledge. This latter result demonstrates the critical 
importance that the buyer selects a knowledgeable supplier. Second, we obtain key 
managerial insights from analysis of a stochastic game with complete information. If 
the buyer pursues a highly novel goal, the efforts required to meet the project scope 
may be uncertain. Importantly, we identify situations where a supplier charges a 
lower versus a higher price in response to more project scope uncertainty. Moreover, 
we find that both the buyer and the supplier may benefit from uncertainty in the 
buyer's project scope. As such, conditions are given whereby the total cost of the 
supply chain decreases as uncertainty increases. Of course, these results contrast the 
detrimental impact of uncertainty in the component outsourcing literature. In a third 
game formulation, we analyze how information asymmetry impacts the supplier’s 
pricing scheme. When information asymmetry exists regarding the buyer’s 
integration factor, we identify conditions whereby the supplier serves only the 
superior type of buyer by charging a high price. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related 
literature in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce the deterministic Stackelberg 
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game of knowledge outsourcing in which both firms have complete information. We 
analyze the game theoretic solutions for the buyer and the supplier when the buyer's 
project scope is uncertain in Section 2.4. The impact of information asymmetry is 
explored in Section 2.5 whereby the supplier does not know with certainty the buyer's 
integration factor at the outset of the game. We conclude with a discussion of the 
key managerial implications for a buyer and a supplier engaged in knowledge 
outsourcing in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Related Literature 
 A great deal is known in the supply chain management literature concerning 
a buyer and a supplier engaged in outsourcing components or finished goods. 
Valuable insights have been developed regarding coordination between partners 
(Cachon and Lariviere 2005), optimal contract types (Van Mieghem 1999), and 
negotiation and bargaining (Feng and Lu 2012). In contrast, despite its importance 
to a firm's performance, the sourcing of intangible resources such as knowledge has 
received little attention in the literature. 
 Recently, research in operations management has considered two situations 
in which a firm might engage an external entity in knowledge intensive projects: a 
firm can collaborate with a partner to jointly create value (Bhaskaran and Krishnan 
2009; Roels et al. 2010), or a firm can outsource a problem partly or entirely to an 
external service provider (Xue and Field 2008; Rahmani and Ramachandran 2017). 
While Roels et al. (2010) show how the choice of contract type depends on the 
verifiability of effort in a knowledge-intensive joint development project, Bhaskaran 
and Krishnan (2009) study collaboration mechanisms for a new product development 
alliance in which two firms jointly contribute effort and share the outcome. Closer 
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to our paper, Rahmani and Ramachandran (2017) consider a firm that entirely 
delegates the solution generation task to an external agent, while Xue and Field 
(2008) study how the workload (tasks) should be allocated between the client and 
the consultant to complete the client's knowledge development project under 
different contractual relationships. We contribute to this stream by examining how 
a profit maximizing supplier sets his price for outsourced knowledge and how a cost 
minimizing buyer meets her performance goal by allocating resources to outsourced 
knowledge versus internal knowledge development. 
 Because knowledge is an intellectual resource as opposed to a physical output, 
the recipient of knowledge outsourcing (buyer) faces the challenge of understanding 
and applying the knowledge purchased from an external source (supplier) (Grant 
1996; Sanchez and Heene 1997; Anderson and Parker, 2013). Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) describe absorptive capacity “as the ability of the buyer to understand and 
apply the knowledge obtained from an external supplier.” A considerable empirical 
literature identifies drivers of absorptive capacity. It has been shown that absorptive 
capacity is larger for a buyer with more existing knowledge (subject to diminishing 
returns) (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Graves 1989). Essentially, the buyer leverages 
her existing knowledge to understand and apply the knowledge purchased from a 
supplier (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Weigelt 2009; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; 
Berchicci 2013). Additionally, it has been shown that absorptive capacity suffers due 
to problems associated with communication and a lack of trust between the buyer 
and the supplier. For example, the supplier’s deliverable may be poorly documented 
or employ different terminology than that used by the buyer. Furthermore, the buyer 
may lack motivation to learn new concepts (e.g., “not invented here syndrome”) 
(Katz and Allen 1982; Dyer and Singh 1998; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Hult et al., 
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2004; Ko et al. 2005; Martinez-Noya et al. 2013). We refer to these dimensions of 
absorptive capacity as the recipient’s integration factor. 
 Beyond the above-mentioned empirical literature, the notion of absorptive 
capacity has also been captured in recent normative research. Ozkan-Seely et al. 
(2015) examine the impact of absorptive capacity when knowledge is transferred 
between a product design team and a process design team during the design of a 
single new product development project. Xiao (2012) examines the evolution of 
knowledge development, forward knowledge transfer and backward knowledge 
transfer during a three-stage new product development project. These authors 
demonstrate the importance of absorptive capacity on a new product development 
manager's pursuit of knowledge development and knowledge transfer. Cui et al. 
(2012) show that it is important for the buyer to properly identify her project scope 
and subsequently to define the contractual deliverables to the supplier when pursuing 
knowledge outsourcing. In our Stackelberg game models, we leverage insights from 
the empirical literature to extend the above-mentioned single firm normative 
research by analyzing the role of absorptive capacity on the decisions of a buyer and 
a supplier who engage in a knowledge outsourcing. 
 The supplier’s prior knowledge is also important in our knowledge outsourcing 
game since he may reuse his stock of knowledge repeatedly without incurring 
additional development costs (Alavi and Leidner 2001; Haefliger et al. 2008; Eccles 
et al. 2013). According to Majchrzak et al. (2004), there are two modes of reusing 
existing knowledge. “Replication” occurs when a firm transfers existing knowledge 
between related research programs, whereas “leveraging existing knowledge for 
innovation” emphasizes integration and recombination of prior knowledge. Haefliger 
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et al. (2008) find that leveraging existing knowledge in the form of computer code is 
common in software development projects. Wu (2015) examines the implications of 
organizational structure and product position on the benefits and the costs of 
replication when a manager transfers her superior knowledge to different teams 
engaged in new product development projects. We examine the impact on knowledge 
outsourcing decisions for a supplier and a buyer when the supplier reuses his stock 
of knowledge to meet the buyer's outsourcing demand. Our results provide insights 
on how a buyer should select a supplier of knowledge outsourcing. 
 Much of our terminology is anchored in the project management literature. 
A variety of performance goals have been addressed in the project management 
literature including reducing processing times, improving quality, increasing 
capacity, or enhancing product features such as ease of use (Clark 1989; Mukherjee 
et al. 1998; Krishnan and Ulrich 2001; Browning and Ramasesh 2007). In three 
knowledge outsourcing games, a buyer (mid-level managers) is directed to achieve a 
specific performance goal set by upper management. Consistent with the project 
management literature, the buyer “translates” the performance goal into the project 
scope, expressed in hours of effort (Clark 1989; Clark and Fujmoto 1991). According 
to the Project Management Institute (PMI, 2014), “project scope” represents the 
“work that must be done to deliver a product (or service) with the specified features 
and functions.” Of course, the buyer’s existing knowledge reduces the extent to which 
new activities must be performed to meet the project scope. Said differently, a large 
project scope suggests that the buyer's goal is substantial or the buyer's existing 
knowledge is small. As expected, we show a buyer always lowers her total cost if she 
is able to leverage more existing knowledge. Interestingly, we provide conditions 
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whereby a supplier is worse versus better off when engaging with a buyer that has 
more existing knowledge.  
  In our second knowledge outsourcing game, we consider a buyer who engages 
in highly novel activities to meet her goal so that her project scope is uncertain 
(Dodin 1985; Keisler and Bordley 2014). We identify conditions in which uncertainty 
in the buyer's project scope is beneficial to the buyer or the supplier. Importantly, 
the analytical results we obtain on the impact of uncertainty for our knowledge 
outsourcing problem contrast those in the component outsourcing literature. Lastly, 
in a third knowledge outsourcing game, we examine the impact on the decisions of 
both the buyer and the supplier when the supplier does not have full information 
regarding the buyer’s integration factor. Analytic results are obtained providing 
insights on when a buyer of knowledge outsourcing is better off not to provide full 
information to a supplier. 
2.3 Deterministic Model 
 In this section, we introduce a Stackelberg game of knowledge outsourcing 
between a buyer and a supplier with complete and perfect information (each firm 
knows her or his own decisions and payoff as well as those of the other firm) and 
where the buyer's project scope is known (deterministic). The sequence of decision-
making is as follows. The profit-maximizing supplier (leader, he) determines a price 
per unit knowledge outsourcing to charge the buyer (follower, she). After observing 
the price, the cost-minimizing buyer determines the quantity of knowledge to develop 
internally versus outsource from the supplier to meet her project scope. The problems 
for both the buyer and the supplier are given in Section 2.3.1. The solutions for the 
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knowledge outsourcing game are analyzed in Section 2.3.2. The terminology and 
notation are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Terminology and notation for the deterministic model. 
Goal 
Buyer’s performance goal set by upper management such as an increase in yield, 
an increase in quality, the creation of component designs, or the results of scientific 
experiments. 
J  Buyer’s project scope defined as hours of effort needed to meet her goal, > 0J . 
bK  
Buyer’s existing knowledge relevant to meeting the project scope expressed in 
hours, > 0bK . 
S  Buyer's knowledge outsourcing from a supplier expressed in hours (buyer's 
decision), ≥ 0S . 
δ  
Integration factor connotes the fraction of supplied knowledge integrated into the 
buyer’s project, (0,1δ ∈    . 
φ  
Buyer's absorptive capacity (e.g., buyer's ability to understand and apply 
outsourced knowledge from the supplier), ( )σφ δ  = ∈  0,1bK , where σ denotes the 
rate of diminishing returns in relation to the buyer's existing knowledge. Note that 







bD  Buyer’s internal knowledge development expressed in hours, ≥ 0bD . 
bc  Parameter indicating the buyer's cost for internal knowledge development, > 0bc . 
p  Supplier's price per unit knowledge outsourced to the buyer (supplier's decision), 
> 0p . 
Deliverables 
Element of the contractual agreement between the buyer and the supplier 
specifying the quantity of the knowledge outsourcing (problems to solve or 
experiments to perform), the reporting mechanism (written report, design 
drawings, physical prototypes, software), and the due date. 
sK  
Supplier’s prior knowledge relevant to meeting the buyer's demand for outsourcing 
expressed in hours, > 0sK . 
sD  
Supplier’s internal knowledge development needed to meet the buyer's demand for 
outsourcing expressed in hours, ≤ <0 sD S . 
sc  
Parameter indicating the supplier's cost for internal knowledge development, 







2.3.1 Modeling Features 
The Buyer’s Problem 
 At the outset of the game, a firm's upper management sets a performance 
goal such as an increase in yield or quality, the creation of design drawings, or the 
execution of scientific or engineering experiments. The firm's mid-level managers 
responsible for meeting the goal (e.g., the buyer) identify the project scope, denoted 
by >0J , which represents the hours of effort required to meet the goal. In this 
deterministic game, we assume the buyer knows with certainty how to convert the 
goal to the project scope (we relax this assumption in Section 2.4). The buyer 
identifies the existing knowledge she already has that is relevant to meeting her 
project scope, denoted by >0bK . The existing knowledge is subtracted from the 
project scope to determine the hours of additional effort the buyer needs to reach 
her goal. Naturally, we are interested in the situation where <bK J , such that the 
buyer needs to increase her level of knowledge to meet her project scope. 
 The buyer can meet the demand for new knowledge from internal knowledge 
development ( ≥0bD ) and from outsourcing knowledge from a supplier ( 0S ≥ ), both 
expressed in hours. The supplier specifies the price per unit knowledge outsourced to 
the buyer, denoted by >0p . The buyer and supplier enter into a contractual 
agreement that specifies the unit price and the amount of outsourcing (such as the 
problem to be solved) as well as the project deliverables (the due date and the 




 While internal knowledge development directly contributes to the buyer’s 
project scope, depending on her absorptive capacity (see Section 2.2), the buyer may 
have difficulty to understand and apply the supplier's outsourced knowledge. 
Empirically, it has been shown that if the buyer's existing knowledge is large, then 
she has a greater ability to absorb outsourced knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1994; 
Osterloh and Frey 2000; Hult et al. 2004), subject to diminishing returns denoted by 
( )σ ∈ 0,1  (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Graves 1989). Additionally, the buyer has 
more absorptive capacity if her integration factor (denoted by δ >0 ) is large, which 
captures her motivation to accept outsourced knowledge as well as the quality of 
communication and trust with the supplier. Since the buyer cannot understand and 
apply more knowledge than the supplier delivers, absorptive capacity is less than 
one. Mathematically, we define the buyer’s absorptive capacity as ( )0,1 ,bK
σ
φ δ  = ∈   






 It follows that S  hours of 
outsourcing from the supplier provides the buyer with φS  units of knowledge 
(expressed in hours) to meet her project scope. 
 Equation (1) mathematically summarizes the above discussion on how the 
buyer meets her project scope from her existing knowledge, internal knowledge 
development, and outsourcing knowledge from the supplier. Therefore, the buyer's 
problem is to meet her project scope while minimizing the sum of the costs incurred 
for: internal knowledge development ( 2b bc D ) and knowledge outsourcing from the 
supplier ( pS ), as given in Equation (2). The cost of internal knowledge development 
is convex increasing with respect to bD  reflecting the additional complexity, 
coordination, and overuse of the buyer’s limited knowledge resources as more internal 
 
 19 
knowledge development occurs (Gaimon et al. 2011; Ozkan-Seely et al. 2015). In 
practice, the buyer (and supplier) has capacity limitations to develop knowledge in-
house. This convex increasing in-house knowledge development cost allows us to 
capture capacitated knowledge development without explicit capacity constraint in 
the model (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1991; Bhaskaran et al. 2010). Lastly, in this 
deterministic model, the buyer's internal knowledge development ( bD ) is simply 
inferred from Equation (1), given J , bK , and φS . Therefore, internal knowledge 
development and outsourcing are substitute knowledge resources the buyer relies on 
to reach her project scope. 
φ= + +b bJ K D S  (1) 
≥ = +
2
, 0bS D b b
Min TC c D pS  
(2) 
The Supplier’s Problem 
 The supplier determines the unit price for knowledge outsourcing to charge 
the buyer ( >0p ) to maximize profit. In addition to the revenue obtained from the 
buyer's outsourcing ( pS ), the supplier incurs a cost to internally develop any new 
knowledge needed to meet the buyer's demand for outsourcing. In other words, if 
the supplier's relevant prior knowledge gleaned from past contractual engagements 
(expressed in hours and denoted by >0sK ) is not sufficient to meet the buyer's 
demand for outsourcing, then the supplier invests in internal knowledge development 
(expressed in hours and denoted by ≤ <0 sD S ) (see Equation (3)). In practice, the 
supplier's reuse of prior knowledge to meet the buyer's demand for outsourcing is 
commonplace (Christensen and Baird 1998; Eccles et al. 2013; Eccles et al. 2014). 
Lastly, analogous to the buyer's cost, the cost incurred by the supplier for internal 
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knowledge development is given by 2s sc D . The supplier's profit-maximizing objective 
appears in Equation (4).  
{ }= − ,0s sSx KD Ma  (3) 
Π≥ = −
2
0p s sMax pS c D  (4) 
2.3.2 Analysis of the Optimal Decisions 
 To obtain a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium, we use backward induction 
(Gibbons 1992; Mas-Colell et al. 1995). The solutions for the buyer and the supplier 
are given in Proposition 1. The first row in the table is the solution when the 
supplier's prior knowledge is sufficient to meet the buyer's demand for outsourcing (
=* 0sD ). However, in the remainder of our analysis, we focus on the more interesting 
solution (second row in the table) when the supplier needs to internally develop new 
knowledge to satisfy the buyer's demand for outsourcing so that >* 0sD . The results 
presented in the remainder of Section 2.3 are important because they provide key 
managerial insights on how the buyer’s absorptive capacity and the supplier's prior 
knowledge impact the equilibrium decisions and both firm's objective values. (All 
proofs appear in the Appendix.) 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium decisions in the knowledge outsourcing game are 
as follows. 
 *p  *sD  *S  
*
bD  
(i) =* 0sD  ( )φ −b bc J K  0  φ
−
2
bJ K  −
2
bJ K  
(ii) >* 0sD  








b b b s s s
b s
c J K c c c K
c c














b b s s
b s
c J K c K
c c






b b s s s
b s







Effect of the Supplier's Prior Knowledge 
 A supplier with more prior knowledge (larger sK ) has less need to develop 
new knowledge to meet the buyer's demand for outsourcing. The reduced cost 
incurred for his own knowledge development allows the supplier to charge a lower 
price to entice more knowledge outsourcing from the buyer. In response, the buyer 
increases her reliance on knowledge outsourcing and reduces her own knowledge 
development to meet her project scope. These key results appear in Corollary 1(i). 
Moreover, we find that the buyer’s total cost ( *TC ) always decreases because the 
lower price and reduction in internal knowledge development compensate for the 
increase in knowledge outsourcing. This demonstrates an important insight: a buyer 
always benefits from selecting a supplier with more prior knowledge to meet her 
demand for outsourcing. Lastly, we show that a supplier with more prior knowledge 
always earns higher profit (Π * ) for two reasons. First, despite his lower price, the 
supplier's revenue increases due to the increase in the buyer's outsourcing. Second, 
with more prior knowledge and despite the increase in outsourcing, the supplier's 
cost for his own knowledge development decreases. Clearly, both firms benefit when 
the supplier has more prior knowledge. The results on how the supplier's prior 
knowledge impacts the objective values of both firms appear in Corollary 1(ii). 
Corollary 1. An increase in the supplier’s prior knowledge ( sK ) impacts the 
equilibrium decisions and the objective values of both the buyer and the supplier in 


























































Effect of Absorptive Capacity 
 To understand the impact of the buyer's absorptive capacity, we first consider 
the effect of an increase in the buyer's integration factor (δ ) as summarized in 
Corollary 2. The buyer's integration factor is larger if she introduces processes to 
establish and maintain high quality communication with the supplier (Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Martinez-Noya et al. 2013). Also, the buyer may introduce incentives 
that facilitate the acceptance and application of the outsourced knowledge from the 
supplier (Osterloh and Frey 2000; Ko et al. 2005). Lastly, the buyer can increase 
trust by selecting a supplier she has successfully worked with in the past (Levin and 
Cross 2004). 
 For the sake of analytic tractability, we assume σ = 1
2
 from which we obtain 
the buyer’s absorptive capacity φ δ  =  
1
2
bK  (Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky 2007). 
Corollary 2 summarizes the impact of an increase in δ  on the solutions for the buyer 
and the supplier. In a key result, we find that if the integration factor increases, then 
while her internal knowledge development always decreases, the buyer's knowledge 
outsourcing may increase or decrease. If the buyer needs a sufficiently large increase 
in knowledge to meet her project scope (large project scope, > 1J J , where 1J  is 
defined in Corollary 2(i)), then as her integration factor increases outsourcing is more 
desirable and increases, as well (Corollary 2(i)). Through backward induction, the 
supplier knows that outsourcing is more desirable to the buyer and charges a higher 
price. As a result, the buyer's increase in outsourcing is moderated by the higher 
price. Alternatively, if the buyer's project scope is sufficiently small ( < 1J J ), then 
the higher integration factor allows the buyer to reduce outsourcing (Corollary 2(i)). 
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To compensate for his loss in revenue, the supplier charges a higher price for 
knowledge outsourcing. Therefore, regardless of whether the buyer's need for 
knowledge to meet her project scope is large or small, we show that an increase in 
δ  always drives the supplier to charge a higher price (see Corollary 2(ii)). (We have 
discussed the solutions obtained for the inequality condition on J . Therefore, here 
and in the remainder of the paper, we do not explore the much less interesting case 
where = 1J J  which indicates that the buyer's need for outsourcing is independent 
from her integration factor). 
 The impact of an increase in the integration factor on both firm's objective 
values is given in Corollary 2(iii). Interestingly, we find that the higher integration 
factor always allows the buyer to reduce her total cost despite the supplier's higher 
price and regardless of whether she increases or decreases knowledge outsourcing. 
The reduction in the buyer's total cost is driven by her cost savings from less internal 
knowledge development. Moreover for two reasons, the supplier's profit always 
increases when the buyer's integration factor increases. First, given the higher price, 
if the buyer's knowledge outsourcing increases then the supplier's total revenue 
increases and thereby compensates for the additional cost he incurs for knowledge 
development. Second, if the buyer's knowledge outsourcing decreases then the 
increase in price is sufficiently large such that, along with his savings from less 
internal knowledge development, the supplier's profit increases. In conclusion, we 
show that both firms who participate in the knowledge outsourcing game benefit 
when the buyer's integration factor is larger. 
Corollary 2. An increase in the buyer’s integration factor (δ ) impacts the 
equilibrium decisions and the objective values of both the buyer and the supplier in 

























































 To complete our analysis of the impact of the buyer's absorptive capacity on 
the solutions for both firms, we consider the effect of an increase in the buyer's 
existing knowledge ( bK ) as summarized in Corollary 3. We find that the impact of 
the buyer's existing knowledge on equilibrium outcomes is not straightforward and 
differs from the impact of her integration factor (Corollary 2). The detailed discussion 
of the corollary follows. 
Corollary 3. There exist thresholds 2J , 3J , 4J  such that 2 4 3≤ ≤J J J , and the effects 
of an increase in the buyer’s existing knowledge ( bK ) on the equilibrium decisions 
and the objective values in the knowledge outsourcing game defined in Equations (2) 
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. 
 If the buyer's existing knowledge increases, she benefits from an increase in 
absorptive capacity and a decrease in the need for new knowledge to meet her project 
scope. As such, the buyer always decreases her internal knowledge development so 
that her total cost decreases despite any increase in her cost of knowledge outsourcing 
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(Corollary 3(i)). In contrast, the effects of the buyer's existing knowledge on the 
supplier's price, the buyer's knowledge outsourcing, and the supplier's profit 
(Corollary 3 (ii), (iii), and (iv)) depends on the relative dominance of the two forces 
illustrated in Figure 1. In region 1, since the buyer's project scope is sufficiently large 
( > 3J J  from which we know 2J J>  and 4J J> ), the effect of the increase in absorptive 
capacity significantly dominates the effect of the decrease in the buyer's need for 
new knowledge. Leveraging this information, the supplier charges a higher price while 
still attracting more knowledge outsourcing and thereby increases his profit. At the 
other extreme, in region 4, since the buyer's project scope is sufficiently small ( < 2J J
from which we know 3J J<  and 4J J< ) , the effect of the decrease in the need for 
new knowledge significantly dominates the effect of the increase in absorptive 
capacity. In this situation, the supplier lowers his price to limit the buyer's reduction 
in knowledge outsourcing. Naturally, the supplier's profit is lower due to the decrease 
in both the price and quantity of knowledge outsourcing.  
 If the buyer's need for new knowledge is moderate, the equilibrium solution 
lies in either in region 3 ( 2 4J J J< <  from which we know 3J J< ) or region 2 (
4 3J J J< <  from which we know 2J J> ). In both regions, while the supplier's price 
increases and the buyer's knowledge outsourcing decreases, the supplier's profit may 
either increase or decrease depending on the relative dominance of either the increase 
in absorptive capacity or the decrease in the buyer's need for new knowledge. Lastly, 
by comparing the results of Corollaries 2 and 3, we obtain an important insight: 
while the supplier and the buyer always benefit from a larger integration factor, if 
the buyer’s existing knowledge is moderately small (moderately large) and increases, 




Figure 1. Relationships among the thresholds on the buyer's project scope. 
( )4,40J ∈ , ( )0,4bK ∈ , 0.5δ = , 1bc = , 0.1sK = , 1.5sc =  
 
2.4 Uncertain Project Scope 
 In this section, we extend the insights obtained from the deterministic game 
of knowledge outsourcing and consider a buyer who must undertake highly novel 
activities to meet a performance goal set by upper management. Since this novelty 
prevents the buyer from precisely converting the performance goal into her project 
scope, she faces project scope uncertainty. Let >0J  denote the true project scope 
the buyer needs to meet her performance goal, which is uncertain at the outset of 
the game and only observed after all the decisions are made. The true project scope 
J  is uniformly distributed from −Ĵ t  to +Ĵ t , with >ˆ 0J representing the mean of 
the uniform distribution ( ĴE J  =  ) and t  with ≤ ≤0 ˆt J  captures the extent of 
uncertainty ( 2 /3Var J t  =  ). 
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 The sequence of decisions is the same as the deterministic model. First, the 
supplier determines the price for outsourced knowledge to maximize profit, as defined 
in Section 2.3.1 (see Equations (3) and (4)). Second, however, since the buyer's true 
project scope is unknown at the outset of the game, her response differs from the 
deterministic solution. In the stochastic game, the buyer determines both the levels 
of internal knowledge development ( bD ) and outsourcing (S ) simultaneously from 
which we obtain the planned project scope AJ , where AJ  is given in Equation (6). 
This formulation contrasts the deterministic model, where the buyer determines only 
knowledge outsourcing and internal knowledge development is inferred since the 
project scope is known before the game begins. 
 After all the decisions are made, the true project scope is revealed. If the true 
project scope is smaller than the planned project scope ( >AJ J ), the buyer earns 
value from the knowledge surplus. In contrast, if the true project scope is larger than 
the planned project scope ( <AJ J ), the buyer must meet the knowledge shortage by 
expediting the completion of the shortfall.1 Let ec  denote the marginal cost for 
expedited knowledge when faced with a shortage, and >0v  denote the marginal 
value for surplus knowledge. We assume >ec p  and >ec v  to focus on non-trivial 
situations. The buyer determines bD  and S  jointly to minimize her expected total 
cost for knowledge outsourcing, internal knowledge development, and expediting to 
meet an expected knowledge shortage, minus the value of an expected knowledge 
surplus. The buyer's expected total cost is given by Equation (5) below. The new 
                                                            
1 We assume that the buyer cannot meet the knowledge shortage from the original supplier. Therefore, 
we prevent the knowledge supplier from “gaming” the solution by inducing the buyer to pursue a 
shortage, which the supplier can exploit later. 
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terminology and notation introduced in this section are summarized in Table 7 of 
proof of A.5. 
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  = + + − − −  ∫ ∫  (5) 
subject to A b bJ K D Sφ= + +  (6) 
 In Proposition 2 below, we characterize the buyer's best response to the 
supplier's price p . This provides insights on how the level of uncertainty about 
project scope and the supplier's price jointly determine whether the buyer should 
pursue a planned surplus or planned shortage. Note that tS and tbD  denote optimal 
values of these variables for a given price p . 
Proposition 2. For a given price p : 
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+ > ; otherwise, 
the buyer pursues a planned shortage ( ˆtAJ J≤ ). 
 In contrast to the deterministic model (Section 2.3), the buyer's balance 
between knowledge outsourcing and internal knowledge development is affected by 
the degree of project scope uncertainty (t ) as well as the supplier's price p . From 
Proposition 2, we observe that the amount of internal knowledge development tbD  
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always increases with p , while the amount of outsourced knowledge tS  decreases 
with p . Further, for a given price p , a buyer with greater absorptive capacity φ  
optimally reduces both internal knowledge development and the level of outsourcing 
from the supplier. These results are consistent with expectation. 
2.4.1 Effect of Project Scope Uncertainty 
 Proposition 2 analyzes the buyer's best response for a given price. In contrast, 
Lemma 1 (appendix A6) provides the equilibrium solutions for both the supplier 
(price) and the buyer (knowledge outsourcing and internal knowledge development). 
Despite the complexity of Lemma 1, several insights are obtained regarding how both 
firms' equilibrium decisions are impacted by uncertainty. In particular, the key 
question remaining is how should the buyer respond to an increase in project scope 
uncertainty t ? To understand this, we consider an interesting parallel between the 
buyer's knowledge outsourcing problem and the canonical problem of the 
newsvendor, which has been studied in great depth in the Operations Management 
literature (Arrow et al. 1951; Porteus 1990). In the newsvendor model, the optimal 
quantity stocked by a retailer has two properties: if the underage (overage) cost is 
higher than the overage (underage) cost, the optimal stocking level is larger (smaller) 
than the expected demand; further, the optimal quantity increases (decreases) as 
demand uncertainty increases. Remarkably, the knowledge buyer in our context has 
a similar response to uncertainty. We find that when either the expediting cost ( ec
) or the value of excess knowledge (v ) is sufficiently large, the buyer should pursue 
a planned surplus, meaning the overall quantity of usable knowledge obtained tAJ  is 
larger than the anticipated project scope ( ˆtAJ J> ); otherwise, the buyer pursues a 
planned shortage ( ˆtAJ J≤ ). In addition, we find that as t  increases, the buyer's 
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knowledge outsourcing decreases (increases) if she pursues a planned shortage 
(surplus). 
 Building further on Lemma 1, we examine how uncertainty impacts the 
supplier’s profit and the buyer’s expected total cost. One might reasonably expect 
that an increase in uncertainty will increase the buyer's total expected cost of the 
project; however, this is not always the case. Proposition 3 below identifies an 
interesting and potentially valuable implication of uncertainty. The interpretation 
follows. 
Proposition 3. The level of uncertainty associated with the buyer’s project scope 









* * *0 2 0
0
s s




















e Ac v t J Jpif S
t t
otherwise
 − − − ∂≤ + ≤ ∂
>
. 
 Proposition 3(i) provides conditions whereby the supplier's profit may 
increase or decrease when uncertainty (t ) increases. More interestingly, Proposition 
3(ii) shows that under certain conditions, the buyer's total expected cost of the 
project may even decrease with the amount of uncertainty (t ). These analytical 
results are best explained by the numerical examples illustrated in Figure 2. For two 
different values of ec , the two panels in the figure show the effect of t  on the 
supplier's profit and price, and the buyer's expected total cost; the figures also show 
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the overall expected project cost, which we refer to as the “Total Supply Chain 
Cost”. We discuss each numerical example, below.2 
 
  
(a) = 200ec : Planned surplus (b) = 40ec : Planned shortage 
Figure 2. Effect of project scope uncertainty on price, cost, and profit. ˆ 25J = , 
1bK = , 1sK = , 0.8δ = , 0.8φ = , 2bc = , 2sc = , 2v =  
 
 First, consider Figure 2(a), where the expediting cost ec  is sufficiently high, 
leading the buyer to pursue a planned surplus at the outset of the game. Said 
differently, the buyer's desire not to incur ec  makes her behave as if the project has 
a deterministic scope of Ĵ t+  (upper bound of the estimated true project scope). 
Clearly, as uncertainty (t ) increases, the supplier exploits the large ec , which drives 
the buyer's desire for a large knowledge surplus, by increasing the price for 
outsourcing ( p ). Moreover, we find that the supplier's equilibrium price and profit 
( *Π ) increase monotonically with t  (see Appendix A6). The buyer's total expected 
                                                            
2 A peculiar aspect of the figure is worth noting: The buyer's total expected cost always appears to 
be higher than the total supply chain cost and the supplier's profit. This occurs because, by 
construction in our model, the buyer’s total cost includes her cost of knowledge outsourcing and the 
supplier’s revenue, which has a net effect of zero. 
 
 32 
cost ( *E TC   ) increases with t , as well, reflecting the increase in the supplier’s price 
and an increase in both the buyer’s internal knowledge development and knowledge 
outsourcing. Not surprisingly, the overall cost incurred by the supply chain also 
increases with t . 
 A contrasting picture emerges when the buyer's cost of expediting is small, 
as shown in Figure 2(b). In this situation, the buyer deliberately pursues a planned 
shortage at the outset of the game. Further, if t  is small and increases, the buyer 
reduces the amount of internal knowledge development as well as knowledge 
outsourcing (again, note the parallel to the newsvendor model). Anticipating the 
buyer’s desire for a planned shortage, the supplier lowers his price p  to limit the 
buyer's reduction in knowledge outsourcing. For these reasons, both the buyer's total 
expected cost *E TC    and the supplier's profit 
*Π  decrease. Interestingly, the fact 
that more uncertainty improves the performance of the supply chain when t  is small 
and increases is a result that is unique to the knowledge outsourcing problem (as 
opposed to the component outsourcing problem). 
2.5 Asymmetric Information about Integration Factor 
 In this section, we consider a game-theoretic model in which information 
asymmetry exists such that the buyer’s integration factor remains her private 
information; all other information is common knowledge to both firms. Specifically, 
while the supplier knows the deliverables, he does not know with certainty the extent 
to which the buyer is capable of understanding and utilizing the outsourced 
knowledge. The impact of this lack of information is clear since the supplier sets his 
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price in relation to the buyer's outsourcing response which includes the integration 
factor. 
 We assume the supplier believes the buyer has a high integration factor 
denoted by δH  with a probability of θ  and a low integration factor denoted by δL  
with the probability θ−1 , where φ φ< < <0 1L H . We refer to an H-type (L-type) 
buyer as having a high (low) integration factor. While the buyer still focuses on 
minimizing her total cost, the supplier determines the equilibrium price to maximize 
his expected profit. To focus on the difference between the H-type and L-type 
integration factors, we assume that all other parameters are the same for both types 
of buyers. The additional notation used in this section appears in Table 2. 
Table 2. Additional notation for the information asymmetry model. 
δH  (δL ) Integration factor of the H-type (L-type) buyer, δ δ< <1L H . 
θ  Probability that the buyer is H-type, θ< <0 1 . 
 
 The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we consider the 
situation where the supplier serves both the H-type and the L-type buyers. Second, 
conditions are given whereby the supplier serves only the H-type buyer. It will be 
shown that the supplier never serves only the L-type buyer so that the supplier 
pursues one of two pricing schemes (both buyers served; only H-type buyer served). 
2.5.1 Buyer and Supplier Problems under Asymmetric Information 
 We refer to the equilibrium decisions of the supplier and the buyer in the 
asymmetric information game with the subscript A . Suppose the supplier serves both 
buyer types. His objective and constraints appear in Equations (7), (8), and (9), 
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where Ap  denotes the supplier's price, AiS  denotes the buyer's level of knowledge 
outsourcing, and sAiD  denotes the supplier's level of internal knowledge development 
corresponding to the i-type buyer, with =i H  or L . The cost-minimizing objective 
and constraints for each buyer type are given in Equations (10) and (11), where the 
i-type buyer's integration factor equals δ i  and bAiD  denotes her level of internal 
knowledge development, with =i H  or L . 
 Alternatively, suppose the supplier chooses to serve only the H-type buyer. 
In this situation, he maximizes the expected profit (Equation (7)) with the second 
term in the objective function eliminated, subject to the constraint in Equation (8) 
(i.e., 1θ = ). As such, for this pricing scheme, the supplier’s problem is analogous to 
the base (deterministic) model except that his expected profit is now proportional to 
the probability that the buyer is H-Type. The buyer’s problem is given by Equations 
(10) and (11) with =i H  and 0LS = . 
( ) ( )( )θΠ θ≥   = − + − −  2 20 1Ap A A AH s sAH A AL s sALMax E p S c D p S c D  (7) 
{ }= −. . max ,0sAH AH ss t D S K  (8) 
{ }= −max ,0sAL AL sD S K  (9) 
  
{ }≥ = ∈+2, 0 ,  ,Ai bAiS D Ai b bAi A AiM Lc in TC D p Hi S  (10) 
φ= + +. . b bAi i Ais t J K D S  (11) 
2.5.2 Supplier's Pricing and Selection Decisions 
 Using backward induction to solve the sequential game, we obtain the Perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). First, for the 
situation where the supplier serves both types of buyers, his price ( *Ap ) is depicted 
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in Proposition 4. Intuitively, the supplier maximizes his expected profit by charging 
a sufficiently low price such that both types of buyers participate. As stated in 
Proposition 4, the equilibrium price is the weighted average between the (high) price 
( *Hp ) charged if the buyer were H-type with a probability of one ( Hδ  with 1θ = ) 
and the (low) price ( *Lp ) charged if the buyer were L-type with a probability of one 
( Lδ  with 0θ = ). Before stating Proposition 4, we introduce the following notation. 
Let L L bK
σφ δ= , H H bK
σφ δ= , ( )4 22H L s b Hc cΛ θφ φ= + , ( ) ( )4 21 2L H s b Lc cΛ θ φ φ= − + , and *Hp  
and *Lp  satisfy Proposition 4 with Hδ δ=  and Lδ δ= , respectively. 
Proposition 4. Pricing under information asymmetry: both buyer types served. 
When the supplier serves both types of buyers, the equilibrium price is given by 
* * *H L
A H L
H L H L
p p p
Λ Λ
Λ Λ Λ Λ
   
= +      + +   
. 
 Second, for the situation where only the H-type buyer is served, the supplier’s 
price is sufficiently high such that the L-type buyer’s outsourcing quantity is zero. 
The equilibrium price for this situation appears in Proposition 5. Before stating this 
proposition, we introduce the following notation. Let H H bK
σφ δ= , Hδ δ= , and 
( )4 22H L s b Hc cΛ θφ φ= + . 
Proposition 5. Pricing under information asymmetry: only h-type buyer served. 
When the supplier serves only the H-type buyer, *Hp  is given by Proposition 1. 
 It is interesting to observe the relationship between Corollary 2 and 
Propositions 4 and 5. From Corollary 2 in the deterministic model with complete 
information, we know that the supplier’s price increases as the buyer’s (known) 
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integration factor increases (for 0θ =  or 1θ = ). It follows that < <* * *L A Hp p p  for 
( )θ ∈ 0,1 . While Propositions 4 and 5 provide the equilibrium solutions for the two 
pricing schemes, Proposition 6 identifies when each occurs. Moreover, the results of 
Proposition 6 indicate that the supplier never chooses to serve only the L-type buyer. 
An important insight from Proposition 6 is that if the probability that the buyer is 
H-type is sufficiently large, the supplier charges a sufficiently high price to exclude 
the L-type buyer. Essentially, the increase in the supplier’s expected profit from the 
higher price charged to the H-type buyer dominates the decrease in his expected 
profit from not serving the L-type buyer. 
Proposition 6. Optimal pricing scheme under information asymmetry.  
If the supplier is not informed about the buyer’s integration factor, he optimally 
chooses to serve both types of buyer only if 0 Aθ θ< < ; Otherwise, serving only the 
H-type buyer is optimal, where ( ) ( )2* * * * *Ai A A Ai s sAip p S c DΠ = −  and { },i H L∈ . The 
threshold is given by ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* * * * * *
AL A
A









 To better understand this threshold Aθ  and its connection to other factors, 
consider Figure 3. The figure illustrates how the supplier's pricing scheme is jointly 
determined by the difference between integration factors of the H-type and L-type 
buyers and the probability that the buyer is H-type. In the figure, the vertical axis 
represents the difference given as H Lδ δ∆ = − , whereas the horizontal axis represents 
θ . 
 We observe that if the difference between the high and low integration factors 
is relatively small, then regardless of the probability the buyer is H-type, the supplier 
optimally serves both types of buyers. In this situation, the price reduction needed 
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to entice the L-type buyer to outsource knowledge is sufficiently small so that the 
supplier’s gain from serving only the H-type supplier does not compensate for the 
loss of excluding the L-type buyer. In contrast, if the difference between the high 
and low integration factors is relatively large, then as the probability the buyer is H-
type increases, the supplier optimally chooses to serve only that buyer. Here, the 
supplier is able to charge a high price by focusing on the H-type buyer, which 
automatically dissuades the L-type buyer from outsourcing knowledge. 
 
Figure 3. Impact of the buyer's integration factor on the supplier's pricing scheme. 
15J = , 1bK = , 3sK = , 3bc = , 1sc = , ( )0,1θ ∈ , 0.5Hδ = + ∆ , 0.5Lδ = −∆  
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
To our knowledge, we are the first to characterize a buyer-supplier game in 
the context of knowledge outsourcing. Three Stackelberg games are introduced in 
which the supplier (leader, he) sets the price for knowledge outsourcing and the 
buyer (follower, she) determines the extent to which her project scope is met from 
knowledge outsourcing or internal knowledge development. The knowledge 
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outsourcing game is markedly different from the standard component (or finished 
good) outsourcing game in three respects. First, the quantities of knowledge 
outsourcing, internal knowledge development, and project scope are measured in 
hours of effort. Second, the buyer only obtains benefits from outsourcing to the 
extent that she has the ability to absorb external knowledge (absorptive capacity). 
In other words, the S units of knowledge that are outsourced from the supplier do 
not reduce the buyer’s need to meet the project scope by S units. Third, once 
developed by either the buyer or the supplier, knowledge is not consumed and can 
be reused. Specifically, to meet the needs of the current buyer, the supplier may 
leverage related knowledge he “produced” to meet the needs of prior customers. In 
the same way, the buyer leverages her existing knowledge directly toward fulfilling 
her current project scope and indirectly as a key element of her absorptive capacity. 
Deterministic Game with Complete Information 
We develop analytic results that provide important insights to three realistic 
situations. First, we consider a deterministic Stackelberg game of complete 
information. We show that the two drivers of absorptive capacity, (the buyer’s 
existing knowledge and her integration factor) impact each firm's equilibrium 
decisions differently. If the buyer’s project scope is sufficiently large, we find that 
her equilibrium knowledge outsourcing increases with respect to both her existing 
knowledge and her integration factor. The fact that outsourcing may increase despite 
the fact that the buyer has a larger amount of existing knowledge demonstrates the 
importance of modeling the two drivers of absorptive capacity. However, whereas 
the supplier’s price always increases as the buyer’s integration factor increases, we 
show that the supplier’s price may increase or decrease when the buyer’s existing 
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knowledge increases. Intuitively, since the buyer’s need for outsourcing decreases as 
her existing knowledge increases, under certain conditions, the supplier is driven to 
lower his price. 
With respect to each firm’s objective value, we have the following important 
insights. As expected, the buyer’s total cost always decreases if either driver of her 
absorptive capacity increases. Additionally, the supplier's profit always increases if 
the buyer’s integration factor increases. In contrast, since an increase in the buyer’s 
level of existing knowledge not only increases her absorptive capacity but also 
reduces her need for new knowledge to meet her project scope, we show the supplier’s 
price and profit may decrease or increase. 
The above results have implications for the buyer when she selects a supplier. 
In particular, the buyer should select a supplier that provides a superior integration 
factor. This analytical insight is consistent with empirical studies that find that 
greater familiarity, trust, and mutual understanding between a buyer and a supplier 
results in a more effective knowledge outsourcing (Mowery et al. 1996; Tzabbar et 
al. 2013). Also, we show that the buyer's total cost is smaller if she selects a supplier 
capable of leveraging more prior knowledge. It is worth noting that, despite the lower 
price set by this supplier, the supplier's profit increases due to the buyer's increase 
in knowledge outsourcing and the decrease in the supplier's cost of internal 
knowledge development. 
Effect of a Buyer's Uncertain Project Scope 
In a second model, we investigate the impact of uncertainty associated with 
the buyer’s project scope, which may occur if she pursues a highly novel project. 
Specifically, we consider the situation where the buyer’s true project scope is 
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uncertain (satisfying a uniform distribution with a known mean and standard 
deviation) and revealed only after all decisions are made. While the supplier’s profit 
maximizing objective does not change from the deterministic game, the buyer now 
minimizes the expected total cost which includes the cost of internal knowledge 
development, the cost of outsourcing, the expected cost of expediting to meet any 
shortage of knowledge, minus the expected value of surplus knowledge. 
We show that the effect of uncertainty on the equilibrium decisions is driven 
by the marginal cost to expedite if a knowledge shortage occurs after the true project 
scope is revealed. Consistent with intuition, if the expediting cost is sufficiently large, 
the buyer pursues a planned knowledge surplus. We show that if the buyer’s planned 
project scope is sufficiently large, then both the buyer’s knowledge outsourcing and 
internal knowledge development increase as uncertainty in the true project scope 
increases. Moreover, recognizing the buyer’s drive to accumulate more knowledge, 
the supplier charges a higher price. Therefore, if the marginal cost of expediting is 
sufficiently large, as uncertainty in the true project scope increases, the total cost 
incurred by a buyer increases as does the profit obtained by the supplier. 
In contrast, also consistent with intuition, if the marginal cost of expediting 
is sufficiently small, the buyer pursues a planned knowledge shortage. As a result, 
the supplier is forced to lower his price to limit the reduction in the buyer’s 
knowledge outsourcing. Naturally, the buyer also reduces her internal knowledge 
development as uncertainty increases. Importantly, we show that, in this situation, 
the extent of project scope uncertainty plays a critical role in the equilibrium 
solutions. First, if the extent of project scope uncertainty is large, then both the 
supplier’s price reduction and the buyer’s reduction in knowledge outsourcing are 
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modest. As a result, the buyer’s total expected cost increases and the supplier’s profit 
increases. Therefore, the total cost of the supply chain increases when uncertainty 
increases. However, if the extent of project scope uncertainty is small, then the 
supplier is forced to substantially lower his price while the buyer pursues much less 
knowledge outsourcing. It follows that the buyer’s total expected cost decreases and 
the supplier’s profit decreases. 
Remarkably, our latter result is counter to the inventory management 
literature. Song (1994) shows that when lead-time uncertainty increases, a single 
firm pursuing a base-stock policy incurs a higher average cost. In a Stackelberg game 
formulation similar to ours, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) find that if the uncertainty 
in market demand increases, the supplier’s profit always decreases while the buyer’s 
profit always increases. In stark contrast, in our knowledge outsourcing game, when 
uncertainty increases, we obtain conditions where (i) the supplier’s profit increases 
or decreases; (ii) the buyer’s expected total cost increases or decreases; and (iii) more 
interestingly, the overall cost incurred by the supply chain may decrease (i.e., more 
uncertainty improves the performance of the supply chain). 
Effect of Information Asymmetry 
 Finally, in a third game-theoretic model, we examine the effect of information 
asymmetry whereby the supplier does not know with certainty whether the buyer’s 
integration factor is high (H-type buyer) or low (L-type buyer). While each type of 
buyer minimizes her deterministic total cost corresponding to her (known) high 
versus low integration factor, the supplier maximizes his expected profit given the 
probability he faces an H-type buyer and an L-type buyer.  
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 Importantly, we find that the supplier pursues one of two pricing schemes. 
First, the supplier may set a sufficiently high price so that only the H-type buyer 
outsources knowledge (the L-type buyer must meet her project scope entirely from 
internal knowledge development). The supplier charges high price to exclude the L-
type buyer from outsourcing only if the following two conditions hold simultaneously: 
the difference between the high versus low integration factors of the two buyer types 
is sufficiently large and the probability the buyer is H-type is sufficiently large. 
Clearly, the L-type buyer’s total cost suffers because she is unable to outsource 
knowledge and must meet her entire project scope from internal knowledge 
development. The H-type buyer’s cost performance is the same as that obtained in 
the deterministic game with full information since the supplier’s price is the same. 
(The equilibrium solution corresponds to that of the deterministic model in which 
the buyer has a high integration factor.) However, the supplier’s profit suffers 
because he forgoes all potential revenue earned from the L-type buyer.  
 In the second pricing scheme, the supplier sets a sufficiently low price such 
that both types of buyers outsource knowledge. In particular, the supplier's price is 
the weighted average of the equilibrium prices he would charge to a known H-type 
buyer and to a known L-type buyer. The L-type buyer’s total cost suffers due to the 
supplier's higher price compared to the price he would charge if he knew she was L-
type. The H-type buyer’s total cost is lower because she benefits from the supplier's 
lower price. The supplier suffers lower profit because the additional revenue earned 
from the H-type buyer does not compensate for the lesser revenue earned from the 
L-type buyer. Overall, therefore, when the pricing scheme attracts both buyers in 
the game of incomplete information, only the H-type buyer wins. 
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 With respect to the buyer, there are two implication of information 
asymmetry. The H-type buyer prefers to keep her integration factor as private 
information (thereby forcing the supplier to charge a lower price), whereas the L-
type buyer prefers to inform the supplier of her type (to avoid the higher price that 
would be charged if the supplier were uncertain of the buyer's type). 
Future Research Opportunities 
 In conclusion, we obtain important insights for several realistic situations in 
a knowledge outsourcing game between a buyer and a supplier. Moreover, we show 
that the equilibrium results obtained are significantly different from the classical 
component outsourcing literature. Nevertheless, there are considerable opportunities 
for future research. We do not consider the possibility that the supplier may provide 
technical training or improve the quality of communication to increase the buyer’s 
integration factor. We believe important insights may be obtained in future research 
that allows the supplier to take actions (at a cost) to improve the buyer’s absorptive 
capacity. In this study, we consider wholesale-price-only type of contracts. Since 
there may be various forms of lump-sum payments in practice, researchers may also 
examine how a buyer and a supplier strategically decide the optimal type of contract 
for knowledge outsourcing (e.g., revenue sharing, milestone-based contract, two-part 
tariff, exclusive contract, etc.). Driven by the need for early market entry in a new 
product development setting, future research may explore the situation where the 
supplier’s price is a function of the agreed upon delivery date of the outsourced 
knowledge to the buyer. Lastly, beyond a buyer-supplier dyad, research opportunities 
exist to investigate the situation where the buyer outsources from more than one 
supplier, or the supplier sells his knowledge to multiple buyers.  
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 Knowledge is the single most valuable resource to aid the successful 
innovation of products and processes by firms (Grant 1996). Firms’ existing 
repositories of internal knowledge are often not sufficient for successful innovation 
(Powell et al. 1996). In such cases, firms may choose to engage with external entities 
(Pisano 1990; Hamel 1991; Dodgson 1993) and pursue knowledge outsourcing (Quinn 
1999; Gaimon et al. 2017). Empirical data shows that the level of knowledge 
outsourcing pursued by firms is increasing over time. According to a report by 
Booz&Co. and Duke University (2007), the “hot” sectors for knowledge outsourcing 
are: new product development and design, engineering services, R&D, and analytical 
knowledge services. Additionally, U.S. census data (BEA 2017) demonstrates that 
the GDP value produced by the knowledge-intensive service industry – which 
includes professional, scientific, and technical services (all of which drive product 
design, R&D, IT, consulting, and marketing) – has more than doubled between 1998 
and 2016. 
 Reflecting the increasing need for professional agents in the markets for 
knowledge (Consoli and Elche-Hortelano 2010), external knowledge providers, such 
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as Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS)3, have become central components 
of current knowledge-based economies (Muller and Zenker 2001; Howells 2006; 
Tether and Tajar 2008; Probert et al. 2013; Lessard 2015). KIBS specialize in 
knowledge development, screening, and assessment and evaluation, and they trade 
professional consultancy services with multiple client firms (Consoli and Elche-
Hortelano 2010). The services of KIBS progress based on a contractual agreement 
between the knowledge source (termed “supplier”) and the recipient (termed 
“buyer”). The contract covers the specific content (problems to be solved or 
experiments to be performed), form (written report, prototype, design drawing, 
software), and due date of the outsourced knowledge to be provided by the supplier 
to the buyer (Probert et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2016). For example, IDEO (2017), one 
of the largest suppliers of knowledge for new product development, works with 
several hundred different firms in over 40 industries and develops 60 to 80 products 
at a time, as of 1997 (Hargadon and Sutton 1997). 
 The unique features of such knowledge outsourcing that arise when one 
knowledge supplier serves multiple buyers competing in the downstream market pose 
many intriguing questions which have yet to be answered in the literature. In this 
paper, we consider the situation where two buyers (buyers 1 and 2) both outsource 
knowledge from a common supplier to improve their product performance (i.e., 
knowledge is a proxy for product performance) and attempt to answer the following 
questions: Under what conditions do either of the buyers pursue knowledge 
outsourcing from the supplier? In the situation where only one of the two buyers 
outsources knowledge from the supplier, how does that buyer’s knowledge 
                                                            
3 KIBS are firms broadly referred to as knowledge intermediaries, knowledge-intensive firms, 
knowledge brokers, technology brokers, or professional service firms in the literature. 
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outsourcing influence both buyers’ decisions concerning knowledge development and 
their retail prices in the downstream market? Under what conditions does the 
supplier prefer to serve only one buyer as opposed to both buyers? Specifically, in 
what ways is the supplier better off serving one buyer instead of both buyers? 
 To answer these critical questions, we introduce a Stackelberg game of 
knowledge outsourcing between a common supplier and two symmetric buyers (1 
and 2). During the first stage of the game, the profit-maximizing supplier 
(Stackelberg leader) determines a common wholesale price (per hour of effort) of 
knowledge to charge to both buyers based on his internal cost of developing 
knowledge to meet the buyers’ needs. In response, profit-maximizing buyers 1 and 2 
(Stackelberg followers) simultaneously determine the levels of knowledge outsourcing 
(hours of effort) and in-house knowledge development (hours of effort) required to 
improve their product performance. At the second stage, buyers 1 and 2 compete in 
the downstream market by simultaneously setting their retail prices. 
 We build on our analysis by also considering the situation where buyer 1 (she) 
sells her product under monopoly, where there is no second buyer. In the monopoly 
case, we find that buyer 1 chooses to outsource knowledge if her in-house knowledge 
development cost is sufficiently high, in order to reduce her total knowledge 
acquisition cost. In the situation where the supplier commits to serve only one of 
two buyers (buyer 1) under duopoly, we find a similar result; buyer 1 outsources 
knowledge from the supplier only if her in-house knowledge development cost is 
sufficiently high. This finding becomes more interesting when compared with the 
situation under monopoly. We find that a buyer’s desire for knowledge outsourcing 
depends on the competition structure (i.e., monopoly or duopoly) in the downstream 
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market. Interestingly, buyer 1 under duopoly is more inclined to outsource knowledge 
than under monopoly. This is because buyer 2, who does not have the option of 
outsourcing knowledge from the supplier in the duopoly case, makes the strategic 
decision to keep her level of product performance lower than that of buyer 1. This 
indicates that buyer 1’s knowledge outsourcing effectively discourages buyer 2 from 
pursuing in-house knowledge development and gives buyer 1 (buyer 2, respectively) 
an advantage as the higher quality (lower cost, respectively) manufacturer. 
 Lastly, we investigate the situation where the supplier attempts to serve both 
buyers 1 and 2. If the buyers’ in-house knowledge development costs are sufficiently 
low, we find that the supplier is better off charging a higher wholesale price of 
knowledge and serving only one of the buyers. In contrast, if the buyers’ in-house 
knowledge development costs are sufficiently high, both buyers are responsive to the 
supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge. Therefore, the supplier charges a lower price 
and serves both buyers. In addition, we identify a certain condition under which the 
supplier decides to serve only one buyer, even if they both pursue knowledge 
outsourcing. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we discuss 
the related literature. We start our analysis by considering the monopoly case 
concerning the supplier and a monopolist buyer in Section 3.3. To further build on 
our insights, in Section 3.4 we analyze the situation where two buyers, 1 and 2, 
compete in the downstream market. Specifically, in Section 3.4.1, we analyze the 
situation where the supplier commits to serve only buyer 1, and therefore only buyer 
1 has the option of outsourcing knowledge from the supplier. In Section 3.4.2, we 
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discuss our findings on the situation where the supplier attempts to serve both 
buyers. We conclude with a discussion of the managerial implications in Section 3.5.  
3.2 Related Literature 
 When firms pursue external knowledge acquisition, they generally face three 
external sources of knowledge: partners, competitors, and consultants (Gaimon et al. 
2017). In this study, we focus on independent and non-competing knowledge 
suppliers such as consultancies. Using game-theoretic formulation, Iyer and 
Soberman (2000) study horizontal market competition between two manufacturers 
who acquire information from a common supplier to improve product performance. 
They identify conditions under which the supplier should sell his information on 
product modification to only one firm, as opposed to both firms. In their study, 
however, the buyers who compete in the downstream market are price takers. Said 
differently, the supplier determines the amount of knowledge embedded in product 
modification information (Iyer and Soberman 2000). Therefore, the buyers decide 
only whether to purchase the pre-packaged knowledge. In contrast, the buyers in our 
study decide the amount of knowledge outsourcing required to solve their specific 
problems and improve product performance. Then, the supplier develops and delivers 
customized knowledge to satisfy each buyer’s knowledge needs. The aforementioned 
KIBS, working as consultancies, specialize in customized knowledge development to 
aid R&D and engineering tasks for their clients’ products and services. 
 Researchers investigate KIBS strategies and practices to better understand 
their role in the successful innovation of client firms. Miles et al. (1995) first defined 
KIBS as businesses focusing on the supply of knowledge and contributing to their 
clients’ own knowledge-generating activities. Therefore, while carrying out 
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customized knowledge development projects for clients, KIBS essentially perform 
problem-solving activities through direct user-producer interaction (Muller and 
Zenker 2001; Probert et al. 2013). Using survey data collected by the US Department 
of Labor in 2007, Consoli and Elche-Hortelano (2010) define the sectors of KIBS and 
show that they have heterogeneous occupational structures and skill requirements. 
Based on interviews with KIBS CEOs and managers in the Cambridge area in the 
UK, Probert et al. (2013) show that KIBS significantly contribute to the innovation 
of the local client firms (also see Muller and Zenker 2001, Howells 2006, and Hsuan 
and Mahnke 2011 to review studies on KIBS). While contributing to a better 
understanding of KIBS, these empirical studies do not provide in-depth implications 
on the practical interactions between a knowledge supplier and a buyer, such as 
decisions about the supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge and the buyer’s level of 
knowledge outsourcing. 
 In contrast to the integration of innovative components, knowledge 
outsourced from a supplier needs to be utilized and embedded into a buyer’s existing 
knowledge repository (i.e., knowledge integration). This requires additional effort 
and incurs integration costs (Weigelt 2009; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; Berchicci 2013; 
Bianchi et al. 2016). In addition, according to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), a 
recipient’s ability to assimilate knowledge obtained from external sources depends 
on their absorptive capacity. The literature shows that absorptive capacity is largely 
a function of a firm’s level of existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
Considering a buyer’s absorptive capacity, Lee et al. (2016) investigate how a 
supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge and a buyer’s level of knowledge outsourcing 
are associated with prior knowledge, uncertainty, and information asymmetry. 
However, Lee et al. (2016) examine only dyadic interactions between one supplier 
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and one buyer. In contrast, we investigate how decisions on knowledge outsourcing 
are influenced when a common knowledge supplier serves multiple buyers who 
compete in the downstream market. 
3.3 Monopoly Buyer 
 In this section, we analyze a two stage game consisting of one upstream 
supplier (he) and one monopolist buyer (she) in the downstream market, referred to 
as buyer 1. To maximize her profit in the marketplace, buyer 1 recognizes the need 
to increase her level of knowledge to obtain scientific, engineering, analytic and 
technical services to improve her final product performance (Pisano 1990; Hamel 
1991; Dodgson 1993; Quinn 1999). Buyer 1 may either develop knowledge in-house 
or outsource knowledge from the upstream supplier. To investigate how the supplier 
and buyer interact, we introduce a Stackelberg game with complete and perfect 
information (both the supplier and buyer are aware of his/her own decisions and 
payoffs as well as that of the other firm). 
 Figure 4 below shows the sequence of decision-making. In the first stage, the 
supplier (Stackelberg leader) determines the wholesale price of knowledge (𝑤𝑤 ≥ 0) 
to charge buyer 1 (referred to as the wholesale price). After observing the supplier’s 
wholesale price in the second stage, buyer 1 (Stackelberg follower) determines the 
level of knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆1 ≥ 0) as well as the level of knowledge to develop 
in-house (𝐷𝐷1 ≥ 0). Also, in the second stage, buyer 1 integrates any outsourced 
knowledge acquired from the supplier to improve performance of her new product. 
In the third stage, buyer 1 sets her retail price (𝑝𝑝1 ≥ 0) and sells her product in the 
downstream market. The buyer’s price will determine the demand for the buyer’s 




Figure 4. Sequence of decisions for the monopoly buyer. 
 
3.3.1 Consumer Utility in the Downstream Market 
 Our characterization of the downstream market is based on the Hotelling 
model (Hotelling 1929). Consumer surplus utility is comprised of the consumer’s 
product preference, the product’s baseline utility, the increase in consumer utility 
(beyond the baseline value) due to performance improvement realized by buyer 1, 
and buyer 1’s price. Figure 5 illustrates how consumers’ surplus utilities and buyer 
1’s demand quantity are determined in the downstream market. 
 




 As illustrated in Figure 5, we assume a market of size 1 in the Hotelling 
model. Buyer 1 offers a product which is ideally positioned at the left end of the 
market (0) and sells her product to consumers. Each consumer’s preference is denoted 
by 𝑥𝑥, which is uniformly distributed (𝑥𝑥~𝑈𝑈[0, 1]) along the market between 0 and 1 
(Iyer and Soberman 2000; Amaldoss and Jain 2015). Consumers incur a disutility for 
the mismatch between the product offered by buyer 1 and the consumers’ preferences 
with respect to product functionality, ease of use, operating characteristics, etc. The 
disutility is measured by 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥, where 𝜃𝜃 (𝜃𝜃 > 0) captures the intensity of the mismatch 
perceived by a consumer at 𝑥𝑥. 
 The baseline utility, denoted by 𝑅𝑅 > 0, reflects the initial product 
performance without any further improvement through in-house knowledge 
development and/or outsourcing from the supplier (Adner and Levinthal 2001; 
Krishnan and Zhu 2006). If buyer 1 invests in in-house knowledge development 
and/or knowledge outsourcing, she improves product performance so that consumers 
gain additional utilities. Knowledge developed in-house by buyer 1 directly increases 
her product performance and thereby increases consumers’ utilities by 𝐷𝐷1. However, 
the level of an increase in product performance through knowledge outsourced from 
the supplier (𝑆𝑆1) depends on her absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), 
denoted by 𝜙𝜙 (0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 1)4. As such, the increase in buyer 1’s product performance 
obtained from outsourced knowledge is given by 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆1. Lastly, buyer 1’s retail price 
(𝑝𝑝1) reduces consumers’ utilities. Summarizing the above discussion, we have 
Equation (12), which denotes a consumer’s surplus utility at 𝑥𝑥: 
 
𝑈𝑈1 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥. (12) 
                                                            
4 Since the buyer cannot understand and apply more knowledge than the supplier delivers, absorptive 
capacity cannot exceed one (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
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 Only those consumers having non-negative surplus purchase a product from 
buyer 1. Therefore, we solve Equation (13) and find buyer 1’s demand quantity in 
the downstream market as defined in Equation (14). Naturally, buyer 1 attracts more 
consumers by increasing her product performance or reducing her retail price. 
 
𝑞𝑞1 = {𝑥𝑥∗:𝑈𝑈1(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 0}, (13) 
𝑞𝑞1 =




 Based on the elements discussed above, as demonstrated in Figure 5, if a 
customer has an ideal preference for buyer 1’s product (𝑥𝑥 = 0), the customer obtains 
the full surplus utility (𝑅𝑅 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑝𝑝1) offered by buyer 1. Otherwise, the 
consumer’s surplus utility is reduced by 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥. 𝑥𝑥∗ represents a consumer’s preference 
with which the consumer’s surplus utility is zero. Therefore, consumers whose 
preferences are below 𝑥𝑥∗ along the market between 0 and 1 obtain positive surplus 
utilities and buy buyer 1’s product (i.e., 𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑥𝑥∗). 
3.3.2 Buyer’s Problem 
 Since we solve the sequential game between the supplier and buyer 1 using 
backward induction, we present the buyer 1’s problem first. In stage 3, buyer 1 sets 
the retail price 𝑝𝑝1 and sells the quantity 𝑞𝑞1 in the marketplace, which provides the 
monopoly revenue 𝑞𝑞1𝑝𝑝1. While we assume buyer 1’s production cost is normalized to 
zero (Ramachandran and Krishnan 2008; Lauga and Ofek 2009), costs are incurred 
for in-house knowledge development and knowledge outsourcing, as follows. 
 In stage 2, buyer 1 incurs the cost 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷12, which is a convex increasing function 
of the level of in-house knowledge development with 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 > 0. The convex increasing 
cost of in-house knowledge development reflects the additional complexity, 
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coordination, and overuse of buyer 1’s limited resources used to generate knowledge 
(Gaimon et al. 2011; Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky 2012; Ozkan-Seely et al. 
2015). It is useful to note that buyer 1 (and the supplier) has capacity limitations to 
develop knowledge in-house. This convex increasing in-house knowledge development 
cost could be used to capture capacitated knowledge development without explicit 
capacity constraint in the model (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1991; Bhaskaran et al. 
2010). 
 Also in stage 2, the contractual agreement between the supplier and buyer 1 
specifies the content and form of knowledge (written report, engineering design 
drawings, physical prototypes, or software) as well as the delivery due date. 
Subsequently, the hours of effort committed by the supplier is determined (𝑆𝑆1). Once 
received, buyer 1 must expend effort to understand and utilize the outsourced 
knowledge to improve product performance. As a result, buyer 1 incurs a two-
dimensional cost for knowledge outsourcing: the (external) purchase cost paid to the 
supplier (𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1) and the (internal) cost to integrate (absorb) the outsourced knowledge 
(𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆12, where 𝑔𝑔 > 0). The supplier sets the price of knowledge (𝑤𝑤) in stage 1, as 
described in the next sub-section. Buyer 1’s integration cost is a convex increasing 
function of the level of knowledge outsourcing, thereby reflecting the additional 
complexity, coordination, capacity limitations, and overuse of buyer 1’s limited 
capacity to absorb the outsourced knowledge (Weigelt 2009; Gaimon et al. 2011; 
Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky 2012; Ozkan-Seely et al. 2015). 
 It is useful to note that in this study buyer 1’s baseline utility reflects her 
prior knowledge, which does not directly affect her absorptive capacity. Additionally, 
as described in the next sub-section, the supplier develops the knowledge required to 
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meet buyer 1’s needs in-house, without incorporating his prior knowledge. Since prior 
knowledge impacts the interactions between a supplier and a buyer (Lee et al. 2016), 
we discuss its implications in the game between a supplier and two buyers in Section 
3.4.2.4. 
 Equations (15) and (16) mathematically summarize the above discussion. As 
shown in Figure 4, buyer 1 solves two sequential problems while maximizing her 
profit: one in stage 2 for knowledge acquisition and the other in stage 3 for the sale 
of her product. In stage 2, buyer 1 jointly determines her levels of in-house knowledge 
development and knowledge outsourcing knowing how these decisions impact her 
retail price. In stage 3, buyer 1 determines the retail price of her product to charge 
in the downstream market. Note 𝑝𝑝1′  in Equation (15) is the best response of buyer 





𝛱𝛱1(𝑆𝑆1,  𝐷𝐷1) = 𝑝𝑝1′𝑞𝑞1(𝑝𝑝1′) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷12 − 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆12, 





𝛱𝛱1(𝑝𝑝1) = 𝑝𝑝1𝑞𝑞1(𝑝𝑝1) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷12 − 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆12. (16) 
 
3.3.3 Supplier’s Problem 
 In stage 1, the supplier, a Stackelberg leader in the knowledge outsourcing 
game between the supplier and buyer 1, sets the wholesale price per unit knowledge 
outsourced to buyer 1 (𝑤𝑤) from which he obtains revenue given by 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1. Additionally, 
the supplier incurs a cost to satisfy buyer 1’s demand for knowledge, which is 
expressed as a convex increasing function of his level of internal knowledge 
development, denoted by 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆12 with 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 > 0. Similar to buyer 1’s cost of in-house 
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knowledge development, the supplier’s convex increasing cost of internal knowledge 
development reflects the additional complexity, coordination, capacity limitations, 
and overuse of the supplier’s limited resources used to meet buyer 1’s demand. 
Equation (17) summarizes the supplier’s profit maximizing objective. Note 𝑆𝑆1′ in 
Equation (17) is the best response of buyer 1’s level of knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆1) 
for a given supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge. Notations used in the monopoly 
case are defined in Table 3. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥
 𝑤𝑤>0
𝛱𝛱𝑆𝑆 = 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1′ − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆1′)2, 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆1′ = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆1, 𝐷𝐷1>0
𝛱𝛱1(𝑆𝑆1,  𝐷𝐷1). 
(17) 
Table 3. Terminology and notation for the monopolist model. 
𝑝𝑝1 Retail Price charged by buyer 1 in the downstream market (𝑝𝑝1 > 0). 
𝑞𝑞1 Quantity sold by buyer 1 in the downstream market (0 ≤ 𝑞𝑞1 ≤ 1). 
𝑥𝑥 A consumer’s preference at 𝑥𝑥, uniformly distributed along the market between 0 and 1 
(𝑥𝑥~𝑈𝑈[0, 1]).  
𝜃𝜃 Parameter indicating the intensity of consumers’ disutility generated by the mismatch 
between their preferences and the product offered by buyer 1 (𝜃𝜃 > 0). 
𝐷𝐷1 Buyer 1’s level of in-house knowledge development (𝐷𝐷1 ≥ 0). 
𝑆𝑆1 Buyer 1’s level of knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆1 ≥ 0). 
𝜙𝜙 Buyer 1’s absorptive capacity (0 < 𝜙𝜙 < 1). 
𝑅𝑅 Consumer’s baseline utility for buyer 1’s product (𝑅𝑅 > 0). 
𝑈𝑈1 Consumer’s surplus utility for buyer 1’s product. 
𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 Parameter indicating buyer 1’s cost of in-house knowledge development (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 > 0). 
𝑔𝑔 Parameter indicating buyer 1’s cost of integrating outsourced knowledge (𝑔𝑔 > 0). 
𝑤𝑤 Supplier’s price per unit of outsourced knowledge sold to buyer 1 (𝑤𝑤 > 0). 






3.3.4 Analysis of the Monopoly Model 
 To build on our analysis, we must consider two situations: buyer 1 (i) chooses 
not to outsource knowledge from the supplier; and (ii) chooses to outsource 
knowledge from the supplier. Following backward induction, we obtain two 
equilibrium outcomes as shown in Proposition 7, below. (All proofs appear in the 
Appendix.) 
Proposition 7. The equilibrium decisions for the monopolist, buyer 1, are: 
(i) If buyer 1 does not outsource knowledge from the supplier, then 𝐷𝐷1∗ = 𝑀𝑀1, 








{𝑀𝑀1 + 𝑀𝑀2(𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 2𝑔𝑔)}, 𝑆𝑆1∗ = 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝜙𝜙𝑀𝑀2, and 𝑝𝑝1∗ = 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝜃𝜃{𝑀𝑀1 +





 From Proposition 7, regardless of whether or not buyer 1 outsources 
knowledge from the supplier, it appears that an increase in the baseline utility (𝑅𝑅) 
increases all equilibrium decisions. This is because a larger 𝑅𝑅 enables the buyer to 
benefit from further improving product performance either through in-house 
knowledge development or knowledge outsourcing. Similarly, our sensitivity analysis 
shows that if buyer 1’s absorptive capacity increases, all equilibrium decisions 
increase due to the buyer’s better ability to improve product performance by utilizing 
outsourced knowledge. However, we find that buyer 1’s profit may decrease as her 
absorptive capacity increases. This happens when buyer 1’s desire for knowledge 
outsourcing is sufficiently large (i.e., when absorptive capacity is sufficiently large). 
In this situation, leveraging the bargaining power, the supplier increases his wholesale 
 
 58 
price of knowledge as buyer 1’s absorptive capacity increases to the extent that buyer 
1’s profit decreases. In response, buyer 1 accepts the supplier’s high wholesale price 
to avoid a larger cost of in-house knowledge development required to maintain her 
product performance. 
 In the remainder of Section 3.3, we examine when the monopolist buyer 
benefits from pursuing knowledge outsourcing. In particular, we compare buyer 1’s 
profit when she outsources knowledge from the supplier with the situation where she 
pursues only in-house knowledge development. Proposition 8 summarizes our 
analytical results; the discussion follows. 




, (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀), then buyer 1 does not outsource knowledge from 
the supplier (𝑆𝑆1 = 0). Otherwise (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀), buyer 1 outsources knowledge from the 
supplier (𝑆𝑆1 > 0). 
 We find a 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 threshold, denoted by 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, under which buyer 1 obtains 




interpret Proposition 8, suppose 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 is less than 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀. Under this condition, since buyer 
1 is able to improve product performance to a certain level only through in-house 
knowledge development, she benefits from cutting down her cost for knowledge 
outsourcing (costs for the purchase and integration). In contrast, if the cost of in-
house knowledge development is sufficiently high (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 ≥ 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀), buyer 1 improves 
product performance through knowledge outsourcing as well as in-house knowledge 
development to balance knowledge acquisition costs while maintaining her product 
performance to a certain level. 
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 Further, we observe that buyer 1’s absorptive capacity and integration cost 
also influence whether or not buyer 1 outsources knowledge from the supplier. In 
particular, our sensitivity analysis shows that buyer 1 is less inclined to outsource 
when her absorptive capacity (𝜙𝜙) is larger (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0). As her absorptive capacity (𝜙𝜙) 
increases, buyer 1 is able to utilize and integrate more outsourced knowledge in her 
product, and therefore her desire for knowledge outsourcing increases. Leveraging 
this information, the supplier charges a higher wholesale price of knowledge. This 
decreases buyer 1’s willingness to outsource knowledge from the supplier (i.e., 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀 
increases). Cost savings obtained from limiting knowledge outsourcing compensates 
for any loss in her revenue due to lower product performance, and therefore she earns 
more profit without knowledge outsourcing. It is worth noting that such an effect 
will not be observed in the traditional context of component outsourcing, where 
absorptive capacity does not play a role. Indeed, in component outsourcing, the 
supplier’s equilibrium price and the buyer’s outsourcing decision are both 
independent of the buyer’s absorptive capacity. 
 Also, we find that buyer 1 is more inclined to outsource knowledge from the 
supplier as her integration cost increases (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
< 0). Similar to the logic behind the 
impact of 𝜙𝜙 above, this is because the supplier offers a low wholesale price of 
knowledge to attract buyer 1. If buyer 1 accepts the supplier’s offer and pursues 
knowledge outsourcing, she is able to reduce her level of in-house knowledge 
development for a given level of product performance. Cost savings in buyer 1’s in-
house knowledge development compensates for her additional costs for the purchase 
and integration of outsourced knowledge, and thus she pursues knowledge 
outsourcing despite her higher integration cost. 
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 The result given in Proposition 8 differs from that described in the supplier-
buyer knowledge outsourcing game introduced by Lee et al. (2016) for a reason. We 
recognize that the buyer incurs a cost to integrate the outsourced knowledge (𝑔𝑔) and 
thereby improves product performance. Basically, if 𝑔𝑔 equals zero, then 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀 in 
Proposition 8 becomes zero so that buyer 1 always pursues knowledge outsourcing, 
which is consistent with Lee et al. (2016). Importantly, in contrast to Lee et al. 
(2016), in the next section, we consider two buyers who compete in the downstream 
market.  
3.4 Duopoly Buyer 
 We consider a situation where two symmetric buyers, 1 and 2, compete in the 
downstream market by setting their retail prices (Iyer and Soberman 2000; Lauga 
and Ofek 2009; Amaldoss and Jain 2015). Note we use the subscript “1” (2, 
respectively) to refer to “buyer 1” (buyer 2, respectively), and all other notations 
used in the duopoly case are defined in Table 4. 
3.4.1 Two Competing Buyers but Supplier Serves One 
 In Section 3.4.1, we focus on examining a situation where the supplier serves 
only one of the two buyers (buyer 1). Figure 6 below shows the sequence of decision-
making for the two competing buyers. In the second stage, after observing the 
supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge, buyers 1 and 2 simultaneously determine 
their levels of knowledge developed in-house and outsourced from the supplier. Given 
performance improvement realized by knowledge acquisition in the second stage, the 
two buyers simultaneously choose their retail prices and sell their products in the 




Figure 6. Sequence of decisions for two competing buyers when the supplier serves 
only buyer 1. 
 
3.4.1.1 Consumers’ Utilities and Buyers’ Quantities 
 We use the Hotelling market model with two buyers in the duopoly case. As 
illustrated in Figure 7, buyer 1 is positioned at the left end of the Hotelling line at 0 
and buyer 2 is positioned at the other end at 1. While both buyers pursue in-house 
knowledge development to improve their product performance (i.e., 𝐷𝐷1 ≥ 0 and 𝐷𝐷2 ≥
0), only buyer 1 has the option to outsource knowledge from the supplier (i.e., 𝑆𝑆1 ≥
0 and 𝑆𝑆2 = 0).  
 
Figure 7. Hotelling market model for the duopoly case. 
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 A consumer whose preference is 𝑥𝑥 along the market between 0 and 1 incurs 
disutility 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥 (𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝑥𝑥), respectively) by purchasing buyer 1’s product (buyer 2’s 
product, respectively). Equations (18) and (19) below denote a consumer’s surplus 
utility at 𝑥𝑥 when the consumer purchases buyer 1’s product and buyer 2’s product, 
respectively. Figure 7 also illustrates the consumers’ levels of surplus utilities for 
different preferences. 
𝑈𝑈1 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝐷𝐷1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑝𝑝1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥, (18) 
𝑈𝑈2 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝐷𝐷2 − 𝑝𝑝2 − 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝑥𝑥). (19) 
 Given the preference (𝑥𝑥∗) of the consumer, whose surplus utility is the same 
regardless of whether the consumer purchases a product from buyer 1 or 2, the 
buyers’ quantities in the marketplace are given by:  
𝑞𝑞1 = {𝑥𝑥∗:𝑈𝑈1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑈𝑈2(𝑥𝑥)}, (20) 
𝑞𝑞2 = {1 − 𝑥𝑥∗:𝑈𝑈1(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑈𝑈2(𝑥𝑥)}. (21) 
 We solve Equations (20) and (21), and find the two buyers’ demand quantities 
in the downstream market as defined in Equations (22) and (23). As in the monopoly 
case, each buyer increases (decreases) market demand by offering a product with 
superior (inferior) performance or by charging a lower (higher) retail price. In 
contrast, we observe that in the duopoly case a buyer loses consumers if the other 
buyer offers a product with better performance and/or a lower retail price due to 
competition. Figure 7 graphically shows how both buyers’ demand quantities are 
obtained.  
𝑞𝑞1 =










3.4.1.2 Problems of the Buyers and Supplier in the Duopoly Case 
 As shown in Figure 6, we solve two simultaneous games between buyers 1 
and 2: one in stage 2 for knowledge acquisition and the other in stage 3 for the sale 
of their products. Each buyer in the duopoly case makes sequential decisions on the 
level of knowledge acquisition first and then her retail price. Therefore, we 
sequentially solve the two simultaneous games between the two buyers using 
backward induction. Given their demand quantities from Equations (22) and (23), 
buyers 1 and 2 who compete in the downstream market simultaneously determine 
their retail prices in stage 3 while maximizing their profits defined in Equations (26) 
and (27). In stage 2, as summarized in Equations (24) and (25), the two buyers 
simultaneously determine their levels of knowledge acquisition required to improve 
product performance. Since this section focuses on the situation where only buyer 1 
has an option to outsource knowledge from the supplier, while buyer 1 jointly decides 
her levels of in-house knowledge development (𝐷𝐷1) and knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆1), 
buyer 2 decides only her level of in-house knowledge development (𝐷𝐷2).  
Stage 2 Buyer 1: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷1,𝑆𝑆1>0




𝛱𝛱2(𝐷𝐷1, 𝑆𝑆1,𝐷𝐷2) = 𝑝𝑝2′ 𝑞𝑞2(𝑝𝑝1′ ,𝑝𝑝2′ ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷22, 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒,𝑝𝑝1′ = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝1>0
𝛱𝛱1 (𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝2′ = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝2>0
𝛱𝛱2 (𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2). 
(25) 
Stage 3 Buyer 1: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝1>0
𝛱𝛱1(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) = 𝑝𝑝1𝑞𝑞1(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷12 − 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆12, (26) 
 Buyer 2: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝2>0
𝛱𝛱2(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) = 𝑝𝑝2𝑞𝑞2(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷22. (27) 
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 In stage 1, the supplier, a Stackelberg leader in the knowledge outsourcing 
game between the supplier and buyer 1, determines the wholesale price of knowledge 
to charge to buyer 1. In contrast to the monopoly case, since buyer 1 competes with 
buyer 2 in the downstream market, buyer 2’s level of in-house knowledge 
development (𝐷𝐷2) indirectly influences the supplier’s decision on the wholesale price 
of knowledge through buyer 1’s response. Equation (28) summarizes the supplier’s 
problem in the duopoly case when he serves only buyer 1. Note 𝑆𝑆1′ in Equation (28) 
is the best response of buyer 1’s level of knowledge outsourcing for a given supplier’s 
wholesale price of knowledge.  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥
 𝑤𝑤>0
𝛱𝛱𝑆𝑆 = 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆1′ − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆1′)2 , 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆1′ = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷1,𝑆𝑆1>0
𝛱𝛱1(𝐷𝐷1, 𝑆𝑆1,𝐷𝐷2). 
(28) 
Table 4. Terminology and notation for the duopoly case. 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 Retail price charged by buyer 𝑖𝑖 in the downstream market, where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 0). 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  Quantity sold by buyer 𝑖𝑖 in the downstream market (0 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 and 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 = 1). 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 Buyer 𝑖𝑖’s level of in-house knowledge development (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0). 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 Buyer 𝑖𝑖’s level of knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0). 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 Consumer’s surplus utility for buyer 𝑖𝑖’s product. 
 
3.4.1.3 Analysis of the Duopoly Case 
 As in the monopoly case, we consider two situations in this duopoly case: 
buyer 1 (i) chooses not to outsource knowledge from the supplier; and (ii) chooses 
to outsource knowledge from the supplier. Following backward induction, we obtain 
interior solutions in each equilibrium as shown in Proposition 9 below. (All proofs 
appear in the Appendix.). 
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Proposition 9. The equilibrium decisions when the supplier serves only buyer 1 
under duopoly are: 
(i) If buyer 1 does not outsource knowledge from the supplier, then 𝐷𝐷1∗ = 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
1
6𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏
 and 𝑝𝑝1∗ = 𝑝𝑝2∗ = 𝜃𝜃; 




















where 𝑀𝑀3 = (𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 2𝑔𝑔)(9𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝜃𝜃 − 1) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝜙𝜙2. 
 
 From Proposition 9(ii), we observe that buyer 1, who has the option to 
outsource knowledge from the supplier, pursues more in-house knowledge 
development than buyer 2 (𝐷𝐷1∗ > 𝐷𝐷2∗), who improves product performance only 
through in-house knowledge development. This is because buyer 1’s knowledge 
outsourcing reduces her overall cost of improving product performance. In addition, 
due to superior product performance, buyer 1 charges a higher price than buyer 2 
(𝑝𝑝1∗ > 𝑝𝑝2∗) in the downstream market. Buyer 1 is therefore able to pursue more in-
house knowledge development. To further build on our analysis of whether or not 
buyer 1 outsources knowledge from the supplier in the duopoly case, in the remainder 
of Section 3.4.1 we examine the circumstances under which buyer 1 benefits from 
knowledge outsourcing. We compare buyer 1’s profit when she outsources knowledge 
from the supplier and when she pursues only in-house knowledge development. 
Proposition 10 summarizes our analytical results and the discussion follows. 
Proposition 10. Consider a supplier that serves only buyer 1 under duopoly: i) If 
the cost of in-house knowledge development (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏) is lower than the threshold (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 <
𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷), then buyer 1 does not outsource knowledge from the supplier. Otherwise (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 ≥
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𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷), buyer 1 outsources, where 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 =
𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠+2𝑔𝑔
9(𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠+2𝑔𝑔)𝜃𝜃−𝜙𝜙2
; ii) Further, 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 <
𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, buyer 1 outsources knowledge from the supplier only if there is a competitor. 
 As shown in Proposition 10, we find a 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 threshold, denoted by 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷, under 
which buyer 1’s profit without knowledge outsourcing is greater than that with 
knowledge outsourcing. Therefore, if 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 is sufficiently small, buyer 1 under duopoly 
finds knowledge outsourcing not to be beneficial. Although this result seems similar 
to Proposition 8, since 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, we find that the competition between buyers 1 and 
2 in the marketplace makes buyer 1 more inclined to outsource knowledge than she 
would be under monopoly. This can be understood through the following logic. Since 
only buyer 1 has access to knowledge outsourcing, buyer 1’s knowledge acquisition 
is more cost efficient than buyer 2. Therefore, if buyer 1 chooses to outsource 
knowledge from the supplier, buyer 2 finds it more beneficial to decrease her level of 
in-house knowledge development and reduce her retail price through those cost 
savings. This indicates that buyer 1’s knowledge outsourcing discourages buyer 2 
from improving product performance, which gives buyer 1 a more competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. 
 Further, it has the interesting implication that if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, then buyer 1 
outsources knowledge from the supplier only if there is a competitor in the 
downstream market. If 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, monopoly buyer 1 has no incentive to further 
improve her product performance through knowledge outsourcing due to her 
relatively low cost of in-house knowledge development. However, even with a low 
cost of in-house knowledge development, buyer 1 under duopoly pursues knowledge 
outsourcing so that her competitor (buyer 2) will reduce product performance. 
Therefore, the existence of competition between buyers in the marketplace provides 
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the supplier with a higher chance of earning profit. To investigate how different 
parameters impact buyer 1’s decision to outsource knowledge from the supplier under 
duopoly, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 and find similar results (
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0) as in the monopoly case. The details of the discussion are therefore omitted. 
3.4.2 Both Buyers Outsource Knowledge 
 In Section 3.4.2, we consider a situation where both buyers, 1 and 2, have the 
option to outsource knowledge from the supplier (i.e., 𝑆𝑆1 ≥ 0 and 𝑆𝑆2 ≥ 0). To build 
on our insights from Sections 3.3 and 3.4.1, we examine which conditions lead both 
buyers to pursue knowledge outsourcing. In addition, we analyze the supplier’s 
service strategies when he would serve only one buyer or both buyers. 
3.4.2.1 Problems of the buyers and supplier in the Duopoly Case 
 Incorporating buyer 2’s knowledge outsourcing (𝑆𝑆2) into the Hotelling market 
model from Section 3.4.1 (see Equations (18) - (21)), the demand quantities of buyers 
1 and 2 in the marketplace are given as:  
𝑞𝑞1 =




𝐷𝐷2 − 𝐷𝐷1 − 𝑝𝑝2 + 𝑝𝑝1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆2 − 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆1 + 𝜃𝜃
2𝜃𝜃
. (30) 
 Similar to Section 3.4.1, given their demand quantities from Equations (29) 
and (30), buyers 1 and 2 who compete in the downstream market simultaneously 
determine their retail prices in stage 3 while maximizing their profits defined in 
Equation (32). In stage 2, as summarized in Equation (31), the two buyers 
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simultaneously determine their levels of in-house knowledge development and 
knowledge outsourcing to improve product performance. 
Stage 2 Buyer i: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖>0
𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆−𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′,𝑝𝑝−𝑖𝑖′ ) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2 − 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖2, 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖′ = 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖>0
𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖 (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝−𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. 
(31) 
Stage 3 Buyer i: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖>0
𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝−𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞−𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝−𝑖𝑖) − 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖2 − 𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖2. (32) 
 When the supplier serves both buyers 1 and 2 simultaneously, we assume that 
he determines a common wholesale price, denoted by 𝑤𝑤, to charge to both buyers. 
The supplier gains his revenue from buyers 1 and 2 separately, but the costs of 
developing new knowledge to meet the needs of both buyers are pooled and denoted 
by 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆2)2. This formulation reflects a situation where undertaking two 
simultaneous knowledge outsourcing projects for two different buyers consumes the 
supplier’s scarce resources, thus incurring additional coordination and opportunity 
costs. Equation (33) below summarizes the supplier’s problem when serving both 
buyers 1 and 2. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥
 𝑤𝑤>0
𝛱𝛱𝑆𝑆 = 𝑤𝑤(𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆2) − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆2)2. (33) 
 Through backward induction we obtain optimal decisions in equilibrium, as 
shown in Proposition 11 below. 
Proposition 11. The equilibrium decisions when the supplier serves both buyers, 1 
and 2, under duopoly: 𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝜙𝜙(2𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠+𝑔𝑔)
6(𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠+𝑔𝑔)
, 𝐷𝐷1∗ = 𝐷𝐷2∗ =
1
6𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏
, 𝑆𝑆1∗ = 𝑆𝑆2∗ =
𝜙𝜙
12(𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠+𝑔𝑔)





3.4.2.2 Buyers’ Decisions on Knowledge Outsourcing 
 A comparison of Proposition 11 and Proposition 9(i) produces interesting 
insights. The two buyers charge the same retail prices and use the same levels of in-
house knowledge development regardless of whether they both together outsource 
knowledge from the supplier. This indicates that even if the two buyers improve 
their product performance through knowledge outsourcing they will in fact be worse 
off due to the additional costs incurred by the purchase and integration of outsourced 
knowledge. One might therefore expect that neither buyer would ever pursue 
knowledge outsourcing. However, since the game between buyers 1 and 2 is non-
cooperative, we find a condition under which both buyers do pursue knowledge 
outsourcing. Based on an analysis of the normal-form game between buyers 1 and 2 
shown in Table 5, we discuss the underlying logic behind their decisions to outsource 
and find it similar to the Prisoner's dilemma (Gibbons 1992). 





Yes (𝛱𝛱112, 𝛱𝛱212) (𝛱𝛱11, 𝛱𝛱21) 
No (𝛱𝛱12, 𝛱𝛱22) (𝛱𝛱1, 𝛱𝛱2) 
 
 Note that the superscripts added to the buyer’s profit indicate the buyers who 
outsource knowledge (e.g., 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖12 reflects buyer 𝑖𝑖’s profit when both buyers, 1 and 2, 
outsource knowledge). When the supplier attempts to serve both buyers 1 and 2, 
under what condition do both buyers choose to pursue knowledge outsourcing? To 
answer this question we compare the buyers’ profits in three scenarios, as shown in 
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the normal-form game between buyers 1 and 2 in Table 5: (1) both buyers outsource 
(𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖12); (2) one of the two buyers outsources (𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖1 and 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖2); and (3) no one outsources 
(𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖), where 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. As shown in Table 5, we find two Nash equilibriums, and 
Proposition 12 summarizes the main results. 
Proposition 12. Consider a supplier who attempts to serve both buyers under 
duopoly: i) If 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏, then both buyers, 1 and 2, pursue knowledge outsourcing from 
the supplier; ii) If 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷, then no buyer outsources. 
 
 In contrast to the insight obtained from the comparison of Proposition 11 and 
Proposition 9(i) above, we find that if the buyer’s cost of in-house knowledge 
development (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏) is higher than 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷, then both buyers pursue knowledge outsourcing 
(i.e., (𝛱𝛱112, 𝛱𝛱212)). As shown in Proposition 10, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏, then we know a buyer who 
has the option to outsource knowledge from the supplier pursues knowledge 
outsourcing. Since the other buyer in Section 3.4.2 also has the option to outsource, 
she also pursues knowledge outsourcing in order to meet the competition in the 
downstream market. The interesting part of this result is that one buyer’s decision 
to pursue knowledge outsourcing logically leads the other buyer to outsource as well, 
when they would in fact both be able to earn higher profits if neither of them 
outsourced knowledge from the supplier. If 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷, however, then both buyers 
choose not to outsource knowledge and maintain equal ability to lower their retail 





3.4.2.3 Supplier’s Service Strategy: Serving One Buyer versus Serving Both 
Buyers 
 Given the buyers’ conditional desire for knowledge outsourcing in Proposition 
12, we investigate further the question of whether the supplier always benefits from 
serving both buyers. As summarized in Proposition 13, we compare the supplier’s 
profit in two situations: (1) the supplier chooses to serve both buyers; and (2) the 
supplier chooses to serve only one buyer (buyer 1). 
Proposition 13. When the supplier considers both buyers as his potential clients: 
𝑖𝑖) If buyers’ in-house knowledge development costs (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏) are lower than the threshold 
(𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆), where 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆 =
𝑔𝑔
9𝑔𝑔𝜃𝜃−𝜙𝜙2
, then the supplier benefits from serving only one buyer 
(niche strategy); Otherwise (𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏), the supplier serves both buyers 1 and 2 
(saturation strategy); ii) Further, 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆, even if both buyers pursue 
knowledge outsourcing, the supplier serves only one buyer. 
 We find that if the buyers’ in-house knowledge development costs (𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏) are 




. The supplier’s optimal service strategy in that case is a niche strategy 
(Erat et al. 2013). To clarify, suppose the buyers’ in-house knowledge development 
costs are sufficiently low. The two buyers are both willing to accept a higher 
wholesale price of knowledge to obtain exclusive access to knowledge outsourcing. 
Leveraging this information, the supplier charges a premium wholesale price and 
provides an exclusive knowledge outsourcing service to one buyer (buyer 1). Buyer 
1 can afford the supplier’s high wholesale price since she then also charges a higher 
retail price than buyer 2 in the marketplace. The supplier also benefits because he 
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saves on in-house knowledge development cost by reducing the need to develop 
knowledge for any other buyer (buyer 2). 
 In contrast, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏, then the two buyers seek to reduce their costs of 
improving product performance since it is too costly. This encourages the supplier 
to charge a lower wholesale price of knowledge and serve both buyers. In that case, 
the supplier’s optimal service strategy is a saturation strategy (Erat et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, we find that 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆. Therefore, when 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆, the supplier 
chooses to serve only one buyer even if both buyers pursue knowledge outsourcing. 
 For further analysis, we examine how exogenous parameters impact the 
supplier’s service strategy using a sensitivity analysis of 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆. First, suppose the buyers’ 
integration costs (𝑔𝑔) decrease. Both buyers then have an increased desire to pursue 
knowledge outsourcing, which increases competition pressure on their product 
performance in the marketplace. Both buyers are therefore more willing to accept an 
increase in the supplier’s wholesale price. In this situation, the benefits the supplier 
gains from charging a higher wholesale price for providing an exclusive service to 
buyer 1 compensate for his loss from not serving buyer 2.  Buyer 1 is willing to 
accept the higher wholesale price of knowledge in return for the exclusive service in 
order to mitigate competition pressure. As a result, the supplier is more inclined to 
serve only one buyer when 𝑔𝑔 is lower (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
< 0). We also find that the supplier is 
more inclined to serve only one buyer (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0) if the buyers’ absorptive capacity 
(𝜙𝜙) is larger. This result can be understood through similar logic to the case of 
integration cost above. 
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 Synthesizing our discussions from Sections 3.3, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2, Figure 8 below 
depicts the important managerial insights obtained from Propositions 8, 10, and 13 
together. 
 
Figure 8. Collective depiction of the three thresholds. 𝜙𝜙 = 0.8, 𝑔𝑔 = 1, 𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆 = 2, 𝜃𝜃 ∈
[0.2, 0.6] 
 Regardless of the competition structure in the downstream market (i.e., 
whether it’s a monopoly or duopoly), if the buyers’ in-house knowledge development 
costs are greater than 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀 then the supplier serves both buyers. Due to the high cost 
of in-house knowledge development, the buyers always choose to pursue knowledge 
outsourcing from the supplier. In contrast, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, as discussed in 
Proposition 10, then a buyer pursues knowledge outsourcing only if there is a 
competitor in the downstream market. However, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆 (see Proposition 13), 
then only one buyer is effectively served by the supplier even if both buyers pursue 
knowledge outsourcing because the supplier is better off providing an exclusive 
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service to one buyer (niche strategy). In contrast, if 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆 < 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 < 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀, then both buyers 
are sensitive to the supplier’s wholesale price of knowledge, so the supplier chooses 
to charge a lower wholesale price and attract both buyers (saturation strategy). 
 
3.4.2.4 Effect of Prior Knowledge 
 As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, in this study, the buyer’s product performance 
does not directly reflect her prior knowledge. Since a buyer’s prior knowledge 
influences interactions between the buyer and the supplier (Lee et al. 2016), in this 
section we further explore the effect of prior knowledge. 
 Suppose the buyer is able to utilize her prior knowledge. First, since the buyer 
is able to maintain a higher level of baseline performance (𝑅𝑅), she increases her 
product performance through a higher level of in-house knowledge development and 
knowledge outsourcing in the monopoly case (see Proposition 7). Naturally, the buyer 
is then also able to charge a higher retail price in the marketplace. Anticipating this 
behavior, the supplier charges a higher wholesale price of knowledge due to the 
buyer’s higher desire for knowledge outsourcing. 
 A buyer’s prior knowledge also impacts whether or not the buyer pursues 
knowledge outsourcing under either monopoly or duopoly through her absorptive 
capacity, which is positively associated with prior knowledge (Lee et al. 2016). As 
shown in Propositions 8 and 10, if a buyer’s prior knowledge increases, the buyer is 
less inclined to outsource knowledge from the supplier due to the supplier’s higher 
wholesale price of knowledge (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0). In a duopoly case, this 
encourages the supplier to serve only one buyer (see Proposition 13, 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
> 0). 
Similarly, since a higher absorptive capacity reduces integration cost (Ceccagnoli and 
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Jiang 2013), if a buyer utilizes her prior knowledge, the buyer is less inclined to 
outsource knowledge under either monopoly or duopoly (𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐?̅?𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
< 0). 
 In addition, if the supplier is able to utilize his prior knowledge, he saves on 
knowledge development cost when meeting the buyer’s needs. To obtain a larger 
amount of knowledge outsourcing, the supplier reduces the wholesale price of 
knowledge he charges to the buyer, thereby also encouraging the buyer to outsource 
knowledge. Due to the decreased pressure on his knowledge development cost, the 
supplier is more inclined to serve both buyers as his prior knowledge increases. 
 As discussed extensively above, leveraging prior knowledge, a unique feature 
of knowledge outsourcing, has a significant role that impacts decisions and outcomes 
of the buyer and the supplier for knowledge outsourcing. This is in fact because of 
the property of knowledge as a resource that firms can repeatedly utilize, which does 
not exist in component outsourcing. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Lee et al. (2016) first introduce knowledge outsourcing games to investigate 
the interactions between one supplier and one buyer. They show how absorptive 
capacity, uncertainty about the buyer’s project scope, and information asymmetry 
affect the decisions and objective values of the supplier and the buyer. To further 
explore the implications on supplier-buyer interactions, specifically when the supplier 
serves multiple buyers, we introduce a Stackelberg game where a common supplier 
(leader) serves two buyers, 1 and 2 (followers), who compete in the downstream 
market. Building on the game formulation introduced by Lee et al. (2016), the 
supplier in this study sets the wholesale price of knowledge charged to both buyers 
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and buyers 1 and 2 determine the extent to which they improve product performance 
through knowledge outsourcing and/or in-house knowledge development. 
 The analytic results provide important insights into the decision-making of 
both the supplier and buyers when one supplier serves multiple buyers. First, we find 
that a buyer is more inclined to outsource knowledge from the supplier when she has 
a competitor in the downstream market. This is because a buyer’s option to 
outsource knowledge under duopoly leads her competitor to profit from reducing 
their cost of in-house knowledge development. This indicates that knowledge 
outsourcing influences buyers’ competition strategies in the downstream market. As 
we show, if only buyer 1 has the option to outsource knowledge, she benefits from 
charging a high retail price and improving her product performance to gain 
advantage over buyer 2, who charges a low retail price. 
 Second, when the supplier serves both buyers, we find a knowledge 
outsourcing version of the Prisoner's dilemma. That is, there are certain conditions 
under which both buyers pursue knowledge outsourcing even if it results in them 
both being worse off. This is because if one buyer deviates from the equilibrium and 
does not outsource knowledge, her profit would be lower than if they both outsource 
knowledge and her competitor would earn an even higher profit. The non-cooperative 
nature of competition between the two buyers in the downstream market provides 
additional advantage for the supplier. 
 Third, leveraging the fact that one buyer who outsources knowledge under 
duopoly gains additional profit, the supplier can charge a higher wholesale price of 
knowledge and benefit from serving only one buyer, even if both buyers wish to 
pursue knowledge outsourcing. Specifically, we identify conditions under which the 
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supplier is better off serving only one of the two buyers. If the buyer’s in-house 
knowledge development cost is sufficiently low, the supplier’s profit when serving 
only one buyer is larger than that when serving both buyers. This is because if the 
buyer’s in-house knowledge development cost is sufficiently low, the buyer is willing 
to accept the supplier’s high wholesale price of knowledge for a given level of 
knowledge outsourcing. In addition, by charging a high wholesale price and serving 
only one buyer, the supplier is able to eliminate the internal cost of developing new 
knowledge to satisfy the second buyer’s needs.  
 Therefore, if buyers compete in classical commodity industries (i.e., the cost 
of in-house KD is low), firms in KIBS including IDEO can benefit from providing an 
exclusive services to one buyer by charging a high price. In contrast, if the buyers 
compete in highly technical industries (i.e., the cost of in-house KD is high), a 
professional service firm should reduce his price of knowledge to attract multiple 
buyers. This service strategy in the context of knowledge outsourcing is in parallel 
with Erat et al. (2013) who study issues on outsourcing for innovative components. 
Since buyers in their component outsourcing study are adopters of technological 
advancement accomplished by the supplier, supplier’s capability (e.g., design 
capability for functionalities) plays a more significant role for his own service strategy 
than the buyers’ internal cost of knowledge development. 
 Overall, building upon the dyadic case featuring one supplier and one buyer 
introduced by Lee et al. (2016), this study has gained important insights regarding 
how one common supplier and multiple buyers who compete in the downstream 
market can effectively manage knowledge outsourcing. However, this study does not 
cover the situation where multiple buyers outsource knowledge from the supplier 
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sequentially. If one buyer waits until her competitor has first received the knowledge 
outsourcing services and comes to the supplier as the second client, then she may 
benefit from the supplier’s previous experience in developing knowledge for the first 
buyer. In this situation, the second buyer’s time to market would be delayed. 
Therefore, an analysis of the trade-off between a buyer’s time of outsourcing and 
time to market would be valuable in future research.  
 To formulate competition between buyers in the downstream market, we use 
Hotelling model due to tractability, in which vertical differentiation is not fully 
captured. A future research may benefit from applying other market demand models 
such as Cournot competition to examine the impact of competition more 
comprehensively. In this study, we consider wholesale-price-only type of contracts. 
Since there may be various forms of lump-sum payments in practice, researchers may 
also examine the joint impact of competition and different types of contracts (e.g., 
revenue sharing, milestone-based contract, two-part tariff, exclusive contract, etc.) 
on knowledge outsourcing. Lastly, an investigation of the situation where two 
knowledge suppliers compete by setting their wholesale prices of knowledge to attract 





CHAPTER 4. KNOWLEDGE OUTSOURCING: A 




 Firms in a diverse range of industries, including automobiles, aerospace, 
computer, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and software 
increasingly rely on external knowledge acquisition due to the increased complexity 
and scope of knowledge required for successful new product development (Carson 
2007; Gaimon et al. 2017a; Quinn 2000). For example, under the catch-phrase, 
“Connect and Develop”, Procter & Gamble aims to source 50% of its new products 
from external firms (Carson 2007). Other high-tech firms, including Dell, Hewlett-
Packard, and pharmaceutical firms such as GlaxoSmithKline and Eli Lilly, are also 
outsourcing much of their new product research from external partners (Calantone 
and Stanko 2007). Reflecting the increasing importance of external knowledge 
acquisition, Booz&Co. and Duke University (2007) report that the “hot” sectors for 
business services are: knowledge/analytical services and innovation services (product 
development, engineering, and R&D). Additionally, U.S. census data (BEA 2017) 
demonstrates that the GDP value produced by the knowledge-intensive service 
industry – which includes professional, scientific, and technical services (all of which 
drive product design, R&D, IT, consulting, and marketing) – more than doubled 
between the years 1998 and 2016. For instance, firms such as InnoCentive have 
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greatly expanded the role of the consulting industry (Lakhani 2008; Gaimon et al. 
2017a). 
 As external knowledge sourcing becomes a central part of a firm’s overall 
strategy, firms seek out knowledge from a variety of external sources including 
customers, competitors, suppliers, and professional knowledge providers such as 
consultancies (Van De Vrande 2013). In this review, we focus on firms’ external 
knowledge acquisition from professional knowledge providers, which we refer to as 
‘knowledge outsourcing’ (Lee et al. 2016; Gaimon et al. 2017b). It is useful to note 
that the term knowledge outsourcing is used interchangeably with the terms ‘R&D 
outsourcing’ (Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; Howells et al. 2008), ‘design and engineering 
outsourcing’ (Zirpoli and Becker 2011), and ‘innovation outsourcing’ (Cui et al. 2012; 
Stanko and Calantone 2011) in the current literature. Based on Grimpe and Kaiser 
(2010) and Howells (1999), knowledge outsourcing can be defined as a contractual 
agreement between a knowledge recipient (buyer) and a source (supplier), and a 
supplier who does not compete in the same market with the buyer performs 
knowledge development tasks independently on her behalf. Upon completion of his 
knowledge development tasks, the outcomes of the supplier’s knowledge development 
are delivered to the buyer in pre-agreed forms (e.g., a written report, software, design 
drawings) with all specified exploitation rights. 
 While a buyer’s reasons for pursuing knowledge outsourcing depend on her 
specific needs for technology and the market, typical motivations include: R&D cost 
reduction, faster new product development, lack of internal knowledge, superior 
technology acquisition, ease of management and control, and the reduction of 
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uncertainty5 and risk6 (Cui et al. 2012; Howells et al. 2008; Stanko and Calantone 
2011). However, there is some risk that knowledge outsourcing may not produce the 
expected outcomes because the costs of suppliers’ opportunistic behavior, possible 
lack of ability to meet the buyer’s needs, and the risk of knowledge leakage are often 
overlooked or underestimated when knowledge outsourcing contracts are agreed upon 
(Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; Raassens et al. 2012). For instance, a critical cause of the 
delayed launch of Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner was the significant reliance on outsourcing 
for both design and production (Lunsford 2007). Siemens faced problems of a 
different nature: some of its knowledge suppliers for NPD refused to adjust technical 
specifications and leaked the knowledge developed for Siemens to other firms (Cui 
et al. 2012). Therefore, firms must understand how to better manage knowledge 
outsourcing in order to benefit from it. 
 While the operations management literature on component outsourcing has 
led to a deep understanding of procurement and contributed to addressing 
operational challenges including quality, performance, and reliability, despite its 
prevalence in practice, studies on knowledge outsourcing are limited (Gaimon et al. 
2017a). Similarly, while the knowledge management literature extensively provides 
managers with important implications and insights into how to manage 
organizational learning processes including knowledge transfer (i.e., vicarious 
                                                            
5 We consider two different types of uncertainty which jointly influence the decisions and outcomes 
of knowledge outsourcing: technological uncertainty and market uncertainty (Walker and Weber 
1984). 
6 We consider the risk of knowledge outsourcing in two angles throughout the paper: 1) risks in 




learning) (Argote 2013; Argote and Hora 2017), although it is also a critical part of 
organizational learning, research on knowledge outsourcing is scant. 
 In this study, we review extant literature on knowledge outsourcing to 
document our current understanding, and provide future research agenda. In Section 
4.1.1, we describe the environment in which knowledge outsourcing takes place, 
where various players and other factors jointly influence firms’ decisions on 
knowledge outsourcing. In Section 4.1.2, we adopt a project management framework 
for knowledge outsourcing which includes five phases: Initiate, Plan, Execute, Utilize, 
and Check. Based on this framework, we review current studies, discuss the 
challenges faced during decision-making, and provide future research agendas for 
each phase in Sections 4.2 to 4.6. Lastly, we conclude this study with a discussion 
on managerial implications in Section 4.7. 
4.1.1 Knowledge Outsourcing Environment 
 As illustrated in Figure 9, buyers obtain knowledge from various external 
sources in the value-chain and improve products/processes by utilizing it. Prior 
studies broadly identify five external pools of knowledge: customers (i.e., lead users), 
supplier chain (i.e., suppliers for components or materials), crowd (i.e., innovation 
contests), competitors (i.e., coopetition), and professional knowledge suppliers 
(Bellamy et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2016; Gaimon et al. 2017b; Gnyawali and Park 
2011; Terwiesch and Xu 2008; Tether and Tajar 2008). 
 While customers (i.e., the consumers of products/services) are the target to 
whom a buyer (i.e., a knowledge buyer) sells her products or services, they are also 
a critical source of market knowledge for product innovation (Chen et al. 2016). 
However, since customers mainly provide a source of new ideas, the buyer still needs 
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to develop in-depth knowledge to integrate and implement those ideas (Von Hippel 
2005). Suppliers in supply networks increasingly take on broader responsibilities, 
including product design, due to their expertise and prior knowledge on the latest 
technologies and components (Bellamy et al. 2014; Du et al. 2014; Lee and Schmidt 
2017). Nevertheless, as shown in the Tesla’s falcon wing door case,7 a supplier’s 
inability to meet a buyer’s requirements may result in unintended consequences such 
as delays in launching new products because the supplier (who develops the product 
design) typically produces and delivers the corresponding components (Ramsey 
2016). 
 To save on R&D cost and expand the landscape of innovation opportunities, 
firms (seekers) often rely on engineers and/or scientists (solvers) in public (through 
intermediaries such as InnoCentive, Topcoder, and IdeaStorm.com). This is known 
as ‘crowdsourcing’ (also ‘innovation contest’ or ‘innovation tournament’) (Terwiesch 
and Xu 2008). Despite its potential benefits and the growing trend towards 
crowdsourcing, a poorly designed contest in terms of the award mechanism and 
participation control may reduce the quality of solvers’ solutions and seekers’ 
implementation rates (Huang et al. 2014; Terwiesch and Xu 2008). Firms in many 
high-tech industries, including automotive, electronics, and pharmaceuticals, often 
obtain knowledge from their competitors, which is formally termed as ‘coopetition’, 
because competing firms typically require similar types of knowledge and possess 
complementary resources (Gaimon et al. 2017b; Gnyawali and Park 2011). However, 
due to the simultaneous pursuit of collaboration and competition, coopetition 
involves a high degree of conflict between a pair of competing firms based on 
                                                            
7 The supplier's inability to meet the design specifications for vertical doors (i.e., falcon wing doors) 
was identified as a critical factor in the delayed launch of Tesla's Model X electric SUV. 
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opportunism where firms try to appropriate a greater share of the co-created value 
(Gnyawali and Park 2011). 
 Lastly, knowledge outsourcing from professional knowledge suppliers such as 
Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS)8 allows firms to avoid conflict with 
competitors as well as to leverage the specialized expertise of knowledge suppliers. 
However, many of the challenges involved in knowledge outsourcing, including 
suppliers’ opportunism and knowledge leakage, are still understudied. As discussed, 
each source of knowledge in the knowledge outsourcing environment has its own 
advantages and challenges. To define the scope of this study, we focus on how to 
manage the knowledge outsourcing process rather than on how to choose an 
appropriate external source of knowledge. We include multiple research 
methodologies in this study such as empirical and normative modeling to synthesize 
the current literature. Other environmental forces such as competition and 
uncertainty influence firms’ decisions and the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. 
Therefore, we also discuss how buyers and suppliers better address those challenges 
and environmental forces based on the knowledge outsourcing framework, which is 
introduced in the next section. 
                                                            
8 KIBS are firms broadly referred to as knowledge intermediaries, knowledge-intensive firms, 
knowledge brokers, technology brokers, or professional service firms in the literature (Howells 2006, 




Figure 9. Knowledge outsourcing environment. 
 
4.1.2 Knowledge Outsourcing Framework 
 A firm’s knowledge outsourcing activities constitute processes which proceed 
in the form of a project (Lee et al. 2016). Therefore, it is useful to understand the 
life cycle of a knowledge outsourcing project in order to better manage them. Project 
Management Institute (PMI)9 identifies five groups of project management processes: 
initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling, and closing (Stackpole 
2013). In the initiating phase, a project manager defines a new project or identifies 
improvements to be made on an existing project and obtains managerial 
authorization to officially start the project. After receiving budgetary approval from 
upper management, the project manager uses the planning phase to establish the 
scope of the project, refine the objectives, and define the course of action required to 
achieve those objectives. In the executing phase, the activities specified in the 
                                                            




planned course of action are performed to satisfy the project specifications. In the 
monitoring and controlling phase, the project manager tracks, reviews, and regulates 
the progress and performance of the project to make sure the project is successful. 
In addition, the project manager identifies any changes required and performs the 
necessary actions during this phase. In the closing phase, the project manager 
finalizes all activities to formally complete the project and evaluate its final 
performance. 
A conceptual framework of a managerial initiative is considered to be an 
effective instrument when discussing firms’ dynamic decisions, objectives, and 
challenges. For instance, Gaimon & Bailey (2013) propose a procedural framework 
based on the venture life cycle to provide entrepreneurial ventures with a guide to 
benefit from their knowledge management activities. Similarly, to identify future 
research opportunities while discussing the current literature on knowledge 
outsourcing, we utilize a knowledge outsourcing framework adapted from Stackpole 
(2013): Phase 1 – Initiate, Phase 2 – Plan, Phase 3 – Execute, Phase 4 – Utilize, 
Phase 5 – Check. Table 6 presents this framework, under which we discuss the 
processes, benefits, challenges, current studies, and future research opportunities of 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Phase 1 – Initiate 
 When a firm first initiates a knowledge outsourcing project they must answer 
two critical questions: 1) Why knowledge outsourcing? And 2) Knowledge 
outsourcing for what? Since multiple governance modes of knowledge acquisition are 
available, including in-house knowledge development, the firm should understand 
the conditions under which they pursue knowledge outsourcing (Chatterji 1996; 
Nicholls-Nixon and Woo 2003; Van De Vrande 2013). The firm’s reliance on 
knowledge outsourcing also depends on many internal and/or external factors, 
including their specific types of innovation (e.g., exploration versus exploitation and 
product innovation versus process innovation) and uncertainty (technological 
uncertainty and market uncertainty) (Gaimon et al.; 2017; Stanko & Calantone; 
2011). 
4.2.1 Why Knowledge Outsourcing? 
 Several studies have identified the drivers of knowledge outsourcing: 
familiarity of target knowledge and the market, asset specificity, appropriability, the 
objectives of knowledge outsourcing, and competition (Cesaroni 2004; Chatterji 1996; 
Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Narula 2001; Steensma and Corley 2000, 2001; Swan 
and Allred 2003; Veugelers 1997; Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). Chatterji (1996) 
shows that when a firm plans to either obtain unfamiliar knowledge or enter an 
unfamiliar market they prefer to pursue knowledge outsourcing over other external 
sourcing modes, including alliances (e.g., joint venture and licensing) and M&A, due 
to its flexibility and lower financial risk. Based on transaction cost theory (Geyskens 
et al. 2006), studies consistently find that when specific assets (e.g., laboratory 
equipment) are required to pursue knowledge outsourcing or related assets are 
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already invested, a firm tends to internalize knowledge development activities 
(Cesaroni 2004; Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Veugelers 1997). 
 A firm’s incentive to outsource knowledge depends on the firm’s 
appropriability, which refers to the firm’s ability to protect the outcomes of its 
intellectual activities and benefit from them (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006). 
Empirical studies have consistently shown that weak appropriability has a negative 
relationship with the external contracting of innovation activities due to the 
possibility of knowledge leakage (Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Steensma and 
Corley 2000; Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). Knowledge leakage poses a significant 
challenge when a firm executes a knowledge outsourcing project with a knowledge 
supplier. More detailed discussion follows in the section Phase 3 – Execute. 
 Firms’ objectives to pursue knowledge outsourcing are heterogeneous. Firms 
may seek external knowledge either to realize their differentiation strategies or to 
achieve their low-cost goals. Using surveys, Swan & Allred (2003) show how firms’ 
decisions on external knowledge acquisition are associated with their goals. With the 
strategic goal of differentiation, a firm needs to create and sustain a first-mover 
advantage. However, since external knowledge acquisition offers the most advantages 
to the fastest second-mover, the study shows that firms’ decisions on external 
knowledge acquisition are negatively associated with their differentiation goals. 
Similarly, other studies using surveys and case-based methodologies suggest that 
firms tend to obtain knowledge from their internal resources to fully exploit 
opportunities if technological innovation is their competitive advantage (Narula 
2001; Steensma and Corley 2001). Consequently, a firm’s desire to imitate 
competitors is positively associated with external knowledge acquisition (Chatterji 
 
 90 
1996). On the other hand, external knowledge acquisition often incurs additional 
costs due to loss of control, knowledge leakage, or the supplier’s opportunistic 
behavior. Based on these arguments, empirical studies show that firms rely less on 
knowledge outsourcing if cost is their dominant concern (Swan and Allred 2003; 
Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). 
 While there have been a good deal of empirical studies, research using 
analytical modeling is scant. Using a game-theoretical formulation between a 
common knowledge supplier and two buyers who compete in the downstream market, 
Lee et al. (2017) study how the interactions between the supplier and the two buyers 
is associated with competition between the buyers. They analytically find that a 
buyer pursues knowledge outsourcing only if the buyer’s in-house knowledge 
development cost is sufficiently high. More interestingly, they show that if a buyer 
has a competitor in the downstream market, the buyer is more inclined to pursue 
knowledge outsourcing because the buyer’s knowledge outsourcing discourages the 
competitor from investing in quality improvement. 
4.2.2 What Type of Knowledge to Be Outsourced? 
 To allocate resources efficiently and utilize innovation outcomes effectively, 
firms apply different managerial schemes to their knowledge acquisition projects 
depending on project type (Chandrasekaran et al. 2015). First, firms often categorize 
their knowledge acquisition projects based on the innovativeness of outputs (i.e., 
radical versus incremental innovation10) and use different knowledge sourcing modes. 
                                                            
10 Ettlie et al. (1984, p. 683) state that “If a technology is new to the adopting unit and new to the 
referent group of organizations, or if it requires both throughput (process) as well as output 
(production or service) change, perhaps the magnitude or cost of change required by the organization 
is sufficient to warrant the designation of a rare of radical, as opposed to incremental, innovation.” 
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Projects with targets to achieve radical innovation deal with more complex and firm-
specific knowledge, which requires frequent information exchange between the 
related functions (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). This interaction between a source 
of information and a recipient occurs more easily if it happens within the boundaries 
of a firm. Driven by this argument, Beneito (2006) empirically shows that radical 
innovation tends to be conducted by in-house R&D, whereas incremental innovation 
is pursued more frequently by contracted R&D. In fact, firms simultaneously manage 
internal and external R&D projects to obtain both existing and new knowledge. 
Based on this practical observation, Rothaermel & Alexandre (2009) study how a 
firm’s mixture of technology sourcing (internal sourcing and external sourcing) and 
the type of technology sourced (known or new technologies) jointly impact the 
performance of a knowledge acquisition project (innovativeness and financial 
performance). Their study suggests that a firm’s performance is improved if 
exploitation (exploration, respectively)11 for the known (new, respectively) 
technologies is pursued by internal (external, respectively) R&D, which provides an 
opposing result argument to Beneito (2006). 
 The discrepancy above calls for a more comprehensive study to understand 
how the innovativeness of knowledge outsourcing projects is associated with firms’ 
decisions about their knowledge sourcing modes (Gaimon et al. 2017b). As Carrillo 
& Gaimon (2004) argue in their analytical study, a radical innovation to obtain new 
knowledge entails a high degree of uncertainty (technological uncertainty). In the 
context of knowledge outsourcing, Lee et al. (2016) study how a buyer’s project scope 
                                                            
11 Levinthal & March (1993) have defined exploration as “the pursuit of new knowledge, of things 




uncertainty impacts the interactions between the buyer and a supplier. They 
analytically find that the question of whether the buyer increases or decreases her 
level of knowledge outsourcing as her project scope uncertainty increases depends on 
her cost of obtaining knowledge from other sources. Specifically, if the buyer’s cost 
of obtaining additional knowledge elsewhere is relatively high (low, respectively), 
then the buyer relies more (less, respectively) on knowledge outsourcing as her 
project scope uncertainty increases. Since the buyer naturally compares the supplier’s 
price with the cost of outside sourcing options, this result suggests that the relative 
advantage of possible external knowledge sourcing options is one of the driving forces 
in decisions about which knowledge sourcing mode to use for radical knowledge 
sourcing projects. 
 While current studies are actively investigating the relationship between 
knowledge sourcing mode and the level of innovativeness, most studies focus on 
knowledge acquisition for product innovation. Given the importance of a firm’s 
process innovation as a competitive weapon (Pisano 1997), Krzeminska & Eckert 
(2016) study how the different characteristics of knowledge involved in process 
innovation, as opposed to product innovation, influence firms’ knowledge sourcing 
modes (internal versus external R&D). Using cross-sectional firm-level data, they 
find that firms benefit less from knowledge outsourcing for process innovation than 
for product innovation since there is more tacit knowledge involved in process 
innovation. The limited benefits gained from using knowledge outsourcing for process 
innovation are shown to be reduced when upstream suppliers are selected as external 
knowledge sources (Antonelli and Fassio 2016). Since selecting the best suitable 
knowledge supplier is a key decision for buyers, we discuss it in more detail in Section 
4.3 on the second phase (Plan). 
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4.2.3 Future Research Opportunities 
 Managers in the initiate phase invariably deal with uncertainty (technological 
uncertainty and market uncertainty) when making their knowledge outsourcing 
decisions. Resulting from technological uncertainty, there are two opposing forces 
which influence a firm’s desire for knowledge outsourcing reversely: flexibility and 
complexity (Stanko and Calantone 2011). As technological uncertainty increases, 
firms need more flexibility to hedge against investment risk, which encourages them 
to obtain knowledge from external sources. On the other hand, the composition of 
knowledge involved in a knowledge acquisition project becomes more complicated as 
technological uncertainty increases, which makes it difficult to describe the 
requirements in a knowledge outsourcing contract. Reflecting these trade-offs, 
current empirical studies produce mixed results on the relationship between the level 
of technological uncertainty and a firm’s propensity toward knowledge outsourcing 
(positive association: Swan & Allred (2003), negative association: Nakamura & 
Odagiri (2005)). Clearly, further research is needed to better understand the 
conditions under which the advantages of flexibility obtained from knowledge 
outsourcing offset the disadvantages caused by increased complexity as technological 
uncertainty increases. 
 Since the current literature on knowledge outsourcing is relatively quiet on 
the impact of market uncertainty on a firm’s knowledge outsourcing decisions, there 
are a myriad of opportunities for impactful research. While empirical studies may 
have limitations when measuring the level of market uncertainty, studies using 
analytical models or lab experiments are better able to fill this gap in the literature. 
In addition, further research is required to investigate how the two types of 
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uncertainty jointly influence a firm’s knowledge outsourcing decisions, in order to 
obtain a more comprehensive view of the impact of uncertainty on knowledge 
outsourcing. 
4.3 Phase 2 – Plan 
 After receiving official authorization to pursue a knowledge outsourcing 
project in the initiating phase, the buyer determines the most suitable knowledge 
supplier and the level of knowledge outsourcing required in the planning phase. 
Subsequently, the buyer and the selected supplier make a contractual agreement on 
the specific content of the knowledge to be outsourced (solutions for problems to be 
solved or results of experiments to be performed), the form of knowledge to be 
outsourced as deliverables (written report, engineering design drawings, physical 
prototypes, or software), the price of knowledge, the level of knowledge outsourcing 
(hours of effort from the supplier), and the due date (Lee et al. 2016). The buyer 
may find these decisions challenging due to uncertainty and information asymmetry 
between the buyer and the supplier. Moreover, since the supplier also optimizes his 
decision such as the unit price of knowledge, the buyer’s decision-making process 
becomes even more complicated. In this section, we review current studies on the 
decisions corresponding to the planning phase and provide suggestions for future 
research to address the current challenges. 
4.3.1 Selection of a Knowledge Supplier 
 When a buyer seeks a supplier for knowledge to solve a specific problem, some 
firm-specific information about the supplier, such as the amount of existing 
knowledge he possesses which is relevant to the buyer’s problem, may remain private. 
This is an issue of information asymmetry. In such situations, the buyer faces the 
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risk that the supplier might in fact be incapable of meeting her needs. Therefore, the 
buyer evaluates whether the supplier is capable of understanding the problem and 
developing effective solutions. A supplier’s research and technical capability is an 
important criterion for the buyer’s selection. It has been empirically shown that 
buyers tend to select outsourcing partners who possess superior technological 
resources (Howells et al. 2008). If the supplier has lower capabilities, the buyer may 
consider a supplier with the right complementary resources to leverage the supplier’s 
prior knowledge (Miotti and Sachwald 2003). Lee et al. (2016) analytically show that 
the supplier charges a reduced price for knowledge if his level of prior knowledge is 
larger, which means the buyer’s total cost is lower. This finding suggests that a buyer 
benefits from selecting a supplier with knowledge proximity. 
 Given that the recombination of different technological domains can produce 
more creative knowledge (Fleming 2001), geographical distance in knowledge 
outsourcing projects may provide this advantage to buyers. In particular, offshore 
knowledge outsourcing12 facilitates knowledge creation through the recombination of 
heterogeneous inputs due to greater cognitive distance13 (Bertrand and Mol 2013; 
Nooteboom 2009). Offshore knowledge outsourcing has further practical advantages, 
including highly qualified knowledge workers available at lower costs abroad 
(Eppinger & Chitkara 2006; Liu et al. 2017). Therefore, Bertrand & Mol (2013) 
empirically show that while knowledge outsourcing from a domestic supplier can be 
used as a substitute for internal knowledge development, knowledge outsourcing from 
                                                            
12 Offshore knowledge outsourcing refers to the procurement of knowledge intensive activities from 
independent suppliers located abroad (Bertrand & Mol, 2013). 
13 Cognitive distance refers to the phenomenon that “a people who have developed their cognition 
along different life trajectories, in different environments, will see, interpret, understand and evaluate 
the world differently.” (Nooteboom, 2009, p. 95) 
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a foreign supplier may be used to complement and strengthen internal knowledge 
development (especially for product innovation as opposed to process innovation). 
In addition, interactions with a foreign knowledge supplier may also provide a buyer 
with access to new markets and argument sales. In their empirical research, 
Rodríguez & Nieto (2016) show that offshore knowledge outsourcing directly and 
positively affects the sales growth of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) who 
actively seek new revenue sources. 
 Relational factors, including trustworthiness and familiarity, are also key 
criteria for a buyer’s supplier selection (Howells et al. 2008; Levin and Cross 2004). 
Since repeated interactions, which build trust and familiarity, may augment the 
supplier’s relationship-specific investments and facilitate active information 
exchange, a buyer may benefit from selecting a supplier with whom they have 
previously worked (Dyer & Singh 1998; Martinez-Noya et al. 2013). Some 
geographical regions may have more frequent social interactions, which facilitates 
the transmission of information and creates trust. In their empirical study, Laursen 
et al. (2012) show that operating a knowledge outsourcing project with a supplier in 
a region with high levels of social interaction improves the outcomes of knowledge 
outsourcing. Since relational factors also influence the effectiveness of a buyer’s 
knowledge integration, we discuss them further in the section Phase 4 – Utilize. 
4.3.2 Decision on the Level of Knowledge Outsourcing 
 Once a supplier has been selected, the buyer determines her level of reliance 
on knowledge outsourcing before agreeing on a contract. While knowledge 
outsourcing may provide buyers with benefits in terms of R&D cost saving, 
flexibility, and innovative outputs, relying heavily on knowledge outsourcing may 
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also bring about new organizational challenges. From the transaction cost of 
economics (TCE) perspective, finding a suitable supplier and coordinating a 
knowledge outsourcing project across the boundaries of organizations may require 
more resources than in-house knowledge development and thus incur additional cost 
(Dyer and Singh 1998). The resource-based view (RBV) of buyers also suggests that 
heavy reliance on knowledge outsourcing may restrict a buyer’s building of path-
dependent knowledge stocks due to a reduction in learning-by-doing (Bettis et al. 
1992). Reflecting these conflicting views, several empirical studies find an inverted-
U shaped relationship between the level of knowledge outsourcing and buyers’ 
innovation performance, showing that there is an optimal level of knowledge 
outsourcing (Berchicci 2013; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010). It is also empirically shown 
that the optimal level of reliance on knowledge outsourcing is associated with a 
buyer’s level of internal knowledge development (i.e., complementarity), knowledge 
protection mechanisms, and absorptive capacity (Beneito 2006; Cassiman and 
Veugelers 2006; Krzeminska and Eckert 2016; Spithoven and Teirlinck 2015; Weigelt 
and Sarkar 2012). 
 These empirical studies, however, generally neglect to study a supplier’s 
optimizing behavior. Incorporating the empirical findings above into their game-
theoretical formulation, Lee et al. (2016) employ a Stackelberg game between a 
supplier and a buyer, in which the buyer determines her optimal level of knowledge 
outsourcing after observing the supplier’s decision on the unit price of knowledge. In 
a key result, Lee et al. (2016) show that if the buyer’s absorptive capacity is larger  
the buyer’s level of knowledge outsourcing may be greater despite the supplier’s 
higher price of knowledge. Moreover, their study identifies conditions whereby 
knowledge outsourcing and in-house knowledge development become complements 
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or substitutes in relation to the buyer’s absorptive capacity and project scope 
uncertainty. Using a similar game-theoretical formulation, Lee et al. (2017) 
analytically investigate how competition between two buyers in the downstream 
market impacts the supplier’s decision on his price of knowledge. They show that 
the supplier’s optimizing behavior might cause unintended negative consequences for 
the buyers. That is, even if both buyers pursue knowledge outsourcing, the supplier 
may serve only one buyer and charge a premium price of knowledge. The supplier’s 
rejection of a knowledge outsourcing partnership may lead a buyer to incur more 
cost because they must use in-house knowledge development and potentially lose 
market competitiveness in the downstream market. 
4.3.3 Future Research Opportunities 
 Another important decision that the buyer should make in the planning phase 
is the timing of knowledge outsourcing. While a knowledge supplier serves multiple 
buyers simultaneously (Lee et al. 2017), buyers who compete in the downstream 
market often work with a common supplier sequentially (Hargadon and Sutton 1997). 
Many questions regarding decisions on the timing of knowledge outsourcing remain 
unanswered. For example, should a buyer outsource knowledge earlier than her 
competitors? If the buyer outsources knowledge from the supplier early, the supplier 
may charge a higher price of knowledge because the related knowledge has not yet 
matured. On the other hand, the buyer may be able to benefit from a faster time to 
market. Further, while a superior buyer may have a greater fear of knowledge leakage 
than inferior buyers when they have different technological capabilities, the superior 
buyer can more effectively understand and utilize the outsourced knowledge from 
the supplier. In this situation, who should the supplier serve first? How can the 
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supplier charge optimal prices of knowledge depending on the buyers’ technological 
capabilities and the timing of knowledge outsourcing? Future research can 
investigate factors that impact buyers’ decisions on timing and the supplier’s service 
strategy. 
 Both buyers and suppliers face uncertainty when making decisions in the 
planning phase. A buyer deals with market demand uncertainty and technological 
uncertainty when selecting a supplier and determining the level of knowledge 
outsourcing. Future research investigating how a buyer addresses uncertainty when 
making decisions in the planning phase would be valuable. The supplier may also 
deal with uncertainty regarding his technological capability to complete the 
knowledge outsourcing project and satisfy the buyer’s needs within the deadline 
specified by the contract. The question of how a supplier’s uncertainty regarding his 
technological capability impacts his interactions with a buyer remains unanswered. 
If the supplier undervalues his technological capabilities and requests a long deadline, 
the buyer may terminate the contract and find another supplier. In contrast, if the 
supplier overvalues his technological capabilities and shortens the length of the 
knowledge outsourcing project, he faces a higher chance of missing the deadline and 
damaging his reputation. Since these trade-offs exist, future research may investigate 
how both a supplier and a buyer can better respond to the supplier’s uncertainty 
regarding his technological capabilities. 
 A more challenging factor influencing decisions in the planning phase is 
information asymmetry, which remains understudied in the knowledge outsourcing 
literature. The buyer cannot discern whether the supplier has the required knowledge 
at the time of supplier selection. Reversely, the buyer has a better understanding of 
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her specific problems than the supplier. Is the buyer better off providing the supplier 
with a less structured description of her problem, which may allow the supplier to 
explore more freely and find better solutions? To answer this question, Rahmani and 
Ramachandran (2016) consider a knowledge outsourcing contract in which a supplier 
performs a specialized search for a buyer’s innovation in technology. They find that 
the solution flexibility allowed by flexible problem specifications may negatively 
influence the quality of solutions due to the buyer’s over-expectations, which may 
lead the supplier to procrastinate. This suggests that a buyer should reduce the level 
of information asymmetry regarding the nature of her problems to be solved by the 
supplier. 
 In fact, most firm-specific information may remain private knowledge: the 
cost of knowledge development, the level of prior knowledge, a supplier’s 
technological ability to meet the deadline (adverse selection problem), absorptive 
capacity, etc. Considering information asymmetry about the buyer’s absorptive 
capacity, Lee et al. (2016) analytically show that both the buyer and the supplier 
may suffer because of information asymmetry. Especially, if the buyer keeps her 
absorptive capacity private, the supplier is not able to charge the optimal price in 
relation to the buyer’s absorptive capacity. Consequently, while the question of 
whether the buyer benefits from information asymmetry depends on her level of 
absorptive capacity, the supplier’s profit is always reduced because the buyer 
requests either too much or too little knowledge outsourcing. In addition, the buyer’s 
inability to recognize if the supplier possesses the required knowledge (i.e., 
information asymmetry on the amount of the supplier’s existing knowledge) to 
accomplish knowledge outsourcing tasks may also impact the decisions and 
performance of knowledge outsourcing. Further research is needed to advance our 
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understanding on how asymmetric information about various factors impacts the 
decisions and profits of both the buyer and the supplier. 
 Once a buyer and a supplier agree to the contents of knowledge, the form of 
knowledge as deliverables, the price of knowledge, the level of knowledge outsourcing, 
and the due date, they sign the contract and the supplier commences independent 
knowledge development activities (Lee et al. 2016). The literature on the impact of 
different contracts between supply chain partners is well developed (Cachon 2003). 
Studies in the literature of knowledge coproduction (i.e., joint knowledge 
development), which is close to the knowledge outsourcing literature, examine how 
different types of contract impact profit, cost, and product quality (Bhaskaran and 
Krishnan 2009; MacCormack and Mishra 2015; Xue and Field 2008). In the 
knowledge outsourcing literature, Lai et al. (2009) consider two specific types of 
contract: revenue sharing and lump-sum payment. Based on a principal-agent 
framework, they analytically identify conditions under which either revenue-sharing 
or lump-sum payment is the principal’s optimal choice. However, since their study 
does not take into consideration any of the critical factors related to knowledge 
outsourcing (e.g., prior knowledge, absorptive capacity, the price of knowledge, and 
uncertainty), further research is required to better understand how knowledge 
outsourcing contracts are influenced by other parameters (Gaimon et al. 2017b). 
 As Lee et al. (2017) consider competition between two buyers in the 
downstream market (both buyers outsource knowledge from a common supplier), 
future research is also needed to examine how competition between knowledge 
suppliers in the market for knowledge (i.e., knowledge-intensive business service 
industry) (Beltencourt et al. 2002) impacts the decisions and profits of the buyers 
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and suppliers. Further, while Lee et al. (2016) and Lee et al. (2017) provide 
important analytical insights for managerial decisions in knowledge outsourcing, 
firms often deviate from theoretical guidance due to behavioral aspects (Loch 2017). 
Future research opportunities exist to explore how behavioral or psychological 
aspects, including bounded rationality (Gurnani et al. 2014), complexity aversion 
(Ramachandran et al. 2018), risk aversion and loss aversion (Bendoly et al. 2010; 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979), fairness concerns (Katok et al. 2014), and not-invented 
here syndrome (Katz and Allen 1982; Menon and Pfeffer 2003) impact buyers’ and 
suppliers’ decisions on knowledge outsourcing. 
4.4 Phase 3 – Execute 
 In the executing phase, the supplier undertakes knowledge development to 
meet the buyer’s needs based on the specifics agreed upon in the contract between 
the buyer and the supplier. Unlike collaborative innovation, where firms jointly 
develop knowledge (e.g., alliances and joint ventures), the supplier develops 
knowledge independently and with discretion under a knowledge outsourcing 
contract. The buyer therefore employs controlling mechanisms to manage the quality 
of the supplier’s work and prevent potential opportunistic behavior from the supplier. 
The buyer often needs to share her existing knowledge with the supplier to facilitate 
knowledge development. Since the supplier may work for multiple buyers, this can 
cause an unintended flow of knowledge from the supplier to the buyer’s competitors. 
Therefore, the buyer should carefully determine how to communicate with the 
supplier in the executing phase. 
 After completing knowledge development, the supplier delivers knowledge in 
the format specified by the contract to the buyer. Similar to the generic processes of 
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project management (i.e., Closing process14), the buyer evaluates the quality of the 
supplier’s outputs compared to the initial specifications in contract, proceeds the 
formal acceptance of all deliverables, and closes out the contact with the supplier at 
the end of the executing phase (Stackpole 2013). In this section, we discuss previous 
research studying buyers’ decisions in the executing phase and provide an agenda for 
future research. 
4.4.1 Controlling the Execution of Knowledge Outsourcing 
 A supplier must be highly creative to develop knowledge to meet a buyer’s 
needs. Since the creative process is delicate and vulnerable to various disruptions, 
controlling behavior from the buyer may negatively influence the supplier’s task 
performance if the knowledge outsourcing project requires a high degree of creativity 
(Andrews and Smith 1996). Carson (2007) empirically investigates the relationship 
between buyer control and supplier performance in creative knowledge development 
when buyers outsource knowledge for new product development. Using Likert-type 
perceptual measures, the study operationalizes control in two ways and reports 
divergent results: ex ante control (control specifications described in the contractual 
agreement) and ex post control (ongoing control activities imposed during the 
execution of the project). 
 Carson (2007) shows that low levels of ex ante control in highly creative 
knowledge outsourcing tasks results in reduced supplier performance due to the 
                                                            
14 The generic closing processes in project management consist of those processes performed to finalize 
all activities and formally close the project. Those processes commonly include activities such as: 
obtaining formal acceptance of all deliverables, comparing the final results to the initial objectives 
(e.g., product requirements, the scope, schedule, and cost baselines), transitioning the final results 
(product or service) to the customer or operations, and closing out all contracts (Stackpole 2013). 
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ambiguity of the buyer’s needs. This suggests that highly innovative knowledge 
outsourcing projects are more successful when the buyer establishes more control 
over the supplier’s knowledge development process before they start enter the 
execution phase. However, it is also known that control from outside sources may 
limit the supplier’s ability to perform creative tasks. Especially, control during the 
execution stage may limit the supplier’s discretion and ability to apply his expertise 
in creative problem solving (Andrews and Smith 1996). Carson (2007) shows that 
the relationship between ex post control and supplier performance is negatively 
moderated by the level of creativity required by the knowledge outsourcing project. 
This suggests that the buyer should impose less ex post control to improve supplier 
performance on highly innovative knowledge outsourcing projects. 
4.4.2 Future Research Opportunities 
 Since creative tasks such as knowledge development require substantial levels 
of motivation (Andrews & Smith 1996; Ko et al. 2005), different types of contract 
between a buyer and a supplier may provide the supplier with different levels of 
motivation in the context of knowledge outsourcing. The supplier’s obligation, based 
on contractual agreement with the buyer, is to provide an acceptable solution for 
the problem specified in the contract; it does not have to be the best solution. Carson 
(2007) suggests that a buyer should reduce her level of control while the supplier 
focuses on the execution of knowledge development, so which specific type of contract 
allows the buyer to most effectively motivate the supplier to develop the best possible 
solution? Future studies may investigate how contract types and control mechanisms 
jointly impact the quality of a supplier’s knowledge development. 
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 Another important decision that a buyer needs to make during the executing 
phase is the location where the knowledge development will be carried out. Since 
geographical proximity increases the frequency and improves the quality of 
communication between the buyer and the supplier, the buyer may encourage the 
supplier to work in-house (Narula and Santangelo 2009). While enhanced 
communication may shorten the completion time of a project, improve the supplier’s 
performance, and/or aid the buyer’s knowledge integration (discussed in the utilizing 
phase), it does also raise concerns about knowledge leakage (Baccara 2007; Lai et al. 
2009). Despite the contractual terms specifying intellectual property rights, Buss & 
Peukert (2015) empirically show that there is a positive link between knowledge 
outsourcing and intellectual property infringement due to the absence of perfect 
contracting (Lai et al. 2009). They also show that larger companies and more 
knowledge-intensive firms have a higher risk of intellectual property infringement. 
Using primary data, Martínez-Noya & García-Canal (2016) show that sharing a 
knowledge supplier with competitors increases a buyer’s fear of knowledge leakage 
(especially for non-standardized knowledge services), which leads to decreased 
knowledge transfer and thus reduced supplier performance. 
 The impact of knowledge leakage on buyer profit and innovation performance 
is currently understudied. Does knowledge leakage always reduce a buyer’s profit? 
Regardless of whether knowledge leakage occurs directly or indirectly, the common 
supplier is able to refine his capabilities and reduce knowledge development cost by 
serving multiple buyers. The reduced price of knowledge offered by the common 
supplier may also lead the buyer to benefit from knowledge leakage. Future research 
is required to investigate if there is any situation where the advantages of knowledge 
leakage outweigh the disadvantages. Furthermore, future studies may examine 
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whether the existence of a common knowledge supplier who serves incumbents might 
lower the barrier of market entrance when an entrant pursues knowledge outsourcing 
to join a preexisting downstream market. 
 One practical challenge that buyers face in the executing phase is supplier 
opportunism, which is defined as self-interest seeking with guile (Jap and Anderson 
2003). A supplier’s opportunistic behavior may include shirking responsibilities, 
hiding information or providing false information, and making hollow promises or 
window-dressing efforts, which results in low motivation to perform (i.e., moral 
hazard problem) (Yan and Kull 2015). Factors such as agreed incentive structures 
in the contract, the buyer’s controlling mechanisms, and the supplier’s concerns 
about reputation and long-term relationship may reduce the extent of the supplier’s 
opportunism. Nevertheless, some degree of opportunism always remains once the 
execution of the supplier’s knowledge development to meet the buyer’s needs is in 
progress (Jap and Anderson 2003).  
 Using primary data collected from the U.S. and China, Yan & Kull (2015) 
show that when supplier opportunism is observed by buyers, it negatively influences 
the performance of knowledge outsourcing. Likewise, supplier opportunism may also 
impact the time spent to finish a knowledge outsourcing project. How should a buyer 
deal with a supplier’s uncertain ability to meet the deadline? When making decisions 
on knowledge outsourcing, the buyer should consider the possibility that the supplier 
may finish the project earlier or later than the deadline specified in the contract. 
Even more challenging is the fact that the level of supplier opportunism is closely 
related to buyer uncertainty (market uncertainty and technological uncertainty) 
(Yan and Kull 2015). Future research may explore incentive mechanisms through 
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which buyers can encourage trustworthy behavior from suppliers during knowledge 
outsourcing projects. 
4.5 Phase 4 – Utilize 
 Regardless of the source, any knowledge obtained from outside must be 
integrated and transformed into physical innovations (e.g., new products or 
processes) to add value to the firm (Roper and Arvanitis 2012). The integration of 
external knowledge is remarkably different from the assembly of physical 
components. When the buyer assembles a component delivered by a supplier into 
her product, the buyer does not have to fully understand the knowledge embedded 
in the outsourced component. In contrast, to integrate the outsourced knowledge 
into her knowledge repository and make use of it (the transformation of knowledge 
into physical innovations – new products or processes) the buyer should have a 
complete understanding of the knowledge, which may incur additional knowledge 
integration cost (Berchicci 2013; Bianchi et al. 2016; Grimpe & Kaiser 2010; Weigelt 
2009). It is known that while a buyer’s absorptive capacity15 improves the 
performance of value extraction from outsourced knowledge, behavioral biases such 
as NIH syndrome16 may hamper knowledge integration. In this section on the 
utilizing phase, we discuss current studies on buyers’ absorptive capacity and suggest 
future research opportunities regarding NIH syndrome and other influencing factors. 
 
                                                            
15 Cohen & Levinthal (1990)refer to “absorptive capacity” as “the ability of a firm to recognize the 
value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends.” 
16 NIH (Not-Invented-Here) syndrome is defined as “the tendency of a project group of stable 
composition to believe it possess a monopoly of knowledge of its field, which leads it to reject new 
ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment of its performance (Katz and Allen 1982).” 
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4.5.1 Absorptive Capacity 
 The literature shows that absorptive capacity is largely a function of a firm’s 
level of existing knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). It has been empirically 
shown that a buyer with large amounts of existing knowledge is better able to 
understand and apply the outsourced knowledge received from a supplier, subject to 
diminishing returns (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Specifically, empirical studies 
consistently show that a firm’s internal R&D capability enhances the positive impact 
of knowledge outsourcing on their innovation performance (Berchicci 2013; Cassiman 
and Veugelers 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010). In addition, relational factors such as 
trust, familiarity, and the quality of communication also affect the performance of a 
buyer’s integration of outsourced knowledge (Howells et al. 2008; Levin and Cross 
2004). For example, benefits are realized if the buyer and supplier have established 
methods of communication (such as shared terminology) and trust based on past 
experience working together (Levin and Cross 2004). 
 Considering the two drivers of a buyer’s absorptive capacity (existing 
knowledge and relational factors), Lee et al. (2016) investigate how those two drivers 
influence interactions between the buyer and the supplier differently. Using a game-
theoretic formulation, they show that while the buyer always benefits from higher 
absorptive capacity regardless of what drives it, the supplier’s profit may be reduced 
when the buyer has high level of existing knowledge because the buyer has a lower 
desire to pursue knowledge outsourcing. 
4.5.2 Future Research 
 Lee et al. (2016) consider dyadic interactions between one supplier and one 
buyer to show how the supplier may increase the price of knowledge as the buyer’s 
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absorptive capacity increases. Is a supplier still be able to increase the price of 
knowledge when the buyer competes with other buyers in the downstream market? 
When a buyer competes with other firms in the downstream market, the increased 
price of knowledge leads to a higher cost to obtain knowledge, therefore reducing the 
buyer’s competitiveness. Future research may investigate how buyers’ absorptive 
capacity and downstream market competition between buyers jointly influence 
interactions between buyers and a supplier. 
 If a buyer is highly motivated to accept the outsourced knowledge, then she 
is better able to understand and apply it (Ko et al. 2005; Osterloh and Frey 2000). 
There are opportunities to study how both buyers and suppliers can incentivize their 
knowledge workers to improve the performance of knowledge outsourcing projects. 
Further, lab experiments can be used to investigate how NIH syndrome influences 
the decisions and profits of both buyers and suppliers. Naturally, levels of motivation 
and NIH are associated with a firm’s management policy and regime. Therefore, 
firms need to define product architecture (e.g., modularity) and the structure of R&D 
organization in such a way that they facilitate the integration of outsourced 
knowledge for innovations (Bianchi et al. 2016; Kamuriwo and Baden-Fuller 2016; 
Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Vickery et al. 2016). Future studies may investigate 
how a firm’s product architecture (e.g., modularity) and the structure of R&D 
organization, including incentive mechanisms, impact knowledge outsourcing. 
4.6 Phase 5 – Check 
 In the final checking phase, buyers evaluate the outcomes of knowledge 
outsourcing projects and plan to further utilize the outsourced knowledge for future 
knowledge development projects. While the generic project management guideline 
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evaluates the quality of outputs (i.e., deliverables) compared to the specifications in 
the initial plan (Stackpole 2013), the checking phase in the knowledge outsourcing 
framework goes beyond assuring the quality of outsourced knowledge and includes 
checking activities for the performance of utilizing outsourced knowledge. Buyers 
often analyze how their knowledge outsourcing projects improve their innovativeness 
and/or financial performance (Cui et al. 2012; Howells et al. 2008; Stanko & 
Calantone 2011). 
 Since relational factors impact the performance of knowledge outsourcing, 
buyers also analyze the effectiveness of their interactions with suppliers, which may 
include suppliers’ responsiveness to their requests, the quality of communication, the 
quality of deliverables, ex post technical support, and the levels of knowledge leakage 
and opportunism. Likewise, a buyer’s internal performance of knowledge integration 
should be also evaluated in the checking phase. However, continuous reliance on 
external sources of knowledge produces concerns that a buyer may lose the ability 
to solve problems independently. In this section, we discuss current studies on the 
outcomes of knowledge outsourcing and knowledge reuse, and explore future research 
opportunities in relation to the path-dependent nature of knowledge development. 
4.6.1 Outcomes of Knowledge Outsourcing 
 Buyers should evaluate the performance of each individual knowledge 
outsourcing project. We provide guidance for such evaluations by reviewing the 
current literature on the overall performance of knowledge outsourcing. Several 
studies investigate the impact of knowledge outsourcing on different outcomes, 
including innovativeness, product quality, time to market, cost, and financial 
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performance. We observe that the current studies are not only scant but conflicting 
in their findings. A detailed discussion is provided as follows. 
 Innovativeness. Using survey and archival data from the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry, Nicholls-Nixon & Woo (2003) show that having R&D contracts (i.e., 
knowledge outsourcing) in a mixture of knowledge sourcing modes (e.g., licenses, 
joint ventures, acquisitions, etc.) increases the number of new products. This is 
because different linkages between different knowledge sourcing modes facilitate the 
development of different types of knowledge. However, other empirical studies find 
an inverted U-shape relationship between the degree of knowledge outsourcing and 
innovation performance, which demonstrates that heavy reliance on knowledge 
outsourcing may reduce innovation performance due to knowledge leakage, the 
dilution of firm specificity, the risk of integration failure, and the additional 
managerial resources required to coordinate and monitor (Berchicci 2013; Bianchi et 
al. 2016; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser 2010). 
 Product quality. Using survey data on the NPD make/buy choices of 
automobile firms in the U.S., Kalaignanam et al. (2017) show that while NPD 
outsourcing more positively influences the short-term quality of new products than 
NPD insourcing, it leads to a reduction in long-term quality. This is because a buyer 
can benefit from a supplier’s greater expertise with respect to a particular technology 
at the time of product launch. However, after product launch, disadvantages such as 
lack of control, adaptation failure, and insufficient learning benefits from NPD 
outsourcing lower the quality of new products over time. In addition, they show that 
the positive impact of NPD outsourcing on the short-term quality of new products 
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is larger if either the technological complexity of NPD or the buyer’s technological 
capability is higher. 
 Time to market. Despite the importance of a quick time to market, little is 
known about whether knowledge outsourcing accelerates a buyer’s innovation on 
new products and processes. Based on case-based research, studies argue that 
knowledge outsourcing reduces the time required to develop new products (Chatterji 
1996; Quinn 2000). In contrast, by surveying new product development projects from 
large US-based companies, Kessler et al. (2000) show that heavy reliance on 
knowledge outsourcing for developing new products increases the time it takes to 
complete those projects. 
 Cost reduction. With regard to cost reduction, Kessler et al. (2000) find no 
relationship between knowledge outsourcing and reduced cost of developing new 
product innovations from their survey results. Using a similar survey method, Huang 
et al. (2009) show that knowledge outsourcing reduces the development cost of NPD 
projects only for incremental innovations (i.e., standardized technology, which is 
relatively easy to codify). Case-based studies, however, consistently argue that 
knowledge outsourcing has the advantage of reducing R&D cost. In their game-
theoretic formulation, Lee et al. (2016) employ cost minimization problems for a 
buyer to choose optimal levels of in-house knowledge development and knowledge 
outsourcing while satisfying a pre-determined project scope. They find that the buyer 
will always pursue a certain level of knowledge outsourcing to compensate for costly 
in-house knowledge development. 
 Financial performance. Does knowledge outsourcing ultimately improve 
financial performance? Even though profitability is one of the biggest motivations 
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for knowledge outsourcing, there are a surprisingly small number of studies 
investigating it. Using the survey method, Huang et al. (2009) show that knowledge 
outsourcing generates more profit than in-house knowledge development only for 
incremental innovations. Using event study methodology, Raassens et al. (2012) 
examine the effect of knowledge outsourcing for NPD on shareholder value (i.e., stock 
price) and find that the announcement of knowledge outsourcing increases stock 
returns by 0.20% on average. In their game-theoretic formulation, Lee et al. (2017) 
investigate how competition between two buyers in the downstream market impacts 
their decisions and profits when both buyers outsource knowledge from a common 
supplier to improve product quality. To build insights, they first consider the profit 
maximization problem for a monopolist buyer and find that knowledge outsourcing 
increases the buyer’s profit only if the buyer’s cost of in-house knowledge 
development is sufficiently high. More interestingly, they show that under certain 
conditions, a buyer under duopoly outsources knowledge even at the expense of lower 
profit because they cannot reasonably assume that the other buyer will not outsource 
knowledge (i.e., the Prisoner's dilemma). 
 As there are currently an insufficient amount of studies, all with wide 
discrepancies, there are a myriad of opportunities for impactful future research on 
the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. This will be discussed in the future research 
section. 
4.6.2 Knowledge Reuse 
 One important outcome of knowledge development, which is remarkably 
different from the production of physical components, is knowledge reuse, and 
knowledge outsourced from a supplier is no exception. Pre-existing knowledge stocks 
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are well recognized as important sources for continuous innovations from the 
literature (Cefis and Orsenigo 2001; Helfat and Leonard-Barton 1994; Roper and 
Hewitt-Dundas 2008). Once the knowledge outsourced from the supplier is integrated 
into a buyer’s knowledge stock, the buyer can plan to reuse the knowledge for future 
knowledge development projects. As discussed in the section on absorptive capacity, 
knowledge assimilated from knowledge outsourcing projects can be used to facilitate 
a buyer’s understanding and utilization of additional outsourced knowledge in the 
future. 
 Beyond the impact of knowledge reuse on a buyer’s absorptive capacity, the 
supplier also reuses knowledge developed to satisfy the needs of buyers in future 
knowledge development projects (Hansen et al. 1999). Despite concerns about 
knowledge leakage, the supplier in fact learns and builds his stock of knowledge 
through experience serving buyers (Hargadon and Sutton 1997). In particular, a 
supplier may repeatedly leverage his stock of knowledge without incurring additional 
development cost (Alavi & Leidner 2001; Haefliger et al. 2008). 
 According to Majchrzak et al. (2004), there are two modes of leveraging 
existing knowledge. “Replication" occurs when a firm transfers existing knowledge 
between related research programs, whereas “leveraging existing knowledge for 
innovation” refers to a recombinative integration of prior knowledge. In their 
empirical case studies, Haefliger et al. (2008) find that leveraging existing knowledge 
in the form of computer code is common in software development projects and 
mitigates development cost. To our knowledge, Lee et al. (2016) is the only study 
that examines the impact of knowledge reuse in the context of knowledge 
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outsourcing. They show that high rates of knowledge reuse by a supplier is mutually 
beneficial to both the buyer and the supplier. 
4.6.3 Future Research 
 To deepen our understanding of the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing, 
future studies may investigate: 1) under which circumstances firms can improve the 
quality of products and processes, increase profits, save R&D cost, and reduce time 
to market, 2) what the main factors that influence those outcomes are and how they 
function. For instance, as there are conflicting findings on the impact of knowledge 
outsourcing on time to market, more comprehensive studies are required to better 
understand whether (or under which conditions) knowledge outsourcing reduces time 
to market. Researchers can also investigate how the impact of knowledge outsourcing 
on time to market is associated with the type of knowledge sourced (known or new 
knowledge), the complexity of problems, and incentive structures (or contracting 
mechanisms), etc. Furthermore, researchers have opportunities to contribute to the 
practice by establishing applicable methods to work on those factors to increase the 
positive outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. In this regard, empirical studies can 
identify applicable measures to evaluate the outcomes and influencing factors of 
knowledge outsourcing. 
 Despite the importance of feedback on suppliers’ performance for future 
projects, studies evaluating the effectiveness of interactions with suppliers for 
knowledge outsourcing are scant. Researchers can establish applicable metrics to 
analyze suppliers’ responsiveness to buyers’ requests, the quality of communication, 




 While previous studies show knowledge reuse to be beneficial to both buyers 
and suppliers, there are still questions which remain unanswered. For example, how 
can firms dynamically develop workers’ knowledge (Carrillo and Gaimon 2004). This 
question can be narrowed down to a job allocation problem: how to deploy knowledge 
workers to maximize the benefits gained from reusing knowledge embedded in 
workers’ individual knowledge stocks for both the buyer and the supplier. In two 
extreme cases, firms can allocate their knowledge workers permanently to either very 
similar knowledge development projects or very different projects. Which allocation 
mechanism is better under which circumstances? Since knowledge development and 
the integration of outsourced knowledge require very different skill sets, buyers may 
permanently allocate their knowledge workers to either in-house knowledge 
development or knowledge outsourcing, or let them continue to alternate between 
the two. If a balancing point exits, what are the factors that influence it? Future 
studies may address these questions. 
 Despite the importance of internal knowledge flow (in-house knowledge 
development) which contributes to innovation outputs (Roper and Hewitt-Dundas 
2015), firms also recognize the potential for its negative innovation effects through 
path-dependency (Thrane et al. 2010). As a result, firms tends to obtain knowledge 
more from external sources (Howells et al. 2008). This, however, incurs the cost of 
losing opportunities of learning-by-doing with which firms build their core 
capabilities (Bettis et al. 1992). With these trade-offs in mind, future studies may 
investigate how a firm can develop a dynamic path of knowledge sourcing modes 
(i.e., insourcing and outsourcing) to obtain different types of knowledge (i.e., known 





 While synthesizing the current literature on knowledge outsourcing, we clarify 
what is currently known and unknown in each phase of the knowledge outsourcing 
framework introduced in this study. In phase 1 (Initiate), a buyer needs to be able 
to clearly identify her purpose and targets for knowledge outsourcing. Current studies 
consistently report that knowledge outsourcing is more suitable to incremental 
innovation, with its relatively low risk of knowledge leakage.  
 In phase 2 (Plan), during which the buyer selects a supplier and makes a 
contractual agreement, the buyer faces the risk that the supplier may not possess 
sufficient technical capabilities to satisfy her knowledge needs. Current studies show 
that choosing a highly capable supplier or a known supplier with whom the buyer 
has previously worked may alleviate this risk. Further studies to identify incentive 
mechanisms or contract types through which the buyer can effectively ensure 
cooperative behavior from the supplier are required. Since both the buyer and the 
supplier make their decisions under uncertainty and with asymmetric information in 
these two phases, future studies may investigate how information structure impacts 
decisions and the outcomes of knowledge outsourcing. 
 In phase 3 (Execute), the supplier independently undertakes knowledge 
development tasks based on the signed contract. The buyer needs to utilize balanced 
controlling mechanisms to ensure the quality of the supplier’s knowledge outcomes 
and to promote the supplier’s creativity. As knowledge leakage is known to be a risk 
to the buyer, it will be interesting to see whether the buyer can ever benefit from 
knowledge leakage in relation to the timing of her knowledge outsourcing. In 
addition, the supplier’s opportunistic behavior is a critical challenge that the buyer 
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faces in the executing phase and future research can investigate how the buyer can 
effectively ensure trustworthy behavior from the supplier.  
 In phase 4 (Utilize), the buyer integrates and utilizes the knowledge 
outsourced from the supplier to generate value. Current studies consistently report 
that higher absorptive capacity leads to higher performance of the buyer’s knowledge 
integration. However, certain behavioral factors of the buyer including NIH 
syndrome may reduce the effectiveness of the buyer’s internal knowledge integration 
process. Future studies should investigate how the buyer can incentivize her internal 
knowledge workers to improve the performance of knowledge integration.  
 In the final phase (Check), the buyer evaluates the performance of the 
knowledge outsourcing project and plans ways to reuse the knowledge developed by 
the supplier in future projects. For most performance measures, including time to 
market, R&D cost, and financial performance, the current literature has not reached 
a consensus. Therefore, further research may investigate under which conditions 
pursuing knowledge outsourcing improves each measure of performance. 
 As most of the current studies on knowledge outsourcing use empirical 
methodologies, more diverse research approaches including normative modeling and 
lab experiments are required to examine the various aspects of knowledge 
outsourcing more comprehensively. In addition, most current studies focus on the 
buyer’s perspective. Exceptions include Lee et al. (2016), Lee et al. (2017), and Iyer 
et al. (2000). As the industry scale of knowledge-intensive business services keeps 
increasing, future research can contribute to the expanding landscape of knowledge 




APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 2 
A.1  Proof of Proposition 1 
 We substitute b bD J K Sφ= − −  into the buyer's objective function (Equation 





 yields the buyer's best response: 

























 minimizes the buyer's total cost. The supplier's problem has an additional 
constraint, ( )2 b bp c J Kφ≤ − , due to ( ) 0BR S ≥ . By substituting ( )BR S  into Equation 








, we know that there is a p  maximizes the buyer's profit. 
Solving the supplier's constrained optimization problem with respect to p  yields 
the two solutions shown in Proposition 1 for 0sD =  and 0sD >  with conditions 
0 2b sJ K K φ< − ≤  and 2b sJ K K φ− > , respectively. Since this paper focuses on the case 
with 0sD > , 2b sJ K K φ− >  holds for our analytical results in Section 2.3. Q.E.D. 
A.2  Proof of Corollary 1 
 Given the closed-form solutions, we take the partial derivative of the 
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, which give us Corollary 1. Q.E.D. 
A.3  Proof of Corollary 2 
 Given the closed-form solutions, we take the partial derivative of the 
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derivation is omitted. Q.E.D. 
A.4  Proof of Corollary 3 
 Given the closed-form solutions, we take the partial derivative of the 
equilibrium outcomes in Proposition 1 with respect to bK  and obtain: 
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Similar to the proof of Corollary 2 above, by the condition for 0sD >  ( 2b sJ K K φ− > ) 












































its derivation is omitted. Q.E.D. 
A.5  Proof of Proposition 2 
Table 7. Additional terminology and notation for the stochastic model. 
Ĵ  Mean value of the buyer's project scope distributed uniformly, >ˆ 0J . 
J  
Buyer's true project scope, which is uncertain and uniformly distributed from −Ĵ t  to 
+Ĵ t , where ˆ0,t J ∈  . 
AJ  
Planned project scope the buyer pursues by determining bD  and S , where 
φ= + +A b bJ K D S . 
− ˆAJ J  
Extent of the buyer's planned surplus ( − >ˆ 0AJ J ) or shortage ( − <ˆ 0AJ J ), indicating 
the difference between the buyer's planned project scope and the mean of the true 
project scope. 
ec  
Buyer's cost per unit expedited knowledge purchased from an external source (other 
than the original supplier) to meet her knowledge shortage after the true project scope 
is realized. 
v  
Buyer's future unit value of surplus knowledge observed after the true project scope is 
realized. 
  
 To solve the buyer's problem in Equation (5), we define Hessian matrix 
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H . To focus on non-trivial situations, we assume ec v>  with 
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Otherwise, ˆtAJ J< . Q.E.D. 
A.6  Proof of Proposition 3 
 To prove this result, we first characterize the equilibrium decisions in Lemma 
1. 
Lemma 1. The equilibrium decisions when the project scope is uncertain are given 
by: 
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(ii)   The buyer's internal knowledge production is ( ) ( )
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where ( ) ( )1 ˆ ˆe b bc J K t v J K tΩ = − + − − − , 2 4e bc c t vΩ = + − . 
 
 Proof: Substituting tbD  and 
tS  from the proof of Proposition 2 above into 
the supplier's problem and taking its second order differentiation with respect to 
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p  yields: ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
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2 2 4 2
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 due to 
ec v> , there is p  that maximizes the supplier's profit. We find the supplier's first 
order condition: 
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. By solving 
the supplier's first order condition, we obtain the supplier's equilibrium price: 
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+ −
. Substituting *p  into the 
buyer’s best responses ( tbD  and 
tS ) yields the equilibrium decisions as shown in 
Lemma 1. Q.E.D. 
 Now we return to the Proof of Proposition 3 using the expressions above. 
 (i) By the Envelope Theorem, we have 
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 (ii) Similarly, by the Envelope Theorem, we have 
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 Further, taking the total derivative of the two first order conditions for the 
buyer's problem given by 1f  and 2f  in the proof of Proposition 2 with respect to 
t  and writing them in a matrix form yields: 
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. The supplier's first order 
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. From the proof of Proposition 2, 
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. Also, using the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain
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A.7  Proof of Propositions 4 and 5 
 To obtain equilibrium solutions for the information asymmetry model, we 
derive the best responses for the H and L-type buyers from Equation (10) as: 
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= . Substituting the best 
responses into the supplier's problem (Equations (7), (8), and (9)) yields the 
constrained optimization problem, where   denotes the Lagrangian  : 










 , ( ) 0HBR S ≥ , 1 0λ ≥ , ( )1 0HBR Sλ = , ( ) 0LBR S ≥ , 2 0λ ≥ , and ( )2 0LBR Sλ =  from 
which we obtain one interior solution and one binding solution whereby ( ) 0LBR S =  
as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. The equilibrium outcomes in the asymmetric information model. 
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 If * *1 2 0λ λ= = , then we have the interior solution in which a price to serve 
both types of buyers is optimal. Letting ( )4 22H L s b Hc cΛ θφ φ= +  and ( ) ( )4 21 2L H s b Lc cΛ θ φ φ= − + , 
and rearranging terms in the equilibrium price yields * * *H L
A H L
H L H L
p p p
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, 
where *Hp  and *Lp  are the equilibrium prices for H-type and L-type buyer in the 
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base model (Proposition 1). Substituting *Ap  into the buyer’s best responses ( ( )HBR S  
and ( )LBR S ), sAiD , bAiD , and objective functions, where { },i H L∈ , gives us the left 
column of Table 8. In contrast, if *2 0λ >  while *1 0λ = , then ( ) 0LBR S =  so the L-type 
buyer is out of the information asymmetry game. Therefore, we form a separate 
problem in which the supplier serves only the H-type buyer. Solving the problem in 
a similar way to Proposition 1 gives us the equilibrium outcomes as shown in the 
right column of Table 8. Q.E.D. 
A.8  Proof of Proposition 6 
 If the supplier serves both types of buyers, his price maximizes expected 
profit ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * *1A AH A AL AE p pΠ θΠ θ Π  = + −  . However, if the supplier serves only the H-
type buyer, his price maximizes the expected profit ( )* * *H H HE pΠ θΠ  =  . Solving the 
inequality ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *1AH A AL A H Hp p pθΠ θ Π θΠ+ − ≥  for θ  gives us * *A HE EΠ Π  ≥    only if 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* * * * * *
0 AL A
















APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3 
B.1  Proof of Proposition 7 
 Let the superscript added on objective functions indicate the buyer who 
outsources knowledge from the supplier hereinafter. Therefore, 1*1Π  ( *1Π , 
respectively) reflects buyer 1's profit with (without, respectively) knowledge 
outsourcing. First, consider the situation where buyer 1 outsources knowledge from 
the supplier as a monopolist. Given the location of the consumer who has a 
positive surplus, buyer 1's quantity in the downstream market is given by 
1 1 1
1





= . Following backward induction, we substitute 1q  into buyer 1's 












, and therefore there is a 1p  that maximizes 
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, we obtain buyer 1’s best response of 




= . Here, buyer 1 
simultaneously determines both levels of in-house knowledge development ( 1D ) and 
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 Under these assumption, 1D  and 1S  jointly maximize buyer 1’s profit. We 
find that if assumption (B2) holds, the other assumption (B1) also holds, therefore 
the optimal condition is given: 
24
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> . Since there 
is w  that maximizes the supplier’s profit, solving the first order condition yields 
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. By substituting *w  in the best responses 
and objective functions, we obtain equilibrium outcomes when buyer 1 outsources 
knowledge from the supplier under monopoly: { }* 1 2b sw c M c Mφ= + , *1 2bS c Mφ= , 
( ){ }*1 1 21 22 sD M M c g= + + , ( ){ }
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B.2  Proof of Proposition 8 
 We compare buyer 1's profits in the two situations with and without 
knowledge outsourcing. Consider the monopoly situation without knowledge 
outsourcing. Given the location of the consumer who has a non-negative surplus, 
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Similar to the situation where buyer 1 outsources knowledge in Appendix B.1, we 












, and therefore 







, we obtain 




= . To 
obtain buyer 1’s best response of the level of in-house knowledge development ( 1D ), 
we substitute ( )1BR p  into 1Π , and find 













. To focus on non-
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. Now, we substitute *1D  into 
buyer 1’s best response and objective function, and obtain equilibrium outcomes: 
11
* 2 bp c Mθ= , *1 12 bq c M= , *1 1D M= , and *1 1bc RMΠ = . Using the equilibrium outcomes in 
the proofs B1 and B2, we have ( )
2 2 2 2
1 21* *
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− = . By the 
conditions for the optimality and non-negativity of the equilibrium outcomes, we 

















. Q.E.D. Since Propositions 





Alavi M, Leidner DE (2001). Review: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Systems: 
Conceptual Foundations and Research Issues. MIS Q. 25(1): 107–136. 
Anderson, EA, Parker GG (2013). Integration of global knowledge networks. Prod. Oper. 
Manag. 22(6): 1446–1463. 
Andrews J, Smith DC (1996). In Search of the Marketing Imagination: Factors Affecting 
the Creativity of Marketing Programs for Mature Products. J. Mark. Res. 33(2): 174–
187. 
Antonelli C, Fassio C (2016). The role of external knowledge(s) in the introduction of 
product and process innovations. R&D Manag. 46: 979–991. 
Argote L, Hora M (2017). Organizational Learning and Management of Technology. Prod. 
Oper. Manag. 26(4): 579–590. 
Arora A, Fosfuri A (2003). Licensing the market for technology. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 52: 277–295. 
Arrow KJ, Harris T, Marschak J (1951). Optimal inventory policy. Econometrica 19(3): 
250–272. 
Baccara M (2007). Outsourcing, information leakage, and consulting firms. RAND J. Econ. 
38(1): 269–289. 
BEA U.S. Department of Commerce (2017). 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm (accessed on 7/5/2017). 
Bellamy MA, Ghosh S, Hora M (2014). The influence of supply network structure on firm 
innovation. J. Oper. Manag. 32(6): 357–373. 
Beltencourt LA, Ostrom AL, Brown SW, Roundtree RI (2002). Client Co-Production in 
Knowledge-Intensive Business Services. Calif. Manage. Rev. 44(4): 100–128. 
Bendoly E, Croson R, Goncalves P, Schultz K (2010). Bodies of Knowledge for Research in 
Behavioral Operations. Prod. Oper. Manag. 19(4): 434–452. 
Beneito P (2006). The innovative performance of in-house and contracted R&D in terms of 
patents and utility models. Res. Policy 35: 502–517. 
 
 131 
Berchicci L (2013). Towards an open R&D system: Internal R&D investment, external 
knowledge acquisition and innovative performance. Res. Policy 42: 117–127. 
Bertrand O, Mol MJ (2013). The antecedents and innovation effects of domestic and offshore 
R&D outsourcing: The contingent impact of cognitive distance and absorptive capacity. 
Strateg. Manag. J. 34: 751–760. 
Bettis RA, Bradley SP, Hamel G (1992). Outsourcing and industrial decline. Acad. Manag. 
Exec. 6(1): 7–22. 
Bhaskaran SR, Krishnan V (2009). Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for 
Collaborative New Product Development. Manage. Sci. 55(7): 1152–1169. 
Bhaskaran SR, Ramachandran K, Semple J (2010). A Dynamic Inventory Model with the 
Right of Refusal. Manage. Sci. 56(12): 2265-2281. 
Bianchi M, Croce A, Dell’Era C, Di Benedetto CA, Frattini F (2016). Organizing for 
Inbound Open Innovation: How External Consultants and a Dedicated R&D Unit 
Influence Product Innovation Performance. J. Prod. Innov. Manag. 33(4): 492–510. 
Booz&Co., Duke University (2007). Offshoring 2.0: Contracting knowledge and innovation 
to expand global capabilities. Service Provider Survey Report. 
Browning TR, Ramasesh RV (2007) A survey of activity network-based process models for 
managing product development projects. Prod. Oper. Manag. 16(2): 217–240. 
Buss P, Peukert C (2015). R&D outsourcing and intellectual property infringement. Res. 
Policy 44: 977–989. 
Cachon GP (2003). Supply Chain Coordination Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts. 
Handbooks OR & MS 11(6): 227–339. 
Cachon GP, Lariviere MA (2005). Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: 
Strengths and limitations. Manage. Sci. 51(1): 30–44. 
Calantone RJ, Stanko MA (2007). Drivers of outsourced innovation: An exploratory study. 
J. Prod. Innov. Manag. 24: 230–241. 
Carrillo JE, Gaimon C (2004). Managing Knowledge-Based Resource Capabilities Under 
Uncertainty. Manage. Sci. 50(11): 1504–1518. 
Carson SJ (2007). When to Give Up Control of Outsourced New Product Development. J. 
Mark. 71(1): 49–66. 
 
 132 
Cassiman B, Veugelers R (2006). In Search of Complementarity in Innovation Strategy: 
Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition. Manage. Sci. 52(1): 68–82. 
Cefis E, Orsenigo L (2001). The persistence of innovative activities: A cross-countries and 
cross-sectors comparative analysis. Res. Policy 30: 1139–1158. 
Cesaroni F (2004). Technological outsourcing and product diversification: Do markets for 
technology affect firms’ strategies? Res. Policy 33: 1547–1564. 
Chatterji D (1996). Accessing external sources of technology. Res. Technol. Manag. 39(2): 
48–56. 
Chen Y, Vanhaverbeke W, Du J (2016). The interaction between internal R&D and different 
types of external knowledge sourcing: an empirical study of Chinese innovative firms. 
R&D Manag. 46(S3): 1006–1023. 
Christensen CM, Baird B (1998). Cultivating capabilities to innovate: Booz-allen and 
hamilton. Harvard Business School Case 9-698-027. 
Clark KB (1989). Project scope and project performance: The effect of parts strategy and 
supplier involvement on product development. Manage. Sci. 35(10): 1247-1263. 
Clark KB, Fujmoto T (1991). Product development performance: Strategy, organization, 
and management in the world auto industry. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA (1989). Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D. Econ. 
J. 99(397): 569–596. 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning 
and Innovation. Adm. Sci. Q. 35(1): 128–152. 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA (1994). Fortune favors the prepared firm. Manage. Sci. 40(2): 
227–251. 
Consoli D, Elche-Hortelano D (2010). Variety in the knowledge base of Knowledge Intensive 
Business Services. Res. Policy 39: 1303–1310. 
Couto V, Lewin AY, Mani M, Manning S, Sehgal V, Russell JW (2007). Offshoring 2.0: 
Contracting knowledge and innovation to expand global capabilities. 
Cui Z, Loch C, Grossmann B, He R (2012). How provider selection and management 
contribute to successful innovation outsourcing: An empirical study at siemens. Prod. 
Oper. Manag. 21(1): 29–48. 
 
 133 
Dodgson M (1993). Learning, trust, and technological collaboration. Human Relations 46: 
77–95. 
Dodin B (1985). Bounding the project completion time distribution in PERT networks. 
Operations Research 33(4): 862–881. 
Du J, Leten B, Vanhaverbeke W (2014). Managing open innovation projects with science-
based and market-based partners. Res. Policy 43(5): 828–840. 
Dyer JH, Singh H (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Interorganizational Competitive. Acad. Manag. Rev. 23(4): 660–679. 
Eccles RG, Kreacic A, Rossano P (2013). A Note on Knowledge Management in Professional 
Services Firms. Harvard Business School Case 9-314-034. 
Eccles RG, Narayandas D, Rossano P (2014). Innovation at the boston consulting group. 
Harvard Business School Case 9-313-137. 
Eliashberg J, Steinberg R (1991). Competitive Strategies for Two Firms with Asymmetric 
Production Cost Structures. Manage. Sci. 37(11): 1452-1473. 
Eppinger SD, Chitkara AR (2006). The New Practice of Global. MIT Sloan Manag. Rev. 
47(4): 22–30. 
Erat S, Kavadias S, Gaimon C (2013). The Pitfalls of Subsystem Integration: When Less Is 
More. Manage. Sci. 59(3): 659–676. 
Ettlie JE, Bridges WP, O’Keefe RD (1984). Organization Strategy and Structural 
Differences for Radical Versus Incremental Innovation. Manage. Sci. 30(6): 682–695. 
Feng Q, Lu LX (2012). The strategic perils of low cost outsourcing. Manage. Sci. 58(6): 
1196–1210. 
Fleming L (2001). Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search. Manage. Sci. 47(1): 
117–132. 
Gaimon C, Ozkan G, Napoleon K (2011). Dynamic resource capabilities: Managing 
workforce knowledge with a technology upgrade. Orga. Sci. 22: 1560–1578. 
Gaimon C, Bailey J (2013). Knowledge management for the entrepreneurial venture. Prod. 
Oper. Manag. 22(6): 429–1438. 
Gaimon C, Hora M, Ramachandran K (2017a). Process capabilities and leveraging advances 
in science and technology. The Routledge Companion to Production and Operations 
 
 134 
Management, ed. (Taylor & Francis Group,NY), 197–213. 
Gaimon C, Hora M, Ramachandran K (2017b). Towards Building Multidisciplinary 
Knowledge on Management of Technology: An Introduction to the Special Issue. Prod. 
Oper. Manag. 26(4): 567–578. 
Geyskens I, Steenkamp JBEM, Kumar N (2006). Make, ally, or buy? A meta-analysis of 
transaction cost theory. Acad. Manag. J. 49(3): 519–543. 
Gibbons R (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press. 
Gnyawali DR, Park BJ (Robert) (2011). Co-opetition between giants: Collaboration with 
competitors for technological innovation. Res. Policy 40(5): 650–663. 
Gooroochurn N, Hanley A (2007). A tale of two literatures: Transaction costs and property 
rights in innovation outsourcing. Res. Policy 36: 1483–1495. 
Grant RM (1996). Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational 
capability as knowledge integration. Organ. Sci. 7(4): 375–387. 
Graves SB (1989). The time-cost tradeoff in research and development: A review. 
Engineering Costs and Production Economics 16: 1–9. 
Grimpe C, Kaiser U (2010). Balancing internal and external knowledge acquisition: The 
gains and pains from R&D outsourcing. J. Manag. Stud. 47(8): 1483–1509. 
Gurnani H, Ramachandran K, Ray S, Xia Y (2014). Ordering Behavior Under Supply 
Risk:An Experimental Investigation. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 16(1): 61–75. 
Haefliger S, von Krogh G, Spaeth S (2008). Code Reuse in Open Source Software. Manage. 
Sci. 54(1): 180–193. 
Hamel G (1991). Competition for competence and interpartner learning within international 
strategic alliances. Strateg. Manag. J. 12: 83-103. 
Hansen MT, Nohria N, Tierney T (1999). What's Your Strategy for Managing Knowledge? 
Harv. Bus. Rev. 77(7): 106–116. 
Hargadon A, Sutton RI (1997). Technology Brokering and Innovation in a Product 
Development Firm. Adm. Sci. Q. 42(4): 716–749. 
Helfat CE, Leonard-Barton D (1994) Firm-specificity in Corporate Applied R&D. Organ. 
Sci. 5(2): 173–184. 
Von Hippel E (2005). Democratizing innovation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). 
 
 135 
Howells J (1999). Research and technology outsourcing. Technol. Anal. Strateg. Manag. 
11(1): 17–29. 
Howells J (2006). Intermediation and the role of intermediaries in innovation. Res. Policy 
35: 715–728. 
Howells J, Gagliardi D, Malik K (2008). The growth and management of R&D outsourcing: 
Evidence from UK pharmaceuticals. R&D Manag. 38(2): 205–219. 
Hsuan J, Mahnke V (2011). Outsourcing R&D: a review, model, and research agenda. R&D 
Management 41(1): 1–7. 
Huang Y, Vir Singh P, Srinivasan K (2014). Crowdsourcing New Product Ideas Under 
Consumer Learning. Manage. Sci. 60(9): 2138–2159. 
Huang YA, Chung HJ, Lin C (2009). R&D sourcing strategies: Determinants and 
consequences. Technovation 29: 155–169. 
Hult G, Ketchen D, Slater S (2004). Information processing, knowledge development, and 
strategic supply chain performance, Academy of Management Journal 47: 241–53. 
IDEO (2017). https://www.ideo.com/work/ (accessed on 1/18/2017). 
Iyer G, Soberman D, Olin JM (2000). Markets for Product Modification Information. Mark. 
Sci. 19(3): 203–225. 
Jap SD, Anderson E (2003). Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity 
Under Ex Post Opportunism. Manage. Sci. 49(12): 1684–1701. 
Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica 47(2): 263–291. 
Kalaignanam K, Kushwaha T, Swartz TA (2017). The Differential Impact of New Product 
Development “Make/Buy” Choices on Immediate and Future Product Quality: Insights 
from the Automobile Industry. J. Mark. 81: 1–23. 
Kamuriwo DS, Baden-Fuller C (2016). Knowledge integration using product R&D 
outsourcing in biotechnology. Res. Policy 45: 1031–1045. 
Katok E, Olsen T, Pavlov V (2014). Wholesale pricing under mild and privately known 
concerns for fairness. Prod. Oper. Manag. 23(2): 285–302. 
Katz R, Allen TJ (1982). Investigating the Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome: A look at 
the performance, tenure, and communication patterns of 50 R&D Project Groups. R&D 
 
 136 
Manag. 12(1): 7–19. 
Keisler JM, Bordley RF (2014). Project management decisions with uncertain targets. 
Decision Analysis 12(1): 15–28. 
Kessler EH, Bierly PE, Gopalakrishnan S (2000). Internal vs. external learning in new 
product development: effects on speed, costs and competitive advantage. R&D Manag. 
30(3): 213–223. 
Ko DG, Kirsch LJ, King WR (2005). Antecedents of Knowledge Transfer from Consultants 
to Clients in Enterprise System Implementations. MIS Q. 29(1): 59–85. 
Krishnan V, Ulrich KT (2001). Product development decisions: A review of the literature. 
Manage. Sci. 47(1): 1–21. 
Krzeminska A, Eckert C (2016). Complementarity of internal and external R&D: is there a 
difference between product versus process innovations? R&D Manag. 46: 931–944. 
Lai E, Riezman R, Wang P (2009). Outsourcing of Innovation. Econ. Theory 38(3): 485–
515. 
Lakhani KR (2008). “InnoCentive.com (A),” Harvard Business School Case, 9–608–170. 
Lariviere MA, Porteus EL (2001). Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only 
contracts. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 3(4): 293–305. 
Laursen K, Masciarelli F, Prencipe A (2012). Regions Matter: How Localized Social Capital 
Affects Innovation and External Knowledge Acquisition. Organ. Sci. 23(1): 177–193. 
Lee HL, Schmidt G (2017). Using Value Chains to Enhance Innovation. Prod. Oper. Manag. 
26(4): 617–632. 
Lee J, Gaimon C, Ramachandran K (2016). An economic model for knowledge outsourcing. 
Working paper, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 
GA. 
Lee J, Gaimon C, Ramachandran K (2017). Knowledge outsourcing for multiple buyers. 
Working paper, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, 
GA. 
Lessard L (2015). Modeling Value Cocreation Processes and Outcomes in Knowledge-
Intensive Business Services Engagements. Service Science 7(3): 181–195. 
Levin DZ, Cross R (2004). The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role 
 
 137 
of Trust in Effective Knowledge Transfer. Manage. Sci. 50(11): 1477–1490. 
Levinthal DA, March JG (1993). The Myopia of Learning. Strateg. Manag. J. 14: 95–112. 
Liu Z, Jayaraman V, Luo Y (2017). The unbalanced indirect effects of task characteristics 
on performance in professional service outsourcing. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 193: 281–293. 
Loch CH (2017). Creativity and Risk Taking Aren’t Rational: Behavioral Operations in 
MOT. Prod. Oper. Manag. 26(4): 591–604. 
Lunsford JL (2007). Jet blues: Boeing Scrambles to Repair Problems With New Plane. Wall 
Street Journal (November 7). 
MacCormack A, Mishra A (2015). Managing the Performance Trade-Offs from Partner 
Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects. Prod. Oper. Manag. 
24(10): 1552–1569. 
Majchrzak A, Cooper LP, Neece OE (2004). Knowledge Reuse for Innovation. Manage. Sci. 
50(2): 174–188. 
Martínez-Noya A, García-Canal E (2016). The framing of knowledge transfers to shared 
R&D suppliers and its impact on innovation performance: A regulatory focus 
perspective. R&D Manag. 46(2): 354–368. 
Martinez-Noya A, Garcia-Canal E, Guillen MF (2013). R&D Outsourcing and the 
Effectiveness of Intangible Investments: Is Proprietary Core Knowledge Walking out of 
the Door? J. Manag. Stud. 50(1): 67–91. 
Mas-Colell A, Michael DW, Jerry RG (1995). Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University 
Press, Inc. 
Menon T, Pfeffer J (2003). Valuing Internal vs. External Knowledge: Explaining the 
Preference for Outsiders. Manage. Sci. 49(4): 497–513. 
Miles I, Kastrinos K, Flanagan K, Bilderbeek R, Den Hertog P, Huntink W (1995). 
Knowledge intensive business services: users, carriers and sources of innovation. Report 
to the EC DG XIII Sprint EIMS Programme, Luxemburg. 
Miotti L, Sachwald F (2003). Co-operative R&D: Why and with whom? An integrated 
framework of analysis. Res. Policy 32: 1481–1499. 
Mowery D, Oxley JE, Silverman BS (1996). Strategic alliances and interfirm knowledge 
transfer. Strateg. Manag. J. 17(SI): 77–91. 
 
 138 
Mowery DC, Rosenberg N (1989). Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth 
(Cambridge University Press). 
Mukherjee AS, Lapre MA, Wassenhove LNV (1998). Knowledge driven quality 
improvement. Manage. Sci. 44(11-part-2): S35–S49. 
Muller E, Zenker A (2001). Business services as actors of knowledge transformation: the role 
of KIBS in regional and national innovation systems. Res. Policy 30: 1501–1516. 
Nakamura K, Odagiri H (2005). R&D boundaries of the firm: An estimation of the double-
hurdle model on commissioned R&D, joint R&D, and licensing in Japan. Econ. Innov. 
New Technol. 14(7): 583–615. 
Narula R (2001). Choosing between internal and non-internal R&D activities: Some 
technological and economic factors. Technol. Anal. Strateg. Manag. 13(3): 365–387. 
Narula R, Santangelo GD (2009). Location, collocation and R&D alliances in the European 
ICT industry. Res. Policy 38: 393–403. 
Nicholls-Nixon CL, Woo CY (2003). Technology sourcing and output of established firms in 
a regime of encompassing technological change. Strateg. Manag. J. 24: 651–666. 
Nooteboom B (2009). A Cognitive Theory of the Firm: Learning, Governance and Dynamic 
Capabilities (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK). 
Osterloh M, Frey BS (2000). Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms. 
Organ. Sci. 11(5): 538–550. 
Ozkan-Seely G, Gaimon C, Kavadias S (2015). Dynamic knowledge transfer and knowledge 
development for product and process design teams. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag. 17(2): 
177–190. 
Pacheco-de-Almeida G, Zemsky P (2007). The timing of resource development and 
sustainable competitive advantage. Manage. Sci. 53(4): 651–666. 
Pisano GP (1990). The R&D boundaries of the firm: An empirical analysis. Adm. Sci. Q. 
35(1): 153–176. 
Pisano GP (1997). The Development Factory Unlocking the Potential of Process Innovation 
(Harvard Business Press, Boston, Massachusetts). 




Powell W, Kenneth WK, Smith-Doerr L (1996). Interorganizational collaboration and the 
locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Adm. Sci. Q. 41(1): 116–
145. 
Porteus EL (1990). Stochastic inventory theory in stochastic models. Handbooks in OR & 
MS 2. 
Probert J, Connell D, Mina A (2013). R&D service firms: The hidden engine of the high-
tech economy? Res. Policy 42: 1274–1285. 
Quinn JB (1999). Strategic outsourcing: Leveraging knowledge capabilities. Sloan Manage. 
Rev. 40(4): 9–21. 
Quinn JB (2000). Outsourcing Innovation: The New Engine of Growth. Sloan Manage. Rev. 
41(4): 13–28. 
Raassens N, Wuyts S, Geyskens I (2012). The Market Valuation of Outsourcing New 
Product Development. J. Mark. Res. 49(5): 682–695. 
Rahmani M, Ramachandran K (2017). Dynamics of delegated search. Working paper, 
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA. 
Ramachandran K, Tereyağoğlu N, Xia Y (2018). Multidimensional Decision Making in 
Operations: An Experimental Investigation of Joint Pricing and Quantity Decisions. 
Manage. Sci. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2919 
Ramsey M (2016). Tesla Sues German Auto Parts Maker Over Model X Door Delays. WSJ 
(January 19). 
Rodríguez A, Nieto MJ (2016). Does R&D offshoring lead to SME growth? Different 
governance modes and the mediating role of innovation. Strateg. Manag. J. 37: 1734–
1753. 
Roels G, Karmarkar US, Carr S (2010). Contracting for collaborative services. Manage. Sci. 
56(5): 849–863. 
Roper S, Arvanitis S (2012). From knowledge to added value: A comparative, panel-data 
analysis of the innovation value chain in Irish and Swiss manufacturing firms. Res. 
Policy 41: 1093–1106. 
Roper S, Hewitt-Dundas N (2008). Innovation persistence: Survey and case-study evidence. 
Res. Policy 37: 149–162. 
Roper S, Hewitt-Dundas N (2015). Knowledge stocks, knowledge flows and innovation: 
 
 140 
Evidence from matched patents and innovation panel data. Res. Policy 44(7): 1327–
1340 
Rothaermel FT, Alexandre MT (2009). Ambidexterity in Technology Sourcing: The 
Moderating Role of Absorptive Capacity. Organ. Sci. 20(4): 759–780. 
Sanchez R, Mahoney JT (1996). Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge management in 
product and organization design. Strateg. Manag. J. 17: 63–76. 
Sanchez R, Heene A (1997). Strategic Learning and Knowledge Management. Wiley. 
Chichester. 
Song J (1994). The effect of leadtime uncertainty in a simple stochastic inventory model. 
Manage. Sci. 40(5): 603–613. 
Spithoven A, Teirlinck P (2015). Internal capabilities, network resources and appropriation 
mechanisms as determinants of R&D outsourcing. Res. Policy 44: 711–725. 
Stackpole CS (2013). A User’s Manual to the PMBOK Guide–Fifth Edition (John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey). 
Stanko MA, Calantone RJ (2011). Controversy in innovation outsourcing research: Review, 
synthesis and future directions. R&D Manag. 41(1): 8–20. 
Steensma HK, Corley KG (2000). On the performance of technology-sourcing partnerships: 
The interaction between partner interdependence and technology attributes. Acad. 
Manag. J. 43(6): 1045–1067. 
Steensma HK, Corley KG (2001). Organizational Context as a Moderator of Theories on 
Firm Boundaries for Technology. Source Acad. Manag. J. 44(2): 271–291. 
Swan KS, Allred BB (2003). A Product and Process Model of the Technology-Sourcing 
Decision. J. Prod. Innov. Manag. 20: 85–496. 
Tavares LV (2002). A review of the contribution of operational research to project 
management. European Journal of Operational Research 136(1): 1–18. 
Terwiesch C, Xu Y (2008). Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem 
Solving. Manage. Sci. 54(9): 1529–1543. 
Tether BS, Tajar A (2008). Beyond industry-university links: Sourcing knowledge for 
innovation from consultants, private research organisations and the public science-base. 
Res. Policy 37: 1079–1095. 
 
 141 
Thrane S, Blaabjerg S, Møller RH (2010). Innovative path dependence: Making sense of 
product and service innovation in path dependent innovation processes. Res. Policy 
39(7): 932–944. 
Tzabbar D, Aharonson BS, Amburgey TL (2013). When does tapping external sources of 
knowledge result in knowledge integration? Res. Policy 42(2): 481–494. 
Van De Vrande V (2013). Balancing your technology-sourcing portfolio: How sourcing mode 
diversity enhances innovative performance. Strateg. Manag. J. 34: 610–621. 
Van Mieghem JA (1999). Coordinating investment, production, and subcontracting. 
Manage. Sci. 45(7): 954–971. 
Veugelers R (1997). Internal R&D expenditures and external technology sourcing. Res. 
Policy 26: 303–315. 
Veugelers R, Cassiman B (1999). Make and buy in innovation strategies: evidence from 
Belgian manufacturing firms. Res. Policy 28: 63–80. 
Vickery SK, Koufteros X, Dröge C, Calantone R (2016). Product Modularity, Process 
Modularity, and New Product Introduction Performance: Does Complexity Matter? 
Prod. Oper. Manag. 25(4): 751–770. 
Walker G, Weber D (1984). A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy Decisions. Adm. 
Sci. Q. 29(3): 373–391. 
Weber, L. (2017, December). Some of the worlds largest employers no longer sell things, 
they rent workers. The Wall Street Journal. 
Weigelt C (2009). The impact of outsourcing new technologies on integrative capabilities 
and performance. Strateg. Manag. J. 30(6): 595–616. 
Weigelt C, Sarkar M (2012). Performance implications of outsourcing for technological 
innovations: Managing the efficiency and adaptability trade-off. Strateg. Manag. J. 33: 
189–216. 
Wu Y (2015). Organizational structure and product choice in knowledge-intensive firms. 
Manage. Sci. 61(8): 1830–1848. 
Xiao W (2012). Essays on Knowledge Management. Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Doctoral Dissertation. 
Xue M, Field JM (2008). Service coproduction with information stickiness and incomplete 




Yan T, Kull TJ (2015). Supplier Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier New Product 
Development: A China-U.S. Study of Antecedents, Consequences, and 
Cultural/Institutional Contexts. Decis. Sci. 46(2): 403–445. 
Zirpoli F, Becker MC (2011). The limits of design and engineering outsourcing: Performance 
integration and the unfulfilled promises of modularity. R&D Manag. 41(1): 21–43. 
 
